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1 Introduction
The purpose of the financial market is to bring buyers of financial assets together, put
a price on time, liquidity and global trade, transfer risks and raise capital. The extent
to which this is possible is very much affected by the degree of financial market
integration. Financial integration facilitates more efficient capital allocation and risk
sharing, and can lead to improved governance and higher growth (Terrones et al.
(2003)). It can also have an impact on the relationship between consumption and
wealth by relaxing the liquidity constraints of consumers. There are however also
adverse effects of financial integration, such as increased risks of financial contagion
and sudden stops of capital flows. Financial integration also enables the build-up of
larger imbalances, which might increase economic and financial market volatility.
This thesis looks at how financial integration and imbalances, either global or
domestic, affect macroeconomic and macrofinancial outcomes such as exchange rate
sensitivity, consumption, international consumption risk sharing or financial sector
development. In addition, it also uses a more appropriate approach to estimate the
degree of risk sharing and to establish the long run linkages between consumption
and wealth. The thesis includes an introductory chapter and four empirical articles,
where the first study in Chapter 2 looks at how the composition of net foreign assets
affects the exchange rate sensitivity to global financial market uncertainty, Chapter
3 uses an unobserved component approach to show how financial integration has
impacted the long run relationship between consumption and asset and housing
wealth, Chapter 4 studies how financial integration and inclusion affects international
consumption risk sharing, and Chapter 5 looks at how deposit dollarization affects
financial development.
The contribution of Chapter 3 is more methodological and shows that financial in-
tegration has increased the consumption-to-wealth ratio. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 instead
highlight some of the shortcomings of the financial markets and conclude that both
external and domestic imbalances can have negative effects on both the real economy
and the financial sector: External imbalances in the form of large net external debt
financing in relation to equity may give rise to exchange rate vulnerabilities (Chapter
2); a domestic imbalance in the form of a large share of hand-to-mouth households
or high income inequality (which might prevent a large share of the population from
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
entering the international financial markets) and a lack of financial reforms have neg-
ative effects in terms of reducing international consumption risk sharing (Chapter 4);
and a domestic imbalance between deposit and credit dollarization reduces financial
development (Chapter 5). Thus, both domestic and external imbalances and the lack
of financial liberalization and integration can lead to increased vulnerabilities and
lower welfare.
More specifically, in the first study in Chapter 2 I look at how the composition
of net foreign assets affect the exchange rate sensitivity to changes in financial mar-
ket risk tolerance. Using a panel of 28 currencies over the period 1/1997-6/2016
I show that debt financing increases the exchange rate sensitivity to financial tur-
bulence, whereas equity financing reduces it. Thus, debt financed imbalances give
rise to much larger swings in the exchange rate during financial market turbulence,
whereas currencies of countries with more FDI or equity financing are much less vul-
nerable to international financial uncertainty. I also look at whether this vulnerability
differs between different owners, and find that private net foreign debt heightens the
exchange rate sensitivity much more than public.
Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Lorenzo Pozzi, shows that financial in-
tegration has affected the long run relationship between consumption and wealth
using a more appropriate methodology than the previous literature. The most com-
mon approach to determine the long-run impact of household wealth on household
consumer expenditures is to estimate a log-linear version of the household intertem-
poral budget constraint as a cointegrating relationship. The evidence in favor of a
stable cointegrating relationship between consumption, assets and earnings is how-
ever weak. Hence, elasticity estimates based on such regressions are unreliable. This
chapter follows an alternative empirical approach using an unobserved component
model applied to US data over the period 1951Q4-2016Q4, where the regression of
consumption on assets and earnings is augmented with a non-stationary unobserved
component. By explicitly estimating - hence controlling for – such a component in
the regression, valid long-run elasticity estimates of consumption to wealth can be
obtained irrespective of whether consumption, assets and earnings are cointegrated.
Our results suggest that there is a non-stationary latent component present in the
consumption equation, and we interpret this component as stemming from financial
liberalization. By relaxing liquidity constraints of consumers, we find that finan-
cial integration has permanently increased the consumption-to-wealth ratio over the
sample period.
Chapter 4 empirically looks at how much consumption risk developed, emerging
and developing countries share internationally, and whether international consump-
tion risk sharing is affected by financial liberalization, integration and the share of
hand-to-mouth consumers in the countries. International consumption risk sharing
should allow countries to internationally diversify away consumption risks, which
3should lead to smoother consumption growth rates and thereby higher welfare. In
a panel of 120 countries from 1970 to 2014, I find that risk sharing is significantly
higher in advanced countries than in emerging or developing economies. I show that
financial liberalization and financial integration has a significantly positive impact
on international consumption risk sharing in poorer developing countries, whereas
emerging market countries seem to have gained less from it. I also find evidence
that a high share of low income individuals or high income inequality reduces con-
sumption smoothing in less developed countries. Lack of financial reforms, a lower
degree of financial integration and higher household poverty rates thus partly ex-
plain why the degree of risk sharing is lower in developing countries than in ad-
vanced economies. Like in Chapter 3, I also find that the international consumption
risk sharing relationship is subject to an unobserved component, which has a differ-
ential impact on the countries in the sample. A second contribution of this paper
is thus using a more appropriate estimation method when analyzing international
consumption risk sharing.
Chapter 5, which is co-authored with Geoffrey Bannister and Jarkko Turunen,
looks at whether dollarization has a positive or negative impact on financial develop-
ment. In this chapter we study the impact of financial dollarization, differentiating
between the impact of foreign currency deposits and credit dollarization, on finan-
cial depth, access and efficiency for a sample of 77 emerging market and developing
countries over the past two decades. Panel regressions estimated using system GMM
show that deposit dollarization, and also the mismatch between aggregate deposit
and credit dollarization, has a negative impact on financial deepening and financial
efficiency. Credit dollarization does not however have a similarly negative impact
on financial development. This finding that deposit dollarization and the dollar-
ization mismatch reduces financial depth and efficiency could be explained by the
observation that banks tend to export the foreign currency rather than extend foreign
currency loans to the economy in case the demand for foreign currency loans is low,
which in turn would lead to lower credit growth and higher net interest margins.
The results suggest that beyond standard concerns related to heightened financial
stability risks, policy efforts to reduce dollarization can spur faster, safer and more
inclusive financial development.

2 Linking net foreign portfolio
debt and equity to exchange rate
movements
2.1 Introduction
There have been large swings in both the financial sector’s risk appetite and in ex-
change rates during the past 10 years, and many countries with large negative net
foreign asset positions have seen their currencies depreciate sharply during times
of global financial market turbulence. Several central banks, especially in emerg-
ing markets, responded to this by conducting substantial currency interventions to
dampen the exchange rate movements and volatility. Different types of external cap-
ital are however heterogeneously influenced by global risk, and the country’s under-
lying foreign debt and asset structure might affect the way the exchange rate reacts
to financial market turmoil. This paper therefore empirically disentangles how the
composition of net foreign assets impacts the sensitivity of exchange rates to global
financial market uncertainty. As many central banks are concerned about the impact
of global financial market shocks on their countries’ exchange rates, a full under-
standing of these mechanisms are important for both policy design and evaluation,
and for predicting future exchange rate movements.
Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) recently proposed a theory of exchange rate determi-
nation based on global imbalances and resulting capital flows in imperfect financial
markets. Financiers absorb the global currency demand imbalances and currency
risk stemming from international trade and financial flows. As the financiers’ risk-
bearing capacity is limited, currencies of countries with large external debts must
offer high expected returns to compensate for the resulting currency risk. Balance
sheet changes of the financial institutions will impact the pricing (or level) of foreign
0I thank Lorenzo Pozzi, Casper de Vries, Agnieszka Markiewicz, Massimo Giuliodori and Vadym
Volosovych for valuable comments, feedback and suggestions. Seminar participants at Erasmus School
of Economics, Tinbergen Institute, RGS, GEP/CEPR, Bank of Finland, Unicredit & SUERF and IFN are
also gratefully acknowledged for their constructive feedback.
6 CHAPTER 2. FOREIGN PORTFOLIO DEBT AND EQUITY
currency lending, which in turn affects the exchange rate.1 Della Corte et al. (2016)
indirectly prove the theory of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) by showing that countries’
external imbalances can explain cross-sectional variation in currency excess returns.
They hypothesize that net debtor countries must offer a currency risk premium in or-
der to compensate investors for taking on the risk and financing the negative external
imbalances, as their currencies tend to depreciate when risk taking is limited. The
vulnerabilities are moreover larger for countries with large foreign currency liabili-
ties, as currencies of countries with difficulties issuing local currency debt tend to be
riskier. Habib and Stracca (2012) also empirically confirm that currencies with large
external imbalances are more vulnerable to swings in the global risk sentiment. This
can also be related to the sudden stop literature that looks at the factors giving rise
to sudden capital flow reversals. That literature has established that external “push”
factors are the main drivers of capital flows, whereas the magnitude of such flows are
determined by domestic “pull” factors (see e.g. Calvo et al., 1993; Fernández-Arias,
1996; Ghosh et al., 2014).
The empirical literature has argued that international capital flows to both ad-
vanced and emerging market economies are procyclical and tend to amplify business
cycle fluctuations.2 However, not all types of capital flows are equally procyclical.
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) note that aggregate FDI and net portfolio equity flows are
generally fairly stable over the financial business cycle. This is partly due to a differ-
ent investor base, but mainly because in a financial crisis the foreign equity investors
absorb the valuation losses, which combined with a local currency depreciation dis-
courages portfolio equity outflows. Foreign subsidiaries moreover often maintain
access to credit through their parent companies during crises, which ameliorates the
capital outflow and exchange rate effect (Blalock and Gertler, 2008). Debt flows, on
the other hand, portray strong procyclicalities. A large share of the debt inflow is
intermediated by banks, and bank lending responds not only to the credit worthi-
ness of the project, but also to the bank’s balance-sheet capacity. Moreover, debt is
subject to maturity mismatch risk as investors may choose to not roll over maturing
debt under uncertain market conditions. Consequently, currencies of countries with
large outstanding net debt liabilities tend to be more vulnerable to changes in the
banking sector risk bearing capacity or the global risk sentiment than countries with
the equivalent net portfolio equity and FDI liabilities. The crash risk for the currency
1Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) note that active exchange rate risk taking is greatly concentrated among
a small number of large financial firms. About 80 % of the exchange rate flows in 2014 was concentrated
among the 10 largest banks, and currency risks also account for a large share of these institutions’ overall
respective risk taking. According to Deutsche Bank’s and Citigroup’s regulatory findings, currency risk
accounted for 17-35 % of total stressed value at risk in 2003. Hence, changes in the risk-bearing capacity
of these large financial institutions can have potentially large impacts on the foreign exchange markets.
Moreover, there is some evidence in the previous literature that financial institutions absorb a part of
the currency risk, see e.g Tai (2005) or Martin and Mauer (2003).
2See Kaminsky et al. (2004), Brunnermeier et al. (2012) Bluedorn et al. (2013), Araujo et al. (2015)
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with large negative net portfolio debt positions should therefore be higher, which
would translate into a higher currency risk premia. Within the sudden stop literature
Levchenko and Mauro (2007) find that especially FDI but also portfolio equity flows
are fairly stable during sudden capital flow stops, whereas portfolio debt and other
flows (such as bank loans and trade credits) experience substantial reversals.
This paper extends the empirical exchange rate and excess currency return lit-
erature that focusses on the impact of global imbalances and the financial sector
risk-bearing capacity in several ways. Studies such as Brunnermeier et al. (2012),
Lustig et al. (2011), Menkhoff et al. (2012) have documented a significant relationship
between global risk and excess currency returns or currency movements. Many pre-
vious studies have looked at the exchange rate impact of international capital flows3,
but fewer studies have looked at the exchange rate impact of a change in the global
risk tolerance, conditional on this country’s net foreign asset position. To the best
of my knowledge, no study has yet properly looked at how the composition of net
foreign assets affects the impact of financial market uncertainty on the exchange rate.
In a panel study of 25 exchange rates against the USD over the period 1/1997-
6/2016, I identify which types of net foreign assets that increase the exchange rate
sensitivity to global risk intolerance. I disentangle how the relationship between the
financial sector risk bearing capacity and different types of foreign capital, such as
portfolio debt, equity, FDI and other investments, affects currency excess returns and
the exchange rate. I differentiate between private and public net foreign assets and
investments, as both public and private investors, but also investors in private and
public debt, generally have different investment horizons and risk bearing capacities.
I moreover show how the relationship between risk intolerance, net foreign assets
and exchange rates differ between G10 and emerging market currencies, and finally
I determine how this relationship has changed over the sample period.
My main findings are that the composition of the net foreign asset position matter
for both the excess currency return and exchange rate sensitivity to changes in global
financial market risk tolerance. Currencies of countries with large net external debt
liabilities, and especially portfolio debt liabilities, are most sensitive to changes in
the financial market risk appetite and banking sector risk. These currencies tend to
depreciate far more in response to a surge in financial market risk intolerance than
countries with smaller net external debt liabilities. Moreover, I find that currencies
of countries with the equivalent negative net foreign equity position are much less
affected by changes in the global risk sentiment. Due to these offsetting exchange
3E.g. Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Alquist and Chinn (2008), Della Corte et al. (2012), Aizenman and
Binici (2015) all suggest that net foreign assets have an impact on nominal exchange rates. Ricci et al.
(2013) and many others have investigated the same impact on real exchange rates.
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rate effects of the external debt and equity positions, the negative impact of financial
market imbalances is underestimated if we look only at the total net foreign assets.
Secondly, I find that the ownership of the net foreign assets affects the exchange
rate sensitivity. Private net foreign liabilities, and especially private net foreign debt,
increase the exchange rate vulnerability much more than public net foreign debt.
Thirdly, although the emerging market currencies are in general more sensitive to
changes in the global financial market volatility index VIX, the net foreign asset po-
sition has a smaller impact on the total effect of a change in risk intolerance on the
exchange rate. Thus, emerging market currencies seem to react more to a change
in risk intolerance, regardless of their underlying net foreign asset position. Finally,
I find that the relationship between banking sector risk intolerance, net external as-
sets and exchange rates has become stronger over time, and especially after the great
financial crisis.
These results are important for risk calculations and hedging decisions, but they
also have important policy implications. In the past, many central banks4 have en-
gaged in currency interventions in order to smooth exchange rate volatility during
times of financial turmoil. These results suggest that policy makers concerned about
a high exchange rate sensitivity to global financial uncertainty could reduce this vul-
nerability by facilitating a shift from debt to equity liabilities. As there are substantial
differences in how debt and equity investments are taxed in most countries, there is
ample scope for intervention.
These results are also important for the evaluation of financial market reforms.
Many emerging market economies have substantial restrictions on foreign owner-
ship of debt, but especially equity products. When evaluating the costs and benefits
of opening up the local financial markets to foreign investors, like for example Saudi
Arabia is currently doing, these findings provide important information on the het-
erogeneous impacts of foreign debt and equity ownership on the exchange rate. From
a financial stability perspective it is crucial for policy makers to know which types of
liabilities that increase the exchange rate vulnerability to the global financial markets,
and which types of assets have a palliative impact. Finally, my findings are also inter-
esting from a corporate finance perspective. Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that if
financial markets are complete, the liability structure should not affect the value of a
firm. If this logic is transferred to the aggregate level, the value of a country’s assets
should not depend on its debt/equity ratio. However, as the price that investors are
willing to pay for a country’s currency depends on the underlying capital structure
in the economy, this implies that the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold on the
aggregate level.
4This includes among others the central banks of Mexico, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia,
Poland, Japan and Switzerland.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the theoretical
framework underlying the model and how different types of capital might affect the
relationship between global risk tolerance and exchange rates. Section 2.3 describes
the method and models, Section 2.4 describes the data, Section 2.5 presents and
discusses the results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Gabaix and Maggiori’s (2015) exchange rate model
The empirical model for this study is inspired by Gabaix and Maggiori’s (2015) two
country model with imperfect markets, where exchange rates are financially deter-
mined by capital flows and the financial sector’s risk bearing capacity. In their model,
households produce tradeable and nontradeable goods, trade in the frictionless in-
ternational goods market and invest with financiers in nominally risk-free bonds.
The international capital flows resulting from households’ investment decisions are
intermediated by financiers, who bear the resulting currency risk. The exchange rate
st is determined by the demand and supply of capital denominated in the different
currencies, where st is defined as the quantity of U.S. dollars bought by 1 unit of
foreign currency. Thus, st determines the strength of the foreign currency and ∆s > 0
implies an appreciation of the foreign currency. The financiers are subject to finan-
cial constraints, which limit their risk-bearing capacity and induce them to demand
a premium for taking on the currency risk. Financiers’ ability to bear risk is denoted
by Γ, where a higher Γ (i.e. lower 1Γ ) implies lower financier risk-bearing capacity.
This imperfect risk-bearing capacity creates a demand function for foreign assets.
By solving the financiers’ constrained optimization problem for a two period model,
they arrive at the financiers’ aggregate demand for assets:
Q0 =
1
Γ
E
[
s0 − s1 R
∗
R
]
(2.1)
The financiers aggregate demand for dollar assets Q0 is decreasing in the strength
of the dollar (s0, where a higher s implies a weaker USD) and the foreign risk-free
interest rate R∗, and is increasing in the U.S. interest rate R and the expected future
value of the dollar (s1).
U.S. exports to the foreign country in time t are denoted as ξt, ıt are the time t U.S.
imports from the foreign country, and the dollar value of the exports is ξtst. Total
U.S. net foreign assets or net exports in the two period model are thereby defined as
NFAt = ξtst− ıt, where a surplus in the first period has to be offset by a deficit in the
second. The market clearing conditions (and the equilibrium USD "flow" demand)
in period 0 and 1 for the USD against the foreign currency, which states that the net
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demand for dollar must be zero, are:
ξ0s0 − ı0 + Q0 = 0 and ξ1s1 − ı1 + RQ0 = 0 (2.2)
By combining equations (2.1) and (2.2) and making the simplifying assumptions R∗ =
R = 1 and ξt = 1 for t = 0, 1 to focus on the key results, Gabaix and Maggiori (2015)
reach the following expression for the period 0 exchange rate:
s0 =
(1+ Γ)ı0 + E[ı1]
2+ Γ
(2.3)
The exchange rate is thus affected by the foreign asset position (ı0 and ı1) and the
financial sector risk intolerance Γ. The net foreign asset position at the end of the
period 0 can be rewritten as NFA0 = ξ0s0 − ı0 = E[ı1]−ı02+Γ . This implies that if the
U.S. has a positive NFA0, and is thereby financing the deficit in the foreign country,
the financiers are long the foreign (debtor) currency and short the creditor currency,
i.e. the US dollar. The financiers need compensation for taking on this resulting
risk, and for them to be willing to absorb the currency risk they must expect the
foreign currency to appreciate.5 This "required" appreciation can occur if the foreign
currency depreciates in time 0.
According to their Proposition 2, the impact of a change in the financial sector
risk bearing capacity Γ on the exchange rate s0 is thus the following:
∂s0
∂Γ
=
−NFA0
2+ Γ
(2.4)
This result implies that if there is a sudden worsening of the financier’s risk-bearing
capacity or a financial disruption, i.e. Γ ↑, countries with a negative net foreign
asset position (NFA0 < 0) see a currency depreciation against the foreign currency
(s ↑), whereas countries with positive net foreign assets appreciate. If we consider
NFA fixed and treat (2.3) as a function of only Γ, f (Γ), by using approximation by
differentials we can use ds0 ≈ ∆s0, where
∆s0 = f ′(Γ)∆Γ =
−NFA0
2+ Γ
∆Γ (2.5)
The same results are reached if R∗ 6= R 6= 1 is assumed and when the time frame is
extended to three periods. A positive interest rate difference between the debtor and
creditor countries would provide incentives for the international investors to finance
the imbalance. During times of worsening funding conditions, the resulting exchange
rate depreciation would thus be dampened by a higher debtor interest rate.
5This can be related to the carry trade, where investors borrow in a low interest rate currency and
invest it abroad under the expectation of obtaining both an interest rate and currency return.
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2.2.2 Different types of foreign capital
There are many different types of foreign assets that differ both in their investor base
and sensitivity to global risk tolerance. Gabaix’s and Maggiori’s (2015) conclusion
that the net foreign asset position affects the way currencies react to changes in the
financial sector risk bearing capacity holds also when different types of net foreign
assets are considered. When foreign debt is added to the model, the impact of a
change in Γ on s is:
∂s0
∂Γ
=
−NFAL0
2+ Γ
+
−NFAD0
2+ Γ
where NFAL0 denotes the net foreign loans and NFA
D
0 the net foreign debt position
needed to finance the imbalance at the end of period 0.
Foreign assets are often separated into debt and equity instruments, or into more
granular classifications such as direct investment, portfolio equity, portfolio debt and
so called "other" investments which includes bank loans etc. Although equity can
be thought of as a debt instrument with infinite maturity, there are however some
substantial differences between these two external sources of financing. Debt creates
leverage, whereas equity does not. Equity financing involves more risk and profit
sharing than debt financing, and debt provides external financing at a fixed cost
whereas for equity the cost of capital varies.
Not all types of foreign assets are equally influenced by the global risk senti-
ment or the financial sector risk bearing capacity. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) explain
that foreign debt flows tend to be much more influenced by the global financial cy-
cle than FDI and foreign equity flows. One reason for this is the different investor
base. A large share of the debt inflow is intermediated by banks, and bank lend-
ing responds not only to the credit worthiness of the project, but also to the bank’s
balance-sheet capacity. During times of higher global risk intolerance, less external
debt is therefore issued. Moreover, during times of high global risk intolerance some
of the existing foreign debt is not rolled over when maturing, but instead repatriated
to the foreign financial institution causing capital outflows. Portfolio debt issued by
banks might also be more affected by business cycle fluctuations than trade credits,
which might make currencies of countries with large foreign debt liabilities more
sensitive to global financial market turbulence. Consequently, debt intermediated by
the banking sector is highly procyclical and more volatile than non-bank debt flows.
Additionally, as equity investments allows for greater risk sharing between creditor
and borrower than debt investments, this increases the riskiness of (portfolio) debt
investments compared to equity and makes debt investments more susceptible to
outflows during times of low financial market risk tolerance.
Foreign equity flows are much less affected by the global risk sentiment. In a
crisis, the foreign equity investors suffer both valuation losses, often in combination
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with a weaker local currency, which discourages portfolio equity outflows. FDI in-
vestments are often sunk in more illiquid assets, and equity related to FDI is likely to
be done by investors with longer term investment horizons and is therefore less in-
fluenced by the business cycle than portfolio investments. Moreover, FDI and equity
investors, often corporations, pension funds or mutual funds, are typically less or not
at all leveraged, which reduces the risk of sudden stops or reversals. As international
debt liabilities are more affected by global risk intolerance than international equity
liabilities, an increase in global risk aversion will lead to much larger capital outflows
from countries with large debt liabilities than from countries with large equity liabili-
ties.6 This explains why, consequently, currencies of countries with large outstanding
net portfolio debt are more vulnerable to changes in the banking sector risk bearing
capacity or the global risk sentiment than countries with the same amount of net
portfolio equity and FDI. When considering the impact of financial market risk intol-
erance on the exchange rate, it is therefore necessary to take into account the type of
assets and liabilities making up a countries’ net foreign asset position.
Net foreign assets generally consist of both private and public foreign assets and
liabilities. The foreign creditors financing public and private debt are also likely to
differ, as private foreign debt is generally perceived as being riskier than government
debt. The higher risk excludes many pension funds and other low risk investors that
generally are less leveraged from investing in the private debt market. Moreover,
many insurance or pension funds are required to invest a substantial share of their
holdings in low risk government bonds. If the investor base for government bonds
and liabilities is less leveraged or has a longer investment horizon than the investor
base for private debt, this might lead to smaller international capital flows in response
to higher risk intolerance. This would in turn mean that the exchange rate is also less
affected by sudden financial market turbulence, which is indeed what I find.
2.3 Method
This section outlines the empirical strategy for studying the dynamics between changes
risk intolerance, different types of global imbalances and the exchange rate or excess
currency returns. As demonstrated in equation (2.4), the impact of a change in risk
intolerance on the exchange rate depends on the net foreign asset position (NFA) of
the country. This study tests this hypothesis empirically with help of an interaction
model that disentangles the exchange rate effect of a change in risk intolerance, RI,
given the net foreign asset position, where RI can be thought of as a proxy for Γ.
After having done this, the NFA position is split into Net Total Debt and Net Total
Equity investments, and finally into different net portfolio, net FDI and net other
6Investments in safe haven currencies such as the JPY, USD and CHF tend however to be exceptions.
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assets, in order to see whether the underlying asset structure has an effect on the
exchange rate impact.
The variable st stands for the log spot exchange rate in the period t in units of USD
(home currency) per foreign currency. Thus, ∆s > 0 implies an appreciation of the
foreign currency against the USD. ft denotes the log forward rate in month t, ∆st+1 =
st+1 − st and f dt = ft − st represents the forward discount. If the covered interest
rate parity (CIP) holds, the forward discount is approximately equal to the interest
differential between the two countries, i.e. ft − st ≈ iUS − i. Monthly unconditional
currency excess returns rxut+1 in period t + 1 are defined as the return from buying a
foreign currency in the forward market and then selling it in the spot market in the
next period t:
rxut+1 = st+1 − ft = st+1 − st + st − ft = ∆st+1 − f dt
The conditional excess currency returns, rxt+1, are defined as the returns from as-
suming a long position in the foreign currency, rxt+1 = st+1 − ft if f dt = ft − st < 0,
(or i > iUS if CIP holds), and a assuming a short position if f dt > 0. Thus
rxt+1 =
st+1 − ft if f dt = ft − st < 0ft − st+1 if f dt > 0 (2.6)
If CIP holds, then this trade is equivalent to the carry trade of going long the foreign
currency and short the USD if i > iUS and vice versa.
2.3.1 Net foreign assets
The basic panel regression equations that look at the interaction of net foreign assets
and financial sector risk intolerance7 on exchange rate changes ∆si,t and excess re-
turns rxi,t of currency i against USD in period t are based on equation (2.5), where
the equation has been augmented with the constitutive terms of the interaction be-
tween net foreign assets to GDP (n f ai,t) and the change in the global financial sector
risk intolerance (∆RIt) and additional control variables. The baseline exchange rate
and excess return models are thus:
∆si,t = β0 + β1∆RIt + β2(n f ai,t∆RIt) + β3n f ai,t + δxi,t−1 + γi + ε i,t (2.7)
rxi,t = β0 + β1∆RIt + β2(n f ai,t∆RIt) + β3n f ai,t + δxi,t−1 + γi + ε i,t (2.8)
7As the indices for risk tolerance used in this study are decreasing in the level of risk bearing capacity,
it is more intuitive for the interpretation of the results to talk about a risk intolerance index rather than
risk tolerance.
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where xit is a vector containing the control variables, the β’s and δ contain the es-
timated coefficients, γi is the currency fixed effect and ε i,t is the error term. It is
however possible that it is not only the net foreign asset position that affects the ex-
change rate, but that the exchange rate also has an impact on the external debts and
liabilities. In order to avoid this simultaneity problem, the beginning of period values
of the net foreign asset positions are used8.
As we have an interaction model the estimated coefficient β1 tells us the exchange
rate impact of ∆RIt when n f ai,t is zero. During times of low financial risk tolerance,
most currencies, with the exception of a few of so called "safe haven currencies", tend
to depreciate and excess returns are lower. Therefore, I expect β1 < 0.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term β2 is expected to be positive
according to Proposition 2 (equation (2.4)) of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015); countries
with negative n f a react stronger to increases in risk intolerance and depreciate more
(remember that ∆s < 0 implies foreign currency depreciation against the USD). When
the risk bearing capacity of the financial sector is good (RI is low), then the excess re-
turns of the net debtor currencies (i.e. countries with n f a < 0) are positive. However,
during times of financial distress when risk intolerance increase, currencies with neg-
ative net external debt positions depreciate due to foreign capital outflows. Typically,
this reduces excess returns as well. Thus, β2 > 0 would indicate that negative net
debt positions increases the exchange rate sensitivity to increases in risk intolerance.
The total impact of ∆RI on exchange rate changes or excess returns is β1 + β2n f a,
where n f a is the average n f a.9
The estimated coefficient β3 on the constituent term n f ai,t tells us the exchange
rate impact of n f ai,t when ∆RIt = 0. If negative net foreign asset positions lead to
currency depreciation or lower excess currency returns when ∆RIt = 0, then β3 > 0.
However, if large negative net foreign asset positions leads to investors demanding
consistently higher currency risk premias when ∆RIt = 0, β3 < 0.
Control variables
Several control variables are included to ensure that the impact of changes in risk
sentiment is correctly identified. As deviations from relative/absolute/trend PPP
give rise to excess currency returns according to among others Coakley and Fuertes
(2001), Habib and Stracca (2012), Jorda and Taylor (2012) and Hossfeld and MacDon-
ald (2015), relative PPP (PPPi,t) is also included. As mentioned in Rossi (2013), in-
terest rate and inflation differentials have an impact on the exchange rate. Moreover,
differences in economic outlooks might also affect the potential return differences in
the stock market, which could also have an impact on the exchange rate. The dif-
8The results are also robust to the use of further lags of the net foreign assets.
9The standard error of this term is se(β1 + β2n f a) =
√
var(β1) + n f a
2
var(β2) + 2n f a cov(β1, β2)
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ference in local stock market performance versus the US (∆stocki,t − ∆S&P), inflation
differentials (pii,t−piUS,t) and 3 month interbank rate differentials (ii,t− iUS,t) (or f di,t)
are therefore included to control for yield differentials. To account for carry trade re-
versals, an interaction term between the interest differential and risk intolerance (here
proxied by VIX), (ii,t − iUS,t) ∗VIXt, is also included like in Habib and Stracca (2012).
Finally, log changes in central bank currency reserves (∆Resi,t) are included to cap-
ture central bank currency interventions. As the exchange rate might have an effect
on inflation, interest rates and stock markets, lags of all the control variables are used
instead of the contemporaneous values to avoid possible simultaneity issues.10
2.3.2 Different types of foreign capital
Net total foreign debt and net total foreign equity
As explained above, not all types of foreign capital flows are procyclical and equally
influenced by the global risk sentiment. To distinguish between the impact of differ-
ent types of net foreign assets on the exchange rate change and excess returns, the
variable n f a is split into 3 components; net total debt11 (nTotDebt), net total equity12
(nTotEquity) and foreign reserve assets (res). Net total debt and net total equity are
the variables of interest and the change in central bank currency reserves, ∆Res, is
included as a control variable in x. The empirical model for the exchange rate impact
is presented below. The same model is also used to study the impact of different
types of net foreign assets and risk intolerance on excess returns (rx).
∆si,t = β1∆RIt + β2(nTotDebti,t∆RIt) + β3(nTotEquityi,t∆RIt)
+β4nTotDebti,t + β5nTotEquityi,t + δxi,t−1 + γi + ε i,t
(2.9)
Currencies with negative net foreign debt assets are expected to be most affected
by the global financial business cycle, as foreign banks often repatriate their capital
during times of low risk tolerance, whereas equity investors are discouraged to sell
their assets due to the depressed equity prices. The estimated coefficient on the
interaction term including net total foreign debt is therefore expected to be positive,
i.e. β2 > 0. Moreover, I also expect β2 to be larger in magnitude than β3, as I
expect net foreign equity liabilities to have a much smaller destabilizing exchange rate
impact. The β1 is again expected to be negative. The total effect of a change in global
risk intolerance RI, as proxied either by VIX or TED, is thus β1 + β2nTotDebt +
10As inflation and the stock market returns are forward looking variables, it might be that current
values of these are correlated with future n f a. To ensure that the results are not driven by inflation,
stock market or interest rate expectations, for robustness further lags of these are also included in the
model.
11Total debt assets include portfolio debt, FDI debt and other debt such as bank loans and deposits,
other loans, trade credits and other accounts payable and receivable.
12Total equity assets include Portfolio equity, FDI equity and other equity.
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β3nTotEquity, where the bar denotes the averages of the series. β4 and β5 tell us the
impact of nTotDebti,t and nTotEquityi,t on ∆si,t when RI is unchanged.
Portfolio debt and equity
There are also substantial differences between different types of debts and equity.
Equity related to FDI is likely to be done by investors with longer term investment
horizons and could therefore be less influenced by the business cycle than portfolio
equity. Also, portfolio debt issued by banks might also be more sensitive to busi-
ness cycle fluctuations than trade credits. The net total debt and net total equity are
therefore split into 4 components; net portfolio equity (nPEquity), net portfolio debt
(nPDebt), net FDI (nFDI) and net "other" investment (nOther). The variables nPDebt,
nPEquity, nOther and nFDI and their interaction with ∆RI are our variables of in-
terest. The model allowing for a differential impact on exchange rate changes ∆s (or
excess returns rx) of the different assets is:
∆si,t = β1∆RIt + β2(nPDebti,t∆RIt) + β3(nPEquityi,t∆RIt)
+β4(nFDIi,t∆RIt) + β5(nOtheri,t∆RIt) + β6nPDebti,t
+β7nPEquityi,t + β8nFDIi,t + β9nOtheri,t + δxi,t−1 + γi + ε i,t
(2.10)
The total impact of a change in RIt on ∆si,t is β1+ β2nPDebt+ β3nPEquity+ β4nFDI+
β5nOther, where the bars again signify averages. If portfolio debt is more highly af-
fected by the risk bearing capacity of the financial market than portfolio equity and
FDI, then the exchange rate of a country with larger net debt would react more
strongly to a change in financial market risk intolerance. Therefore, the estimated
β2 on the interaction term including nPDebt should be much larger than β3 with
nPEquity and β4 with nFDI. The category "other investment" includes a large share
of bank loans. As new bank loans are highly influenced by banking sector risk tol-
erance, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term including nOther, β5, is also
expected to be positive and larger than β3 and β4.
Public and private net foreign debt
The net foreign assets consist of both private and public foreign assets and liabilities.
The foreign creditors financing public and private debt are also likely to differ, both
in their risk tolerance and investment horizon. If the investor base for government
bonds and liabilities is less leveraged or has a longer investment horizon than the
investor base for private debt, this might lead to smaller international capital flows
in response to higher global risk intolerance. This, would in turn mean that the
exchange rate would also be less affected by sudden financial market turbulence. Al-
faro et al. (2014) also note that net public debt flows (sovereign-to-sovereign flows) are
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negatively correlated with growth in developing countries, whereas the correlation
between net private capital inflows and growth is instead positive. As the different
sources and recipients of external financing are heterogeneously related to the real
economy, it could be that the exchange rate response is also affected by the ownership
structure of the net foreign asset position. The exchange rate impact of the size of
private (PRIV) and general government (GOVT) net foreign assets, net total debt, net
portfolio debt and net other investments on the exchange rate is therefore considered
separately as well. Finally as financial institutions might have different investment
objectives than households and other corporations, the private net foreign assets are
also separated into net foreign assets held by deposit taking financial institutions,
BANK, and non-bank sectors (including households), OSECT.
Emerging markets versus G10 currencies
Bluedorn et al. (2013) note that net capital flows have been roughly equally volatile
for emerging market and advanced economies since 1980. Emerging Market invest-
ments, both debt, equity and other investments, are however generally perceived as
being riskier than investments in most of the advanced economies. The higher risk of
emerging market investments compared to similar investments in the G10 currency
countries13 might attract a different foreign investor base and at the same time ex-
cludes some low risk investors that generally are less leveraged. Moreover, Bluedorn
et al. (2013) note that net capital flows to emerging markets are driven primarily by
foreign investors, whereas in advanced economies the net flows are driven by both
foreign and domestic financiers. If the international investor base in the emerging
markets is very different from the one in advanced economies, more leveraged or
affected by the global financial business cycle, this might lead to larger international
capital flows in response to higher risk intolerance. This, would in turn mean that
the exchange rates of the emerging markets would be more affected by sudden fi-
nancial market turbulence. The sample is therefore split into a G10 currency and an
Emerging Market currency sample as well.
An evolving relationship
It is possible that the relationship between imbalances, risk-bearing capacity and ex-
change rates has changed over time for several reasons. First, financial innovation
has led to a wider range of financial products, which allows for different investment
(and hedging) opportunities, which could have an effect on the above mentioned
relationship. Second, changes in financial openness, financial reforms and financial
integration has also altered the characteristics of the capital flows between countries.
13The G10 currency countries are Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Eurozone (EUR), Japan (JPY),
New Zealand (NZD), Norway (NOK), Sweden (SEK), Switzerland (CHF), UK (GBP) and USA (USD).
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Third, changes in banking regulations (both global and domestic) after the recent
financial crisis has also changed the amount and type of risk taking allowed by fi-
nancial institutions. Finally, the global role of the emerging market economies has
evolved over time, which could have had impacted the international capital flow dy-
namics. Also, it might be that the impact of financial market uncertainty was stronger
during the financial crisis than in normal times due to additional negative spill over
effects. I therefore investigate whether these dynamics have changed over time, and
in particular during and after the financial crisis. The sample is therefore split into a
pre financial crisis sample (1/1997-3/2007), a financial crisis sample (4/2007-12/2009)
and a post-crisis sample (1/2010-6/2016).
2.4 Data
The analysis is done using monthly data for an unbalanced panel of 26 advanced
(G10) and Emerging Market (EM) currencies over the period 1/1997 to 6/2016. The
included countries and currencies are listed in Appendix A. Bilateral (end of period)
exchange rates and 1 month forward rates against the USD are downloaded from
Bloomberg. The included currencies are freely floating or at least subject to a man-
aged float for most of the sample period. The observations for currencies which
were temporarily subject to exchange rate pegs or strict capital controls, such as the
1.20 floor on EUR/CHF during 2011-2014, are excluded. The INR is excluded from
1/2014 onward due to the strict capital controls implemented by the Indian govern-
ment since then. EUR is included from 1/1999 onwards. The excess returns rx are
computed as outlined in 2.3 and the cross-sectional averages for both ∆s and rx are
presented in Figure 2.1. The correlation between ∆s and rx in the sample is 0.66.
Figure 2.1: Average ∆s and rx
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External assets and liabilities
Data on total external assets and liabilities, FDI, external portfolio debt assets and
liabilities and the subcomponents are collected from IMF’s Balance of Payments and
International Investment Position Statistics (BoP-IIP, 2016). As these data are only
available at a quarterly frequency, the last known value is used until the data is
updated next quarter. External assets is the USD value of the assets a country owns
abroad, and external or foreign liabilities refers to the USD value of domestic assets
owned by foreigners. Net foreign assets (n f a) is the difference between external assets
and liabilities relative to GDP. Net total debt (nTotDebt), net total equity (nTotEquity),
net portfolio debt (nPDebt), net portfolio equity (nPEquity), net FDI assets (nFDI)
and net other investments (nOther) are defined in a similar manner and depicted in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Net Total Debt consists of Portfolio investment: Debt securities,
Direct investment: Debt instruments and Other investment: Currency and deposits,
loans, Other accounts receivable, Trade credits and advances. Net Total Equity is in
turn made up of portfolio investment: Equity and investment fund shares, Direct
investment: Equity and investment fund shares, and Other investment: Other equity.
Data for the holders of foreign liabilities and assets are also available for many of the
countries in the sample. The underlying net foreign asset positions can therefore be
split into net foreign assets or investments held either by the private sector (n f aPRIV)
or the general government (n f aGOVT). The privately held net assets are in turn made
up of assets and liabilities held by deposit taking corporations, labeled BANK, and
other sectors, OSECT, which includes nonfinancial corporations, households, other
financial corporations and other sectors. The private net foreign position is created
by subtracting the private foreign liabilities from the private foreign assets, and the
same applies to the other ownership positions.
Risk intolerance
This paper uses two different proxies for global financial sector risk intolerance, the
VIX index and the TED spread. The volatility index VIX of the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (CBOE) is a commonly used measure of financial sector risk, which
measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Several papers have found
that the VIX is closely related to different types of financial market risk and risk
intolerance (Collin-Dufresn et al., 2001). A surge in the VIX index (∆VIX > 0) im-
plies higher financial market volatility and typically higher market uncertainty and
risk intolerance. The TED spread is generally used as a measure of the banking sec-
tor risk intolerance. The TED spread is the difference between the 3 month interest
rates on interbank loans (LIBOR) and short-term government debt (T-bills). The TED
spread can be seen as an indicator of credit or banking sector risk, as the short-term
government debt can be considered risk free, whereas the interbank rate reflects the
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Figure 2.2: Different types of foreign assets in the sample
credit risk of borrowing to banks. An surge in the TED spread (∆TED > 0) signals
increased interbank default risks, which implies that the banking sector risk bearing
capacity is lower and risk intolerance is higher. This paper uses a weighted TED
spread which combines the TED spreads of the US, UK, the Eurozone (Germany),
Canada, Switzerland and Japan. The contribution of each country to the weighted
TED spread is determined by their relative GDP. Data for the TED spreads and the
VIX index are downloaded from Bloomberg. To make the VIX and TED series com-
parable, they are normalized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Control variables
As for the control variables, 3 month interbank interest rates and 1 year swap rates,
inflation (CPI), output (GDP), PPP and stock market data are downloaded from
Bloomberg. The interest rate differential is the 3 month interbank rate difference14
between the foreign country and the US. The 1 year swap rate difference is used for
robustness. The stock market differential captures the monthly differences between
the main stock market index of the foreign country versus the US, and the inflation
differential is the difference between foreign and US CPI.15 The change in foreign
currency reserves is defined as the change in foreign reserve assets relative to GDP.
14For Chile the 1 year swap rate difference is used instead of the interbank rate difference.
15To ensure that the results are not driven by a correlation with n f a and future inflation or stock
market returns, as these might be forward looking, in the robustness check the models are also estimated
with 4 month lags of the inflation and stock market return differentials.
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Figure 2.3: Total foreign debt vs. total foreign equity in the sample
2.5 Results
The results from models (2.7) - (2.10), which regress exchange rate changes or excess
currency returns on net foreign assets, changes in risk intolerance and the interaction
of these two are presented below. The models are estimated both without and with
control variables16 for the full sample, and for the subsamples of G10 and Emerging
Market (EM) currencies. As it is possible that the impact of external assets and
liabilities has changed over time due to either changes in financial market integration
or regulation, or because the relationship might have been different during the great
financial crisis, the sample is also split into three subperiods, one before the financial
crisis, 1/1997-3/2007, a crisis period 4/2007-12/2009 and one after the financial crisis,
1/2010-6/2016.
2.5.1 Net foreign assets
First, the results from models (2.7) and (2.8) that look at the impact of total n f a on
the exchange rate or excess returns are presented below. As can be seen from Table
2.1, the coefficients on the change in global risk intolerance ∆RI, as proxied either
by an increase in financial market volatility, ∆VIX, or banking sector uncertainty,
∆TED, and on the interaction terms of n f a and a change in risk intolerance, are
significant and of the expected sign. The negative estimated coefficient on ∆RI, βˆ1,
implies that an increase in RI leads to a significant currency depreciation against the
USD (as ∆s < 0 imply foreign currency depreciation) and a reduction in currency
16For the sake of space the control variables are not presented in the tables included in the text. The
full tables with the control variables for a selection of the models can be found in the appendix.
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excess returns rx in countries with zero net foreign assets.17 When the sample is
split into G10 and EM currencies, the same conclusion can be drawn and the Chow
tests18 does not reject the null hypothesis of no structural differences between the two
subsamples.
The interaction effect of a change in risk intolerance, as measured either by ∆VIX
or ∆TED, and n f a on both ∆s and rx is significant in both the full, crisis and the
post-crisis sample, and the coefficient on the interaction term is positive. The positive
coefficients imply that countries with negative net foreign assets (n f a < 0) pay lower
excess currency returns and depreciate in case of a sudden worsening of the financial
market sentiment (∆VIX or ∆TED > 0). Countries with a positive net foreign asset
position, on the other hand, experience a much smaller currency depreciation (if
at all any) and pay relatively higher excess currency returns when risk intolerance
increase.19
The total estimated impact on ∆s or rx of a change in RI is βˆ1 + βˆ2n f a. As an
illustration, the results in column (ii) suggest that a one standard deviation increase
in the VIX volatility index would depreciate currencies with no net foreign assets
by 1.44 % against the USD. However, countries with negative net foreign assets will
experience a much larger depreciation. For example Mexico, which has an average
negative n f a among the net debtor countries, would depreciate by an additional 0.27
%-points against USD, so in total by 1.7 %. The exchange rate impact of the increase
in VIX is thus almost 20 % larger for the MXN than for a country with zero net foreign
assets. The effect on a net creditor currency like the Swiss franc, CHF, is the opposite.
Due to its positive net foreign asset, the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the VIX index is much smaller and results in CHF depreciating by only 0.48 %
against the USD. The total impact of a change in risk intolerance on the dependent
variable, Avg. ∆RI impact, for the average n f a position is also reported in the tables.
As the average n f a position in the sample is rather small (and globally it should be
zero), the average ∆RI impact is however fairly close to the estimated impact of ∆RI
for when n f a = 0.
The estimated interaction coefficients including ∆TED are all much smaller in
magnitude compared to the ones including ∆VIX for the full sample, and the av-
erage impact of a change in VIX is in most cases twice as large compared to the
17A lagged dependent variable was initially included in the models, but as it was in most cases
close to zero and rarely significant, and the panel Durbin Watson test indicates the absence of serial
correlation, it was excluded. When lags of the interaction terms are added to the models, the sign of
the estimated coefficients on lagged interaction variables are in most cases positive but insignificant.
18The Chow test for structural stability tests whether the true coefficients of the linear regressions on
different datasets are identical.
19Proposition 7 in GM (2015) states that low risk bearing capacity in period 0 implies that the required
expected currency returns must be higher for the financiers to be willing to undertake the investment.
Lags of the change in the risk intolerance are used to test whether a drop in the risk bearing capacity in
the previous period leads to higher excess currency returns. The results are however insignificant and
not reported here.
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same change in TED. The R¯2 is also substantially higher for the models using VIX to
proxy risk intolerance as compared to the ones using TED. It thus seems like in the
full sample between 1997-2016, the main channel through which large external debt
positions affect the exchange rate or excess returns is via the change in financial mar-
ket volatility and the uncertainty resulting from that, rather than via banking sector
uncertainty. The same conclusion holds for the G10 and EM subsamples, presented
in the lower panel of Table 2.1.
However, when the sample period is split into pre-, crisis and post-crisis periods
in Table 2.2, this changes, and the Chow test points to structural instabilities in the
relationship. After the financial crisis, the change in the TED spread seems to have
a much larger exchange rate impact than before the crisis, and of similar magnitude
as the VIX, as both the interaction coefficient in columns (x) and (xii) are much larger
than in the pre-crisis and crisis models, and the R¯2 is also higher.20 Thus, the impact
of banking sector risk for the exchange rate vulnerability seems to have increased
since the financial crisis. These results thus imply that a policy maker concerned
about exchange rate volatility should be more alert when the private net foreign
liabilities are large. Also, as the impact of the banking sector uncertainty has become
stronger in the past years, this also warrants more attention now than 20 years ago.
The net foreign assets are finally split into private (n f aPRIV) and general gov-
ernment holdings (n f aGOVT), with the results for the full and the post-crisis sample
presented in Table 2.3. The coefficients for the full and the post-crisis estimates are
not significantly different from each other in the estimations involving ∆VIX, but
the coefficients on the models including ∆TED are somewhat larger in the post-crisis
period than in the full sample. The impact of private negative net foreign assets
on the exchange rate sensitivity is much larger than that of negative public ones, as
is suggested by the much larger and more significant coefficients on the interaction
terms involving the private net external assets. Instead, negative government n f a
holdings seem to ameliorate the exchange rate response to an increase in the TED
spread, as suggested by the significantly negative interaction coefficient in column
(iii) (although this is no longer the case in the post-crisis sample). When the posi-
tions are split into private net foreign assets held by the banking sector (n f aBANK)
and other sectors (n f aOSECT), the results suggest that the effect is the largest for net
foreign liabilities held by the banking sector. Thus, negative private net foreign assets
seem to be the channel through which the vulnerability arises.
20Similar results are also obtained if the post-crisis sample starts in 2011 or 2012 after the onset and
worst part of the European debt crisis.
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Full sample
Dep. Var ∆s rx
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
∆VIX -1.520∗∗∗ -1.438∗∗∗ -1.602∗∗∗ -1.449∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.086) (0.091) (0.087)
∆TED -0.810∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.116) (0.118) (0.119)
∆VIX*nfa 0.882∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.127) (0.134) (0.127)
∆TED*nfa 0.403∗∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.421∗∗
(0.172) (0.167) (0.175) (0.170)
nfa 0.228 -0.014 0.269 0.000 0.233 -0.017 0.274 0.006
(0.227) (0.235) (0.231) (0.242) (0.233) (0.240) (0.237) (0.247)
Avg.∆RI impact -1.606∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗ -0.849∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -1.690∗∗∗ -1.527∗∗∗ -0.897∗∗∗ -0.829∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 5,175 4,861 5,175 4,861 4,959 4,752 4,959 4,752
R¯2 0.082 0.115 0.012 0.053 0.092 0.132 0.013 0.070
DW 1.97 2.05 1.94 2.01 1.98 2.06 1.95 2.02
G10 currencies EM
Dep. Var ∆s rx ∆s rx
(ii) (iii) (vi) (vii) (ii) (iii) (vi) (vii)
∆VIX -1.208∗∗∗ -1.209∗∗∗ -1.623∗∗∗ -1.647∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.135) (0.106) (0.107)
∆TED -0.537∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -1.023∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.167) (0.158) (0.166)
∆VIX*nfa 1.048∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.233) (0.130) (0.129)
∆TED*nfa 0.558∗ 0.557∗ 0.145 0.156
(0.316) (0.316) (0.169) (0.173)
nfa -0.711∗ -0.784∗ -0.740∗ -0.813∗∗ 0.361 0.409 0.625∗∗ 0.716∗∗
(0.395) (0.406) (0.396) (0.406) (0.293) (0.300) (0.300) (0.308)
Avg.∆RI impact -1.185∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗ -0.523∗∗∗ -1.718∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗ -1.739∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25) (0.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9 9 9 9 16 16 16 16
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 1,930 1,930 1,930 1,930 2,931 2,931 2,822 2,822
R¯2 0.093 0.047 0.096 0.049 0.136 0.065 0.162 0.091
DW 2.04 2.01 2.04 2.00 2.06 2.01 2.07 2.03
Chow 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.13
Note: White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 %
levels, respectively. Constant and currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 n f a,
where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED. DW refers to the panel Durbin-Watson test statistic for
serial correlation and Chow to the Chow test for poolability of the EM and G10 sample, with H0 : no
structural difference between the samples.
Table 2.1: Panel regression of models (1) and (2)
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Before the crisis, 1/1997-3/2007 Crisis, 4/2007-12/2009 After the crisis, 1/2010-6/2016
Dep. Var ∆s rx ∆s rx ∆s rx
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
∆VIX -0.363∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -2.524∗∗∗ -2.551∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗∗ -1.432∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.144) (0.247) (0.247) (0.119) (0.119)
∆TED -0.341∗∗ -0.351∗∗ -1.088∗∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -1.383∗∗∗ -1.387∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.151) (0.213) (0.213) (0.348) (0.348)
∆VIX*nfa 1.014∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.215) (0.299) (0.298) (0.165) (0.165)
∆TED*nfa 0.068 0.059 0.404∗ 0.404∗ 0.853 0.848
(0.235) (0.241) (0.237) (0.237) (0.548) (0.547)
nfa 0.859∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 3.082∗∗ 3.819∗∗ 3.096∗∗ 3.845∗∗ 1.247∗ 1.496∗ 1.257∗ 1.510∗
(0.317) (0.316) (0.305) (0.304) (1.540) (1.589) (1.534) (1.584) (0.753) (0.781) (0.753) (0.781)
Avg. ∆RI -0.46∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗ -2.587∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -2.61∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.46∗∗∗ -1.45∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.45∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.00) (0.25) (0.22) (0.12) (0.35) (0.12) (0.35)
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
T 122 122 122 122 33 33 33 33 78 78 78 78
Obs 2,174 2,174 2,065 2,065 812 812 812 812 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875
R¯2 0.043 0.034 0.068 0.060 0.245 0.142 0.242 0.135 0.194 0.114 0.194 0.112
DW 2.04 2.02 2.03 2.00 2.14 2.01 2.13 2.00 2.28 2.26 2.28 2.27
Chow 9.01∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗ 7.67∗∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗ 9.01∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗ 7.67∗∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗ 9.01∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗ 7.67∗∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗
Note: White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively. Constant, control variables and currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 n f a, where RI
is proxied either by VIX or TED. DW refers to the panel Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation. Chow refers
to the Chow test for structural stability of the parameters in the different subsamples, with H0 : structural stability.
Table 2.2: Panel regression of models (1) and (2) for the different time periods
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Full sample 1/1997-6/2016 Post-crisis sample 1/2010-6/2016
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
∆VIX -1.0649∗∗∗ -0.9028∗∗∗ -0.9671∗∗∗ -0.7918∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.130) (0.157) (0.183)
∆TED -0.8619∗∗∗ -0.7249∗∗∗ -0.6716 -0.3205
(0.172) (0.172) (0.512) (0.556)
∆VIX*nfaPRIV 1.6200∗∗∗ 1.3484∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.402)
∆VIX*nfaGOVT 0.1924 0.5642∗ 0.2552 0.5886∗
(0.286) (0.307) (0.280) (0.325)
∆VIX*nfaOSEC 1.4388∗∗∗ 1.0950∗∗
(0.291) (0.473)
∆VIX*nfaBANK 3.3893∗∗∗ 3.2025∗∗∗
(0.774) (1.052)
∆TED*nfaPRIV 1.0561∗∗∗ 2.5263∗∗
(0.298) (1.273)
∆TED*nfaGOVT -1.6458∗∗ -1.2587 -0.3404 0.1451
(0.779) (0.879) (0.939) (1.048)
∆TED*nfaOSEC 1.1958∗∗∗ 2.2536
(0.324) (1.404)
∆TED*nfaBANK 1.4422 5.7234∗
(0.957) (3.085)
N 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20
T 233 233 233 233 78 78 78 78
Obs 3,209 3,629 3,209 3,629 1,382 1,437 1,382 1,437
R¯2 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.12
DW 2.09 2.08 2.04 2.04 2.26 2.27 2.23 2.26
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed
effects included.
Table 2.3: Panel regression of model (1) for the full and post-crisis sample
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2.5.2 Different types of foreign capital
Net total debt and net total equity
As not all types of capital are equally affected by the business cycle, the foreign as-
sets are first split into two components, net total debt, (nTotDebt) and net total equity
(nTotEquity). This allows us to see whether net external debt, consisting of port-
folio debt, bank loans and "other debt", has a different impact on the exchange rate
than net foreign equity (portfolio equity, direct investment equity and "other equity").
Moreover, it tells us whether currencies with negative net foreign total debt are more
sensitive to risk sentiment changes than countries with similar net foreign total eq-
uity positions. As the results for using ∆s and rx as dependent variables are fairly
similar and rarely significantly different from each other, only the results using ∆s are
presented for the sake of space. The conclusions regarding the relationship between
net foreign assets, ∆RI and ∆s thus also apply for the excess currency returns.
As can be seen from Tables 2.4 and 2.5, in both the full sample and in the sub-
samples, the estimated coefficients on the ∆RI proxies are all negative and in most
cases significant. The negative coefficients on the ∆RI terms again imply that coun-
tries with zero net total debt and equity experience a currency depreciation against
the USD when global risk intolerance increases. The interaction terms including
nTotDebt and the change in either VIX or the TED spread are positive and significant
in almost all models (with the exception of column (iv) in the EM sample and (vi)
for the pre-crisis period in Table 2.5). The positive and significant interaction terms
imply that negative net total debt positions increase the exchange rate sensitivity to
surges in risk intolerance so that the currency depreciates even further, whereas coun-
tries with positive net total debt depreciate much less or not at all. Alternatively, in
case the risk sentiment improves (∆RI < 0), currencies of countries with positive net
debt positions appreciate more against the USD than currencies with negative debt
positions. The impact of net equity positions on the exchange rate sensitivity is small
and insignificant in most cases, however for the EM currencies the results indicate
that currencies of countries with net equity liabilities tend to appreciate rather than
depreciate when the global risk intolerance increases.
When the sample is split into G10 and EM currencies in Table 2.5, two observa-
tions can be made. First, the coefficients on both ∆VIX and ∆TED are much larger
for the EM than for the G10 currencies, implying that EM countries with no net debt
or equity experience much larger depreciations against the USD than the G10 cur-
rencies. The average impact of a change in risk intolerance on the exchange rate is
moreover significantly larger for the EM than for the G10 currencies, even though
the interaction term on total debt and risk intolerance is smaller. This suggests that
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Dep. Var: ∆s
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
∆VIX -1.201∗∗∗ -1.227∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.091)
∆TED -0.717∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.115)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.368∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.204)
∆VIX*nTotEquity 0.229
(0.281)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.599∗∗ 0.499∗∗
(0.244) (0.246)
∆TED*nTotEquity 0.565
(0.459)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.492 -1.492 -0.885 -0.828
N 25 25 25 25
T 233 233 233 233
Obs 4,703 4,888 4,703 4,888
R¯2 0.116 0.117 0.052 0.053
DW 2.07 2.05 2.03 2.01
Note: White SE in parentheses.Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and
currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity.
Table 2.4: Panel regression of model (3) for the full sample
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the EM currencies are much more vulnerable to changes in the global risk sentiment
than the G10 currencies, regardless of their net foreign debt or equity positions.
When the sample is divided into a pre-crisis, crisis and a post-crisis sample to
see whether the relationship between ∆s, ∆RI and nTotDebt has stayed constant over
time, the Chow test again suggest that there are structural differences between the
samples. As can be seen from columns (v) to (x) in Table 2.5, the impact of changes
in VIX has been fairly constant over the full currency sample, which raises suspicions
that the significant Chow statistic is driven by some large residuals during the crisis
period. The impact of banking sector uncertainty, TED, is however much larger after
the crisis. The interaction effect between net total debt and the TED spread is much
stronger in the post-crisis sample, which suggests a tighter relationship between the
banking sector and foreign exchange markets now than during the beginning of this
millennium. My results thus suggest that the interaction between net total debt and
banking sector risk intolerance has a much larger impact on the exchange rate since
the financial crisis. The substantially higher R¯2 also confirm that the factors included
in the models explain a larger share of the variation in ∆s since the credit crisis.
The total exchange rate or excess return impact of a change in risk intolerance,
RI, is βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity. As the average net debt and net equity
position in the sample are rather small (as the sample consists of both net debtor and
net creditors), the average total impact of a change in risk intolerance is fairly close
to the impact for nTotDebt and nTotEquity=0. Figure 2.4 therefore illustrates how the
different currencies in the sample respond to changes VIX and TED. According to
the figure, reactions between the different currencies vary substantially. An increase
in the VIX index or the TED spread causes the CHF to appreciate against the USD,
whereas the HUF, NZD and TRY depreciate the most due to their countries’ large
negative net debt positions. Again can be seen that the impact of the banking sector
risk intolerance, the TED spread, has a much smaller impact on the exchange rate
and excess returns than a change in the VIX index.
When the net total debt positions are split into private and public holdings Table
2.6, the results suggest that private net total debt increases the exchange rate sensi-
tivity to the VIX index more than two times more than private net total debt in both
the full and the post-crisis period. The estimates including VIX are not significantly
different in the full and post-crisis sample, but the TED estimates in column (x) are
somewhat larger. The results in column (v) indicate that only private net debt makes
the exchange rate respond stronger to a change in banking sector risk bearing capac-
ity, although the reaction is much smaller than compared to the change in VIX. When
the net private debt is split into banking sector holdings and non-bank holdings, the
interaction between non-bank holdings and the VIX seem to move the exchange rate
the most.
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G10 currencies Emerging Markets Before the crisis, Crisis, After the crisis,
01/1997-06/2016 01/1997-03/2007 4/2007-12/2009 1/2010-06/2016
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆VIX -0.786∗∗∗ -1.849∗∗∗ -0.107 -2.414∗∗∗ -1.152∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.200) (0.150) (0.277) (0.131)
∆TED -0.314∗ -0.905∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗ -1.036∗∗∗ -0.958∗∗
(0.185) (0.287) (0.151) (0.227) (0.405)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.554∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.267) (0.253) (0.468) (0.310)
∆VIX*nTotEquity -0.114 -1.466∗∗ 0.877 -0.120 -0.050
(0.400) (0.719) (0.626) (0.908) (0.324)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.611∗ 0.270 -0.048 0.700∗ 2.061∗∗
(0.336) (0.355) (0.291) (0.380) (1.001)
∆TED*nTotEquity -1.345 0.715 1.168∗ 0.065 -0.292
(0.882) (0.930) (0.620) (0.719) (1.037)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.132 -0.616 -1.732 -1.119 -0.404 -0.447 -2.610 -1.155 -1.465 -1.456
N 9 9 16 16 24 24 24 24 25 25
T 233 233 231 231 122 122 33 33 78 78
Obs 1,930 1,930 2,773 2,773 2,064 2,064 779 779 1,860 1,860
R¯2 0.100 0.049 0.139 0.066 0.044 0.039 0.237 0.133 0.195 0.113
DW 2.05 2.01 2.09 2.04 2.09 2.06 2.15 2.02 2.27 2.27
Chow 1.38∗ 1.28 1.38∗ 1.28 8.59∗∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗ 8.59∗∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗ 8.59∗∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed effects included. Avg.
∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED. DW refers to the panel
Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation. Chow refers to the Chow test for structural stability of the
parameters in the different subsamples, with H0 : structural stability.
Table 2.5: Panel regression of model (3) for the different currency samples and time periods
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Figure 2.4: Total effect of ∆RI taking the impact of nTotDebt and nTotEquity into
account
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My findings that large debt liabilities increase the exchange rate sensitivity to
financial market risk intolerance are in line with Gabaix’s and Maggiori’s (2015) ex-
change rate theory, which hypothesizes that currencies of net debtor countries de-
preciate in case of a sudden deterioration in the market sentiment. They posit that
the main channel which this effect operates through is the balance sheet channel of
banks. If there is a deterioration in the bank’s risk bearing capacity, this leads the
bank to reprice their currency lending which in turn affects both capital flows and
the exchange rate. If that was the case here, one would expect especially the coeffi-
cient on the interaction between ∆TED and n f a to be positive and significant, and of
much larger magnitude than the coefficients on the terms including VIX. Although
the coefficient was mostly significant and positive as expected, it is only in the post-
crisis period that TED has had a larger impact on the exchange rate vulnerability
than VIX. Also, in all the models that use the TED spread as the measure of risk
intolerance produced substantially smaller R¯2’s than the same models that use VIX
instead. This would suggest that it is not only the banking sector risk bearing capacity
that plays a role, but also the risk bearing capacity of other financial market players.
My finding that the influence of ∆TED has become stronger after the financial crisis
however gives support to Gabaix and Maggiori’s (2015) theory that the exchange rate
vulnerability originates from changes in the international financial sector risk bearing
capacity.
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Full sample Post-crisis sample
1/1997-6/2016 1/2010-6/2016
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆VIX -0.897∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.197) (0.123) (0.187) (0.164)
∆TED -1.112∗∗∗ -1.325∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.565 -0.829∗
(0.279) (0.306) (0.173) (0.693) (0.474)
∆VIX*nTotDebtPRIV 3.203∗∗∗ 3.078∗∗∗
(0.618) (0.756)
∆VIX*nTotDebtGOVT 1.336∗ 1.206∗ 1.466∗∗
(0.692) (0.692) (0.719)
∆VIX*nTotDebtOSEC 5.295∗∗∗ 4.417∗∗∗ 4.139∗∗∗
(1.253) (0.978) (1.379)
∆VIX*nTotDebtBANK 2.228∗∗ 2.199∗∗∗ 2.074∗∗
(0.895) (0.762) (1.010)
∆TED*nTotDebtPRIV 1.747∗
(0.948)
∆TED*nTotDebtGOVT -1.677 -1.331 0.392
(1.651) (1.660) (2.190)
∆TED*nTotDebtOSEC 5.568∗∗∗ 1.748 6.412 8.682∗∗
(1.888) (1.348) (4.805) (4.196)
∆TED*nTotDebtBANK 0.041 1.022 4.653 4.308
(1.244) (0.959) (3.228) (2.866)
Avg. ∆RI impact -0.90 -1.05 -1.28 -1.11 -1.32 -0.91 -0.70 -1.15 -0.57 -0.83
N 12 12 19 12 12 19 12 19 12 19
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 78 78 78 78
Obs 1,690 1,690 3,250 1,690 1,690 3,250 867 1,405 867 1,405
R¯2 0.143 0.143 0.129 0.080 0.081 0.061 0.190 0.199 0.114 0.122
DW 2.11 2.11 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.03 2.23 2.27 2.23 2.26
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed
effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX
or TED.
Table 2.6: Panel regression of model (3) for the full and post-crisis sample
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Net portfolio debt and equity, net FDI and net Other investment
The net foreign assets are eventually split into four different components, net portfo-
lio debt (nPDebt), net portfolio equity (nPEquity), net portfolio FDI (nFDI) and net
other investment (nOther), where the "other investments" include among other items
bank loans and trade credits. As can be seen from the results in Table 2.7, the positive
interaction coefficients on nPDebt and nOther suggest that negative net foreign port-
folio debt and negative net foreign other investments lead to a significantly larger
currency depreciation during times of financial turbulence than countries with pos-
itive net positions in the full sample. The less cyclical net external portfolio equity
holdings seems to insulate the exchange rate from an increase in financial market
risk aversion, as suggested by the negative coefficients on the interaction terms in-
cluding nPEquity and VIX in columns (i) and (ii). These results imply that currencies
of countries with large negative portfolio debt holdings and negative net other in-
vestments (which consists to a large extent of bank loans) are the most vulnerable
to a sudden worsening in the global financial market risk sentiment. Currencies of
countries that have the same amount of outstanding external liabilities in portfolio
equity are however not affected by swings in the market sentiment to the same extent.
Thus, negative net external portfolio debt increases the exchange rate vulnerability
to financial market volatility, whereas external portfolio equity reduces this impact
somewhat. As a large share of the portfolio debt inflow is intermediated via foreign
banks whose risk bearing capacity decreases during times of financial uncertainty, an
increase in risk intolerance translates into larger currency depreciation for countries
with large portfolio debt liabilities and bank loans. The result that changes in bank-
ing sector risk, as measured by ∆TED gives support to this hypothesis. However, as
the exchange rate impact of ∆TED is again much smaller than ∆VIX, this suggests
that it is not only the banking sector risk that matter for the exchange rate sensitiv-
ity to global risk aversion, but that risk intolerance of other financial market players
matter as well.
The sensitivity of the currencies in the sample to changes in global financial mar-
ket risk intolerance are illustrated in Figure 2.5. Again, the CHF is associated with
only a tiny exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) in case of a sudden increase
(decrease) in RI, whereas the reaction of the NZD, HUF and CLP to changes in VIX
is over 50 % larger than for the average currency in the sample. The impact of a
change in banking sector risk intolerance, as measured by ∆TED, on the exchange
rate is much smaller than for ∆VIX, and moreover less significant, especially when
the sample is split into subsamples or subperiods in Table 2.8.
When I look at how the relationship between different types of net foreign as-
sets, global risk intolerance and exchange rates has changed over time (Table 2.8),
I again find that the impact of banking sector risk bearing capacity, TED, has be-
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come stronger after the financial crisis, although it is only significant at the 10 %
significance level. There is also some weak evidence pointing to negative net foreign
portfolio equity reducing the exchange rate sensitivity to swings in global risk toler-
ance. The significantly higher R¯2 after the crisis also point to global risk intolerance
and external imbalances playing a much bigger role for both exchange rate move-
ments and excess currency returns. As the Chow test indicates structural instability
in the series over time, more weight should be given to the post-crisis results.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
∆VIX -1.089∗∗∗ -1.188∗∗∗ -1.279∗∗∗ -1.456∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.123) (0.117) (0.087)
∆TED -0.562∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗∗ -0.698∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.147) (0.116) (0.146)
∆VIX*nPDebt 1.139∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.232) (0.219) (0.216)
∆VIX*nPEquity -0.631∗ -0.939∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.320)
∆VIX*nFDI 0.687
(0.427)
∆VIX*nOther 3.112∗∗∗ 1.995∗∗∗ 1.703∗∗
(1.060) (0.735) (0.717)
∆TED*nPDebt 0.083 0.345 0.494∗
(0.287) (0.281) (0.275)
∆TED*nPEquity -0.222
(0.668)
∆TED*nFDI 1.006∗
(0.549)
∆TED*nOther 2.638∗ 1.593∗ 0.906
(1.464) (0.875) (0.964)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.58 -1.48 -1.52 -1.50 -0.99 -0.87 -0.86 -0.81
N 23 24 25 25 23 25 25 25
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 4,414 4,640 4,814 4,814 4,414 4,814 4,814 4,888
R¯2 0.118 0.113 0.115 0.114 0.054 0.053 0.052 0.052
DW 2.07 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.01
Note: Dependent variable ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constituent terms, controls and currency fixed
effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nPDebt + βˆ3 nPEquity + βˆ4 nFDI + βˆ5 nOther, where RI is
proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.7: Panel regression of model (4) for the full sample
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G10 EM Before the crisis, Crisis, After the crisis,
1/1997-3/2007 4/2007-12/2009 1/2010-6/2016
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆VIX -0.834∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ -0.136 -2.590∗∗∗ -1.087∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.213) (0.195) (0.357) (0.161)
∆TED -0.392∗∗ -1.081∗∗∗ -0.343∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -0.701
(0.195) (0.297) (0.186) (0.274) (0.494)
∆VIX*nPDebt 1.304∗∗∗ 1.596∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.572) (0.330) (0.599) (0.316)
∆VIX*nPEquity -0.538 -1.523∗ -0.354 -1.976∗ -0.792∗∗
(0.417) (0.810) (0.809) (1.170) (0.379)
∆VIX*nOther 4.714∗∗ -0.373 1.744∗ 0.664 2.318∗∗
(2.086) (1.000) (0.946) (2.070) (1.123)
∆TED*nPDebt -0.045 -0.172 -0.184 0.686 1.729∗
(0.480) (0.797) (0.382) (0.469) (1.046)
∆TED*nPEquity -1.514∗ 0.715 0.071 -0.907 -2.379∗
(0.915) (1.649) (0.924) (0.972) (1.239)
∆TED*nOther 3.560 0.039 0.696 2.395 4.674
(3.221) (1.158) (0.860) (2.015) (3.270)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.15 -0.53 -1.68 -1.09 -0.42 -0.43 -2.66 -1.19 -1.43 -1.43
N 9 9 15 15 24 24 24 24 24 24
T 233 233 231 231 122 122 33 33 78 78
Obs 1,930 1,930 2,710 2,710 2,064 2,064 779 779 1,797 1,797
R¯2 0.104 0.055 0.132 0.065 0.044 0.035 0.235 0.130 0.186 0.109
DW 2.06 2.02 2.09 2.04 2.09 2.06 2.15 2.01 2.27 2.27
Chow 1.35∗ 1.37∗ 1.35∗ 1.37∗ 7.54∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗ 7.54∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗ 7.54∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗
Dep. var: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively. Constant, constituent terms, controls and currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI
impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nPDebt + βˆ3 nPEquity + βˆ4 nFDI + βˆ5 nOther, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.8: Panel regression of model (4) for the different subsamples
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Figure 2.5: Total effect of ∆RI on ∆s taking the impact of net portfolio debt, equity
and other investments into account
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2.5.3 Robustness
Finally, some robustness tests are conducted to confirm that the results are not driven
by the choice of base currency, some underlying time trend or outliers. The results
from the robustness tests are presented in Appendix 2C.
Base currency and endogeneity concerns
What matters from a policy maker’s perspective is not necessarily currency move-
ments against the USD, but the currency movements against the country’s most im-
portant trading partners. The results of using the trade weighted currency basket as
dependent variable can therefore be found in Table 2.12 in Appendix 2C. When the
analysis is done using the change in the trade weighted currency basket as depen-
dent variable instead of the currency pairs against the USD, the same conclusions as
before can be drawn. The biggest difference to the main results are that the impact
of ∆TED is much stronger and comparable to the impact of ∆VIX.
As the USD is used as the base currency and the VIX Index is a risk intolerance
measure originating from stock options on U.S. stocks, there is the potential risk that
a change in USD has an impact on the VIX. To exclude this possibility, the analy-
sis is done with different G10 currencies and the bigger EM currencies like KRW as
base currency, while excluding USD from the sample. Changes in GBP and EUR, but
especially changes in smaller currencies like the SEK and KRW against all other cur-
rencies, are very unlikely to have a significant impact on the VIX or TED spread. The
results for using EUR, GBP, SEK and KRW as base currency can be found in Tables
2.13 and 2.14. From there can be seen that when using different base currencies and
excluding USD from the sample, the same conclusion as in the main analysis can be
drawn. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that the results and conclusions are driven
by the impact of USD on VIX. Finally, one could argue that a big change in USD
could have an impact on VIX via JPY and CHF against other currencies, as USD, JPY
and CHF all tend to move in the same direction in case of an increase in financial
market turbulence due to their (perceived) ‘safe haven’ status. As the original con-
clusion also prevails even after excluding USD, JPY and CHF from the sample, this
strongly suggests that the results are not driven by reverse causality. These results
are not reported for the sake of space, but are available upon request.
Regarding endogeneity concerns between the net foreign asset position and ex-
change rate changes, I reach the same conclusion even if I condition the exchange
rate response on the net foreign asset position from over a year back, i.e. if I use the
asset positions lagged by 12 months.
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Impact of RI instead of ∆RI
In Gabaix’s and Maggiori’s (2015) model, an increase in the financial sector risk in-
tolerance leads to a depreciation of the net debtor currency against the net creditor
one. It is however also possible that net debtor currencies depreciate whenever the
risk bearing capacity is low (i.e. risk intolerance is high), instead of only being af-
fected by the change in risk intolerance. The analysis is therefore repeated using the
levels of VIX and the TED spread instead of changes. The results in Table 2.15 reveal
that a higher VIX index, i.e. higher financial market uncertainty, is also associated
with weaker exchange rates in negative net foreign asset countries. However, once I
include both the risk sentiment level and change in the model, only the interaction
terms with the net foreign assets and ∆VIX or ∆TED are significant, and the in-
teraction terms with VIX or TED and the net foreign assets are insignificant.21 This
suggests that the baseline specification is more appropriate than the one in Table 2.15.
Gross foreign asset and liability positions
Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that gross foreign capital inflows can behave very
differently from net foreign capital inflows during sudden capital flow stops. Al-
though looking at the relationship between gross capital flows or gross positions and
exchange rates is a fundamentally different question, I show that my conclusions
based on the net positions hold also for gross positions. To see how the underlying
stock of assets and liabilities affect the impact of ∆RI on ∆s and rx, the net total
foreign debt and equity positions in equation (2.9) are split into total foreign debt
assets TotDebtAs, total foreign debt liabilities TotDebtLiab, total foreign equity assets
TotEquityAs and total foreign equity liabilities TotEquityLiab. In this way, we are
able to disentangle the separate effects of gross foreign asset and liability stocks on
the exchange rate sensitivity to risk intolerance. Fairly similar conclusions can be
drawn from the results presented in Table 2.16 in Appendix 2C as from the analysis
on net foreign assets. The significantly negative coefficients for the gross total debt li-
abilities and most of the gross total equity liabilities imply that both foreign debt and
equity liabilities are associated with weaker currencies against the USD and lower
excess currency returns. Total debt liabilities significantly increase the sensitivity of
the foreign currency to changes in the financial market risk intolerance, as measured
either by an increase in the TED spread or VIX index. Total foreign debt assets on
the other hand, decrease the exchange rate vulnerability to changes in RI, whereas
foreign equity assets increase the exchange rate sensitivity to changes in VIX. These
conclusions are thus generally supporting the claim that higher foreign debt liabil-
ities makes the exchange rate more sensitive to changes in VIX or TED, and this
negative effect is offset by holding foreign debt assets.
21These results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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Time fixed effects or time trend
As both the VIX index and the weighted TED spread are global indices, the inclusion
of time fixed effects is not possible as the time fixed effect and the risk intolerance
measure would be linearly dependent. In order to circumvent this problem and
confirm that the results are not driven by some underlying time trend, the (global)
weighted TED spread, (which includes the GDP weighted average of the TED spreads
for UK, EMU, Japan, Switzerland, Canada and the US) is made into country-specific
foreign TED spreads. This is done by excluding the contribution of the own-country
TED spread from the global average for the global weighted TED spreads for the
countries that the weighted TED spread is made up of. Thereby, the weighted foreign
country TED spread for the GBP, EUR, JPY, CHF, CAD and the USD are not identical
to the weighted TED spreads for the rest of the currencies included in the sample.
The results presented in Table 2.17 show that the previous conclusions hold and are
robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects. The conclusions are also robust to the
inclusion of currency specific time trends (not reported here), where the time trends
are allowed to have a different impact on the different currency pairs.
Final robustness tests
Finally, some additional robustness checks are done.22 To ensure that the results are
not driven by extreme outliers the analysis is conducted using winzorized data.23
The same conclusions can be drawn as in the main analysis. Also, if the covered
interest rate parity (CIP) holds, then the forward discount f dt = ft − st ≈ iUS − i.
When I use f d as a control variable instead of the interest rate difference, my results
do not change much. Moreover, as inflation and the stock market returns are forward
looking variables, it might be that current values of these are correlated with future
net foreign assets. To ensure that the results are not driven by inflation, stock market
or interest rate expectations, further lags of these are also included in the model to
confirm this. Additionally, as the log change in central bank reserves are related to
the actual reserves to GDP (which are included in the total n f a position but not in the
decompositions into debt and equity), I also confirm that the results and conclusions
do not change if I exclude ∆Res from the control variables or if I exclude the reserves
from the net foreign asset position. Also, to rule out that the results are driven
by omitted variable bias because I use lagged control variables, I confirm that my
conclusions hold also when the contemporaneous values of the control variables are
used. The conclusions are also robust to the deletion of single countries from the
sample as well as to the use data on total net foreign assets, net foreign debt and net
foreign equity instead of the ratios of these to the countries’ GDP.
22These final robustness tests are not reported for the sake of space, but are available upon request.
23A 95 % winsorization involves computing the lowest 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles of the data, and replacing
the values in these quantiles by the respective 2.5 and 97.5 cutoff values.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this panel study of 25 advanced economy and emerging market currency pairs
against the USD over the time period 1/1997-6/2016, I show that the composition of
net foreign assets affects the way exchange rates and excess currency returns react to
financial market uncertainty.
Gabbaix and Maggiori’s (2015) exchange rate theory predicts that the exchange
rates of countries with net foreign liabilities are more sensitive to reductions in fi-
nancial market risk bearing capacity. I find that this is indeed the case, but more
importantly, I show that different types of net foreign assets have different effects on
this exchange rate vulnerability. Net foreign debt liabilities, and in particular pri-
vate and portfolio debt liabilities, increase the exchange rate sensitivity to especially
changes in financial market uncertainty. Net foreign equity liabilities, on the other
hand, seem to ameliorate the negative exchange rate and excess currency return im-
pact of financial market uncertainty somewhat. Due to these offsetting exchange rate
effects of the different types of net foreign assets, if one only considers the impact
of the total net foreign asset position, the negative impact of different external im-
balances on exchange rate stability is underestimated. Thus, the exchange rates of
countries with large net foreign debt liabilities depreciate much more in response to
a drop in the global risk sentiment than countries with the equivalent net foreign
equity position. This phenomenon can partially be explained by the observation that
net debt investments are more procyclical than net equity investments, owing to both
a different investor base, different degrees of risk sharing, the fact that a large share
of foreign debt is issued and intermediated by international banks and the debt roll-
over risk. Net FDI positions do not have any significant impact on the relationship
between risk intolerance and the exchange rate, which can be explained by FDI flows
being less influenced by the global financial cycle.
Another important finding of this paper is that private and public net foreign
assets have different effects on the exchange rate vulnerability. The sensitivity of the
exchange rate to global financial market uncertainty seems to be driven largely by
private foreign investment, whereas public net foreign assets do not add to the ex-
change rate vulnerability to the same extent. This can be explained by the lower risk
associated with government debt as compared to corporate, which makes it easier
for governments to attract financing during crisis times than corporations. Moreover,
private investors are often more leveraged than public ones, which suggests that the
investors are more affected by both banking sector and general financial market un-
certainty. I also find that emerging market currencies are overall more influenced by
the global risk sentiment than the G10 currencies. The interaction effect between dif-
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ferent types of net foreign assets and risk intolerance is nevertheless smaller for the
emerging market currencies than for the G10 currencies. In this paper I only briefly
look at the separate impact of gross foreign assets and liabilities, but as the foreign
and domestic capital flows tend to behave differently, it would be interesting to take
a closer look at the relationship between the gross asset positions and exchange rate
movements in the future.
Although the currencies react to changes in global banking sector uncertainty, as
measured by the TED spread, I find that the impact of global financial market risk
intolerance, as proxied by the VIX index, is much larger. This suggests that not all of
the impact is coming from the change in the banking sector’s risk bearing capacity,
but also via non-bank investors and additional channels. My results suggest that the
relationship between the exchange rates, different net foreign assets and global finan-
cial market uncertainty, as measured by the VIX index, has remained fairly constant
over the sample period, although the Chow test points to some structural instability
in the full sample. The exchange rate impact of the TED spread, and the interaction
effect with different types of net foreign assets, has nevertheless become larger and
stronger after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Currencies of countries with negative
net debt respond more strongly to changes in banking sector risk now than before
the credit crisis.
My findings are of importance for central banks that are worried that their ex-
change rates are too sensitive to the global financial business cycle, and for the eval-
uation of the impact of financial reforms. My results imply that a policy maker
concerned about exchange rate volatility should be more alert when the net foreign
private and portfolio debt liabilities are large. As the impact of the banking sector
uncertainty has become stronger in the past six years, this also warrants more atten-
tion than at the beginning of the millennium. The finding that foreign debt liabilities
reduce exchange rate stability whereas foreign equity liabilities even marginally sup-
ports it, weakens the justification for levying lower taxes on debt investments than on
equity investments. My results suggest that policy makers could reduce the exchange
rate sensitivity to fluctuations in the financial market risk sentiment by reducing their
dependence on debt financing and shifting towards more equity financing. Finally,
knowledge of the differential impact of net foreign debt equity on the exchange rate
vulnerability is furthermore important for the countries that are currently consider-
ing reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of both equity and debt instruments.
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2.7 Appendix
Appendix 2A. List of countries, currencies and nfa variables
Australia (AUD), Brazil (BRL), Canada (CAD), Chile (CLP), Colombia (COP), Euro
Area (EUR), Hungary (HUF), India (INR), Israel (ISL), Japan (JPY), Korea (KRW),
Mexico (MXN), New Zealand (NZD), Norway (NOK), Peru (PEN), Philippines (PHP),
Poland (PLN), Romania (RON), Singapore (SGD), South Africa (ZAR), Sweden (SEK),
Switzerland (CHF), Thailand (THB), Turkey (TRY), United Kingdom (GBP), and United
States (USD).
Variable Description
nfa Net foreign assets
nfaPRIV Net foreign assets held by the private sector
nfaGOVT Net foreign assets held by the government
nfaOSEC Net foreign assets held by nonfinancial corpora-
tions, households and NPISH
nfaBANK Net foreign assets held by deposit taking corpora-
tions
nTotDebt Net total foreign debt assets
nTotEquity Net total foreign equity assets
nToTDebtPRIV Net total foreign debt assets held by the private
sector
nToTDebtGOVT Net total foreign debt assets held by the govern-
ment
nToTDebtOSEC Net total foreign debt assets held by nonfinancial
corporations, households and NPISH
nToTDebtBANK Net total foreign debt assets held by deposit tak-
ing corporations
nPDebt Net foreign portfolio debt assets
nPEquity Net foreign portfolio equity assets
nFDI Net foreign direct investment
nOther Net foreign other investment
Table 2.9: A description of the net foreign asset variables
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Appendix 2B. Full tables for selected models
Full sample, Before the crisis, Crisis, After the crisis,
1/1997-6/2016 1/1997-3/2007 4/2007-12/2009 1/2010-6/2016
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Constant 0.2635 0.1326 -10.07∗∗∗ -10.04∗∗∗ -14.94 -20.56∗∗ 18.80∗∗∗ 23.93∗∗∗
(0.914) (0.940) (2.064) (2.090) (9.798) (10.48) (4.358) (4.350)
∆VIX -1.44∗∗∗ -0.3631∗∗ -2.52∗∗∗ -1.4180∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.142) (0.247) (0.119)
∆TED -0.7716∗∗∗ -0.3414∗∗ -1.0879∗∗∗ -1.3826∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.141) (0.213) (0.348)
nfa -0.0140 0.0001 0.8589∗∗∗ 0.8723∗∗∗ 3.0822∗∗ 3.8190∗∗ 1.2473∗ 1.4961∗
(0.235) (0.242) (0.317) (0.316) (1.540) (1.589) (0.753) (0.781)
∆VIX*nfa 0.8032∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 0.8426∗∗∗ 0.6029∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.218) (0.299) (0.165)
∆TED*nfa 0.4006∗∗ 0.0685 0.4041∗ 0.8528
(0.167) (0.235) (0.237) (0.548)
∆Res−1 3.684∗∗∗ 3.570∗∗∗ 2.673∗∗∗ 2.124∗∗ 0.5648 2.649 7.295∗∗∗ 8.518∗∗∗
(0.835) (0.901) (1.019) (1.020) (1.80) (2.17) (2.25) (2.25)
(stock− stockUS)−1 4.983∗∗∗ 5.716∗∗∗ 3.530∗∗ 3.350∗∗ 3.304 3.866 6.104∗∗∗ 9.994∗∗∗
(1.15) (1.17) (1.68) (1.70) (2.37) (2.55) (1.86) (1.95)
(pi − piUS)−1 0.0386∗ 0.0402∗ 0.0456 0.0468 0.0774 0.1131∗ 0.0999∗ 0.0817
(0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.065) (0.068) (0.054) (0.055)
(i− iUS)−1 0.1771∗∗∗ 0.2531∗∗∗ 0.1675∗∗ 0.1916∗∗∗ 0.1267 0.3329∗∗ 0.6498∗∗∗ 0.8935∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.048) (0.068) (0.070) (0.132) (0.145) (0.122) (0.120)
(i− iUS)−1 ∗VIX−1 -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.0037 -0.0047∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0360∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
PPP−1 -0.195 -0.135 6.15∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 8.88∗ 11.85∗∗ -9.87∗∗∗ -12.48∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.505) (1.24) (1.26) (5.38) (5.77) (2.19) (2.19)
Avg.∆RI impact -1.516∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗ -2.587∗∗∗ -1.118∗∗∗ -1.462∗∗∗ -1.445∗∗∗
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
T 233 233 122 122 33 33 78 78
Obs 4,861 4,861 2,174 2,174 812 812 1,875 1,875
R¯2 0.115 0.053 0.043 0.034 0.245 0.142 0.194 0.114
DW 2.05 2.01 2.04 2.02 2.14 2.01 2.28 2.26
Note: Dependent variable ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 n f a, where RI is
proxied either by VIX or TED. DW refers to the panel Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation.
Table 2.10: Panel regression of models (1) and (2) with constitutive terms and controls
presented (Tables 2.1 and 2.2)
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Full sample Post-crisis sample G10 currencies EM currencies
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Constant 0.196 0.067 17.792∗∗∗ 22.509∗∗∗ -0.117 0.009 0.666 0.439
(0.893) (0.920) (4.411) (4.415) (1.246) (1.270) (1.264) (1.308)
∆VIX -1.201∗∗∗ -1.152∗∗∗ -0.786∗∗∗ -1.849∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.131) (0.159) (0.200)
∆TED -0.717∗∗∗ -0.958∗∗ -0.314∗ -0.905∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.405) (0.185) (0.287)
nTotDebt 0.683∗∗ 0.664∗ 1.471 1.572 0.516 0.549 1.023∗∗ 1.039∗∗
(0.330) (0.350) (0.977) (1.035) (0.558) (0.603) (0.406) (0.427)
nTotEquity -0.434 -0.410 0.442 0.644 -0.949∗∗ -0.999∗∗ -0.523 -0.381
(0.328) (0.334) (0.832) (0.851) (0.428) (0.436) (0.553) (0.569)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.368∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.310) (0.309) (0.267)
∆VIX*nTotEquity 0.229 -0.050 -0.114 -1.466∗∗
(0.281) (0.324) (0.400) (0.719)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.599∗∗ 2.061∗∗ 0.611∗ 0.270
(0.244) (1.001) (0.336) (0.355)
∆TED*nTotEquity 0.565 -0.292 -1.345 0.715
(0.459) (1.037) (0.882) (0.930)
∆Res−1 3.459∗∗∗ 3.196∗∗∗ 6.890∗∗∗ 8.177∗∗∗ 1.976∗ 1.559 4.850∗∗∗ 5.093∗∗∗
(0.799) (0.886) (2.213) (2.249) (1.055) (1.154) (1.201) (1.338)
(stock− stockUS)−1 4.056∗∗∗ 5.026∗∗∗ 6.060∗∗∗ 9.972∗∗∗ 7.619∗∗∗ 8.706∗∗∗ 3.162∗∗∗ 4.226∗∗∗
(0.974) (1.012) (1.868) (1.963) (2.296) (2.352) (1.061) (1.105)
(pi − piUS)−1 0.029 0.030 0.121∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002
(0.022) (0.023) (0.057) (0.059) (0.071) (0.072) (0.024) (0.025)
(i− iUS)−1 0.185∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.046) (0.121) (0.120) (0.132) (0.140) (0.045) (0.049)
(i− iUS)−1 ∗VIX−1 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
PPP−1 -0.106 -0.045 -9.201∗∗∗ -11.587∗∗∗ 0.494 0.409 -0.339 -0.240
(0.486) (0.501) (2.210) (2.216) (1.102) (1.123) (0.543) (0.563)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.492 -0.885 -1.465 -1.456 -1.132 -0.616 -1.732 -1.119
N 25 25 25 25 9 9 16 16
T 233 233 78 78 233 233 231 231
Obs 4,703 4,703 1,860 1,860 1,930 1,930 2,773 2,773
R¯2 0.116 0.052 0.195 0.113 0.100 0.049 0.139 0.066
DW 2.07 2.03 2.27 2.27 2.05 2.01 2.09 2.04
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed effects
included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.11: Panel regression of model (3) with control variables and constitutive terms
presented (Tables 2.4 and 2.5)
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Appendix 2C. Additional Results
Full sample G10 EM
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆VIX -1.438∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -1.188∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.497∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.095) (0.123) (0.093) (0.126)
∆TED -0.296∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.267
(0.076) (0.077) (0.094) (0.112) (0.218)
∆VIX*nfa 0.803∗∗∗
(0.127)
∆TED*nfa 0.478∗∗∗
(0.101)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.368∗∗∗ 0.201 0.308∗∗
(0.205) (0.142) (0.131)
∆VIX*nTotEquity 0.229 -0.153 -0.671
(0.281) (0.228) (0.426)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.553∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.165
(0.133) (0.187) (0.166)
∆TED*nTotEquity 0.865∗∗∗ 0.500 1.108
(0.240) (0.484) (0.696)
∆VIX*nPDebt 1.184∗∗∗
(0.232)
∆VIX*nPEquity -0.939∗∗∗
(0.320)
∆VIX*nOther 1.995∗∗∗
(0.735)
∆TED*nPDebt 0.614∗∗∗
(0.152)
∆TED*nPEquity -0.284
(0.316)
∆TED*nOther 0.676
(0.528)
Avg. ∆RI impact -1.52 -0.34 -1.49 -0.37 -1.48 -0.37 -0.01 -0.08 -0.41 -0.55
N 25 25 25 25 24 24 10 10 16 16
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 231 231
Obs 4,861 4,861 4,703 4,703 4,640 4,640 2,163 2,163 2,773 2,773
R¯2 0.115 0.053 0.116 0.051 0.113 0.049 0.037 0.043 0.063 0.063
Note: Dep. Var: ∆ Trade weighted currency basket. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and
currency fixed effects included. Avg. ∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either
by VIX or TED.
Table 2.12: Panel regression of models (1), (3) and (4) for a trade weighted currency basket
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Base currency: EUR GBP
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
∆VIX -0.363∗∗∗ -0.142 -0.093 -1.010∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.095) (0.123) (0.091) (0.102) (0.133)
∆TED -0.259∗∗ -0.192 -0.165 -0.121 -0.062 -0.032
(0.114) (0.119) (0.159) (0.119) (0.128) (0.155)
∆VIX*nfa 0.813∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.127)
∆TED*nfa 0.434∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.167)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.286∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.204)
∆VIX*nTotEquity 0.177 0.209
(0.227) (0.266)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.557∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗
(0.181) (0.237)
∆TED*nTotEquity 0.358 0.552
(0.394) (0.463)
∆VIX*nPDebt 1.203∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.235)
∆VIX*nPEquity -0.957∗∗∗ -0.507
(0.293) (0.310)
∆VIX*nOther 2.042∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗
(0.734) (0.793)
∆TED*nPDebt 0.417∗ 0.346
(0.227) (0.276)
∆TED*nPEquity -0.591 -0.297
(0.530) (0.581)
∆TED*nOther 1.225 1.382
(0.982) (0.931)
N 24 24 24 24 23 23 24 24 24 24 23 23
T 220 220 220 220 220 220 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 4,564 4,564 4,419 4,419 4,356 4,356 4,628 4,628 4,470 4,470 4,407 4,407
R¯2 0.034 0.021 0.034 0.020 0.034 0.020 0.055 0.010 0.054 0.010 0.053 0.010
DW 2.00 1.99 2.01 2.00 2.01 2.00 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.04 2.05
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed effects included. Avg.
∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.13: Panel regression of models (1), (3) and (4) using EUR and GBP as base currency
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Base currency: SEK KRW
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
∆VIX 0.058 0.245∗∗ 0.222∗ 0.064 0.324∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗
(0.090) (0.099) (0.127) (0.110) (0.123) (0.166)
∆TED -0.126 -0.110 -0.079 0.838∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.129) (0.172) (0.148) (0.164) (0.205)
∆VIX*nfa 0.789∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.154)
∆TED*nfa 0.458∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.158) (0.227)
∆VIX*nTotDebt 1.368∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.234)
∆VIX*nTotEquity -0.059 0.168
(0.254) (0.281)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.671∗∗∗ 0.593∗
(0.226) (0.314)
∆TED*nTotEquity -0.015 0.302
(0.488) (0.556)
∆VIX*nPDebt 1.415∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.262)
∆VIX*nPEquity -1.249∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.335)
∆VIX*nOther 1.341∗ 2.166∗∗
(0.767) (0.997)
∆TED*nPDebt 0.571∗∗ 0.394
(0.286) (0.399)
∆TED*nPEquity -0.566 -0.915
(0.594) (0.721)
∆TED*nOther 1.068 1.805
(1.010) (1.200)
N 24 24 24 24 23 23 24 24 24 24 23 23
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 4,654 4,654 4,496 4,496 4,433 4,433 4,719 4,719 4,561 4,561 4,498 4,498
R¯2 0.014 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008
DW 2.02 2.02 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed effects included. Avg.
∆RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.14: Panel regression of models (1), (3) and (4) using SEK and KRW as base currency
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
VIX -0.263∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.065) (0.082)
TED -0.144∗∗ -0.154∗∗ -0.190∗∗
(0.059) (0.065) (0.082)
VIX*nfa 0.186∗∗
(0.094)
TED*nfa 0.063
(0.085)
VIX*nTotDebt 0.303∗∗
(0.139)
VIX*nTotEquity 0.215
(0.232)
TED*nTotDebt 0.142
(0.126)
TED*nTotEquity -0.185
(0.236)
VIX*nPDebt 0.303∗
(0.158)
VIX*nPEquity -0.241
(0.270)
VIX*nOther 0.156
(0.467)
TED*nPDebt 0.133
(0.155)
TED*nPEquity -0.018
(0.295)
TED*nOther -0.230
(0.465)
Avg. RI impact -0.28 -0.15 -0.28 -0.17 -0.29 -0.17
N 25 25 25 25 24 24
T 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 4,861 4,861 4,703 4,703 4,640 4,640
R¯2 0.047 0.043 0.045 0.041 0.045 0.041
DW 1.99 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.01 2.02
Note: Dependent variable: ∆s. White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables and currency fixed effects
included. Avg. RI impact=βˆ1 + βˆ2 nTotDebt + βˆ3 nTotEquity, where RI is proxied either by VIX or TED.
Table 2.15: Panel regression of models (1), (3) and (4) for the level of RI instead of ∆RI
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Dep. Var ∆s rx
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
∆VIX 0.069 -0.317 -0.560 -0.496
(0.760) (0.717) (0.738) (0.719)
∆TED 0.335 0.255 0.429 -0.035
(0.818) (0.814) (0.861) (0.840)
∆VIX*TotDebt As 6.498∗∗∗ 6.230∗∗∗ 6.626∗∗∗ 6.071∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.954) (0.974) (0.970)
∆VIX*TotEquity As -2.161∗∗∗ -2.411∗∗∗ -2.059∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.552) (0.545) (0.569)
∆VIX*TotDebt Liab -4.602∗∗∗ -4.331∗∗∗ -4.803∗∗∗ -4.382∗∗∗
(1.261) (1.228) (1.301) (1.251)
∆VIX*TotEquity Liab -1.085 -0.365 -0.417 -0.241
(1.176) (1.080) (1.102) (1.080)
∆TED*TotDebt As 2.015∗ 2.364∗∗ 2.127∗ 2.145∗
(1.077) (1.161) (1.175) (1.267)
∆TED*TotEquity As -0.113 -0.144 0.248 0.241
(0.520) (0.618) (0.554) (0.711)
∆TED*TotDebt Liab -0.764 -0.221 -0.618 -0.339
(1.668) (1.647) (1.792) (1.734)
∆TED*TotEquity Liab -2.416∗ -3.165∗∗ -3.127∗∗ -2.824∗∗
(1.251) (1.252) (1.253) (1.248)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
T 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233
Obs 5,003 4,700 5,003 4,700 4,798 4,591 4,798 4,591
R¯2 0.088 0.118 0.015 0.054 0.102 0.140 0.022 0.077
Note: White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively. Constant and currency fixed effects included.
Table 2.16: Panel regression with gross assets and liabilities instead of net
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Full sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
∆TED 1.024 1.098 1.096 0.498 2.179∗∗
(0.932) (0.934) (0.936) (0.866) (1.043)
∆TED*nfa 0.508∗∗∗
(0.150)
∆TED*nTotDebt 0.713∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.220)
∆TED*nTotEquity 0.309
(0.421)
∆TED*nfaPRIV 1.119∗∗∗
(0.278)
∆TED*nfaGOV -2.034∗∗∗
(0.718)
∆TED*nTotDebtPRIV 1.852∗∗
(0.911)
∆TED*nTotDebtGOV -0.278
(1.593)
N 25 25 25 21 12
T 184 184 184 184 184
Obs 4,355 4,244 4,365 2,880 1,618
R¯2 0.462 0.463 0.463 0.484 0.500
Note: Dep. var: ∆s White SE in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Constant, constitutive terms, control variables, currency and time
fixed effects included.
Table 2.17: Models including time fixed effects and using a ’country specific’ TED
spread

3 Consumption and wealth in the
long run: the impact of financial
liberalization
with Lorenzo Pozzi1
3.1 Introduction
The study of the long run aggregate relationship between consumption and total
household wealth (i.e., the sum of tangible assets and unobserved human wealth)
serves a twofold purpose. First, it is central to the estimation of long run elasticities
of consumption to wealth and its components. These elasticities are useful, among
other things, to evaluate and predict the implications of wealth changes for economic
growth. Second, it allows for the estimation of the unobserved ratio of consumption
to total wealth. According to the aggregate intertemporal household budget con-
straint, the consumption-to-wealth ratio contains information about future variables,
in particular future consumption changes and future returns to wealth.
The contemporaneous literature on the long run aggregate relationship between
consumption and wealth originates from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) who pro-
pose a cointegration approach to proxy the unobserved consumption to total wealth
ratio. To this end, they regress log consumption on log assets and log earnings (as a
proxy for human wealth) using US data and argue in favor of a stable cointegration
relationship between these variables. From the stationary regression residuals, they
calculate a proxy for the consumption to total wealth ratio (i.e, the variable "cay")
and find that it has strong predictive power for (excess) stock returns. Rudd and
Whelan (2006) however find no cointegration in the US upon adjusting the data to
1For constructive comments and suggestions, we thank Gerdie Everaert, Massimo Giuliodori, Vadym
Volosovych, Agnieszka Markiewicz and participants of the following seminars and conferences: econo-
metrics and economics seminars at the Erasmus School of Economics (Rotterdam, Netherlands), the
2018 workshop on financial econometrics and empirical modeling of financial markets at Kiel Institute
for the World Economy (Kiel, Germany), the 2018 International Association for Applied Economet-
rics conference (Montreal, Canada), the 2018 European summer meeting of the Econometric Society
(Cologne, Germany), and the Tinbergen Institute Macro Research Day (Rotterdam, Netherlands).
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make it more consistent with the underlying intertemporal household budget con-
straint, i.e., they argue that "cay" is not stationary.2 Their finding suggests that results
obtained from the cointegration approach to measure wealth effects on consump-
tion and to predict stock returns using the estimated consumption-wealth ratio "cay"
are spurious.3 In a recent contribution, Bianchi et al. (2017) acknowledge these is-
sues and - after adjusting the data along the lines of Rudd and Whelan (2006) and
failing to find stationarity for the standard "cay" measure - propose a new proxy
for the consumption-wealth ratio obtained from a regression that includes a two-
state Markov switching intercept. This allows for regime shifts in the consumption
to wealth ratio which they link to the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. They
argue that the consumption-wealth ratio obtained from this approach is stationary
and has stronger predictive ability for (excess) stock returns when compared to the
traditional "cay" variable.
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the long run consumption-
wealth relationship using an alternative empirical approach. In particular, we pro-
pose an unobserved component model applied to US data over the period 1951Q4-
2016Q4. The regression equation of log consumption on log assets and log earnings
is augmented with an integrated unobserved component (see e.g. Harvey et al., 1986;
Canarella et al., 1990; Sarantis and Stewart, 2001; Planas et al., 2007; Everaert, 2010,
for the inclusion of such a component in regressions conducted in a different context).
This inclusion allows us to reliably estimate the long run relationship between con-
sumption and total household wealth, even though consumption, assets and earnings
are not cointegrated. Our unobserved component model is estimated using Bayesian
state space methods with model selection along the lines of Frühwirth-Schnatter and
Wagner (2010). This allows for the calculation of the posterior probability that an
integrated unobserved component is present in the regression equation. Posterior
distributions are calculated for the elasticities of consumption to assets and earnings
and these elasticities are compared to elasticities obtained for models without an inte-
grated unobserved component. An alternative "cay" variable - i.e., the stationary part
of the consumption to wealth ratio - is calculated from this set-up and its persistence
and predictive ability for (excess) stock returns are evaluated and compared to that
of the standard "cay" variable.
The paper contains the following results. Using standard frequentist cointegra-
tion tests, we confirm that the evidence in favour of a stable cointegrating relationship
between consumption, earnings and assets in the US is very weak. Our Bayesian un-
observed component approach with model selection strongly supports the presence
2As far as international evidence is concerned, Slacalek (2004) fails to find evidence in favor of a
stable cointegrating relationship between consumption, earnings and assets in a sample of 26 countries.
3Given considerations like absence of cointegration and instability of the cointegrating vector, Carroll
et al. (2011) argue against cointegration methods to measure wealth effects and instead propose an
indirect approach based on the consumption Euler equation and stickiness in consumption growth.
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of an unobserved integrated component in the consumption equation. We argue that
a model with an integrated unobserved component added to the regression is pre-
ferred over alternative options to deal with the non-stationarity of the consumption-
to-wealth ratio such as the modelling of regime switches in its mean. With respect
to the estimates of the elasticities of consumption to assets and earnings we find,
in line with the previous literature, that asset wealth has a much smaller impact on
consumption than earnings (as a proxy for human wealth), and that non-stock asset
wealth (i.e., housing wealth) is more important for consumption than stock assets
(see e.g., Davis and Palumbo, 2001; Carroll et al., 2011). Importantly, we find that
the estimated elasticities for assets (and their components) tend to be overestimated
when we wrongfully exclude the unobserved integrated component from the model.
Hence, the failure to appropriately account for the non-stationarity in the consump-
tion equation leads to elasticity estimates that are misleading. We further provide an
interpretation for the unobserved integrated component and test this interpretation.
In particular, we argue that financial liberalization has, by relaxing liquidity con-
straints of consumers, permanently increased the consumption-to-wealth ratio over
the sample period. Finally, we evaluate both the in-sample and out-of-sample predic-
tive ability for excess stock returns of our new "cay" variable, i.e., the stationary part
of the consumption to wealth ratio. In-sample, we find that its predictive ability for
future excess stock returns, while diminished compared to that of the traditional "cay"
variable, is statistically and economically significant and in line with the univariate
predictability results typically reported in the literature for excess stock returns using
other predictors (see e.g. Ferson et al., 2003, for an overview). Out-of-sample, we find
that its predictive ability for future excess stock returns is comparable to that of the
standard "cay" variable.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 3.2 derives the estimable equa-
tions that relate consumption to earnings and asset wealth (and its components).
Section 3.3 provides a brief description of the data while Section 3.4 provides evi-
dence on cointegration between consumption, assets and earnings based on standard
frequentist cointegration tests. Section 3.5 presents and discusses our unobserved
component approach and the results obtained using this method. A theoretical inter-
pretation of the estimated integrated unobserved component is presented and tested
and the predictive ability for excess stock returns of our alternative "cay" is discussed.
Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical framework
This section derives two estimable equations that relate consumption to earnings and
assets and to earnings and asset components (i.e., stock wealth and non-stock wealth).
The derivations are largely based on the framework considered initially by Campbell
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and Mankiw (1989) and then explored further by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004).
Note that linearization constants are ignored throughout the section.
The per period budget constraint of a representative consumer is given by,
At+1
1+ rt+1
= At +Yt − Ct (3.1)
where At are real assets, Yt is real disposable labor income (earnings), Ct is real
consumption and rt is the real rate of return. Alternatively, write
Wt+1
1+ rt+1
= Wt − Ct (3.2)
where Wt ≡ At + Ht is total wealth and Ht is human wealth.
To reconcile both eqs. (3.1) and (3.2), note that
Ht = Yt +
Ht+1
1+ rt+1
(3.3)
which is consistent with the definition of human wealth as the presented discounted
value of future earnings.4
After log-linearizing eq. (3.2) and solving the resulting log-linearized per period
constraint forward, we can write
ct − wt = Et
∞
∑
j=1
ρj(rt+j − ∆ct+j) + lim
k→∞
ρkEt(ct+k − wt+k) (3.4)
where ct is the log of real consumption Ct, wt is the log of total real wealth Wt, Et
is the expectation operator conditional on period t information and ρ is the discount
factor (0 < ρ < 1).5 The transversality condition limk→∞ ρkEt(ct+k − wt+k) = 0 is
imposed so that
ct = wt + nt (3.5)
where nt = Et ∑∞j=1 ρ
j(rt+j − ∆ct+j).
We then log-linearize Wt ≡ At + Ht to obtain wt = αat + βht so that eq. (3.5)
becomes
ct = αat + βht + nt (3.6)
where at is the log of assets At, ht is the log of human wealth Ht, α is the elasticity
4For ease of exposition, we do not decompose the return on total wealth into a return on human
wealth and a return on asset wealth hence effectively assuming these returns are equal. The framework
can be easily extended to incorporate this distinction but this does not offer additional insight.
5In particular, ρ = 1− CW where C and W are the steady state values of Ct and Wt around which we
linearize.
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of consumption with respect to assets and β is the elasticity of consumption with
respect to human wealth.6
Since log human wealth ht is unobserved, we log-linearize eq. (3.3), solve the
resulting expression forward and impose a transversality condition to obtain
ht = yt + mt (3.7)
where mt = Et ∑∞j=1 ρ¯
j(∆yt+j − rt+j) with discount factor ρ¯ (0 < ρ¯ < 1).7
Substituting eq. (3.7) into eq. (3.6) then gives the baseline equation,
ct = αat + βyt + zt (3.8)
with zt = nt + βmt.
If we decompose assets At into stock wealth Ast (financial wealth) and non-stock
wealth Anst (mainly housing wealth), we have Wt ≡ Ast + Anst + Ht and we can derive
the extended equation,
ct = αsast + α
nsanst + βyt + zt (3.9)
where ast is the log of stock wealth A
s
t , a
ns
t is the log of non-stock wealth A
ns
t , α
s is
the elasticity of consumption with respect to stock wealth and αns is the elasticity of
consumption with respect to non-stock wealth.8
This set-up allows for the estimation of the elasticities of consumption to assets
and to asset components, but also for the construction of a proxy for the consumption
to total wealth ratio ct − wt, i.e., the estimated variable zt - which in the case of eq.
(3.8) - is commonly denoted by "cay". The ways to estimate these equations are
discussed in detail in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 after a description of the data is first given
in the next section.
3.3 Data
For the estimation of eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) we use quarterly US data over the period
1951Q4 − 2016Q4. A detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix
3A. Our dataset is constructed identically as the dataset considered by Lettau and
Ludvigson (2015). For ct we use the log of real per capita total personal consumption
6We have α = AW and β =
H
W where A, H and W are the steady state values of At, Ht and Wt around
which we linearize.
7In particular, ρ¯ = 1− YH where Y and H are the steady state values of Yt and Ht around which we
linearize.
8We have αs = A
s
W and α
ns = A
ns
W where A
s, Ans and W are the steady state values of Ast , A
ns
t and Wt
around which we linearize.
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expenditures.9 For yt we use the log of real per capita disposable labor income. For
at we use the log of real per capita household total net worth which includes stock
and non-stock financial assets, housing wealth and durable goods.10 For ast we use
the log of real per capita stock market assets while for anst we use the log of real
per capita non-stock assets (i.e., real estate, non-stock financial assets, durable goods)
minus liabilities. The asset variables at, ast and a
ns
t are all measured at the end of the
period.
3.4 Cointegration
This section investigates whether regression equations (3.8) and (3.9) constitute coin-
tegrating relationships. To this end, first we discuss the integratedness of the vari-
ables included in these equations. Next, we conduct a battery of standard frequentist
cointegration tests and discuss their results.
3.4.1 Integrated variables
Figure 3.1 presents the variables ct, yt, at, ast and a
ns
t (logs) and ∆ct, ∆yt, ∆at, ∆a
s
t and
∆anst (growth rates) used in our analysis. From the figure, we note that the variables
ct, yt, at, ast and a
ns
t are stochastically trended. In particular, augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests (reported in Appendix 3B) suggest that they are integrated of order one - I(1)
- and become integrated of order zero - I(0) - upon first differencing, i.e. implying
that the growth rates ∆ct, ∆yt, ∆at, ∆ast and ∆a
ns
t are stationary. With respect to the
stationarity of these growth rates, it should be noted however that Dickey-Fuller tests
may fail to detect a unit root if it underlies a volatile high frequency component. As
such, growth rates may appear stationary rather than be stationary. We argue below
that due to financial liberalization, aggregate consumption growth ∆ct contains a
slow moving low frequency stochastic trend underneath its volatile high frequency
component.
3.4.2 Cointegration
If the regressions given by equations (3.8) and (3.9) are believed to consist of inte-
grated I(1) variables, then the standard approach to estimate the elasticities α, β, αs
and αns is to estimate these equations as cointegrating regressions (see Engle and
9Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) originally used expenditures on nondurable goods and services
as a proxy for consumption but they recently switched to the use of total personal consumption expen-
ditures (see Lettau and Ludvigson, 2015).
10Rudd and Whelan (2006) argue in favor of excluding durable goods from assets as ct already
includes expenditures on durable goods. However, as durable goods are not fully consumed in the
period of purchase, we follow Lettau and Ludvigson (2004, 2015) and do not exclude them from net
asset wealth at. Our results are robust to using a definition of wealth that excludes durable goods
however. These results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Real per capita personal consumption expenditures (c), disposable labor
income (y), net assets (a), net stock wealth (as) and net non-stock wealth (ans) - US
data 1951Q4− 2016Q4.
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Granger, 1987). For this approach to be valid, the term zt in both equations should
be stationary, i.e., the variables ct, yt and at in eq. (3.8) and the variables ct, yt, ast
and anst in eq. (3.9) must be cointegrated. In the following subsections we first use
standard frequentist cointegration tests to find out whether zt is stationary. We then
provide potential reasons why zt is found to be non-stationary, and finally we discuss
the implications of a non-stationary zt.
Testing whether zt is stationary
To check whether zt is stationary or not, we conduct a standard Engle-Granger coin-
tegration test (see Engle and Granger, 1987) and report the results in Table 3.1. From
the table, we note that there is very little evidence in favor of cointegration between
the variables ct, yt and at or between the variables ct, yt, ast and a
ns
t . This is the case for
the full sample period (the period 1951Q4− 2016Q4) as well as for the sample that
excludes the years from the Great Recession onward (the period 1951Q4− 2007Q3).
We have also conducted a number of alternative cointegration tests, the results of
which are reported in Appendix 3B. These tests also strongly suggest that there is
no cointegration between the variables considered. As we argue in the appendix, the
failure of finding cointegration does not seem to originate from statistical issues - i.e.
the lack of power to reject a false null hypothesis - but rather suggests that there is in
fact a unit root present in zt.
c, a, y c, as, ans, y
1951Q4− 2016Q4 1951Q4− 2007Q3 1951Q4− 2016Q4 1951Q4− 2007Q3
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
-2.32 -2.57 -2.36 -2.47
5% and 10% critical values (3 variables) 5% and 10% critical values (4 variables)
5% −3.74 5% −4.10
10% −3.45 10% −3.81
Notes: The null hypothesis tested is the no cointegration hypothesis. A constant is included in the cointegrating
equation. The 5% and 10% critical values are taken from MacKinnon (2010). The number of lags included in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller regression is based on the Bayesian information criterion.
Table 3.1: Engle-Granger cointegration test between c, a and y and between c, as, ans
and y
Reasons why zt is non-stationary
There are different potential reasons as to why eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) are not cointegrat-
ing regressions. First, the stationarity of zt requires the stationarity of the term nt in
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eq. (3.5). Since the result in eq. (3.5) is obtained after imposing a transversality condi-
tion, a violation of this condition renders nt in eq. (3.5) non-stationary. Additionally,
the log-linearization conducted to derive eq. (3.5) pushes potentially non-stationary
higher-order terms in nt. The same arguments can be evoked when considering the
stationarity of the term mt in eq. (3.7), which also is a component of zt. Second,
the model presented in Section 3.2 assumes stability in the steady state ratios of the
model variables and hence in the resulting elasticities. This assumption may not hold
in practice.11 Structural instability in the cointegrating equation may lead to an I(1)
component in zt.12 Third, from the definition of the terms nt in eq. (3.5) and mt in eq.
(3.7) these terms are stationary only if the variables rt, ∆ct, and ∆yt in the model are
stationary. As argued by Bianchi et al. (2017), regime shifts in US monetary policy
may - through rt - have caused shifts in the mean of the consumption to wealth ratio,
rendering it non-stationary. In this paper, we instead focus on aggregate consump-
tion growth ∆ct. In what follows we argue that financial liberalization occurring over
the sample period has rendered ∆ct non-stationary, i.e. underneath the volatile high
frequency component which is apparent from Figure 3.1, there is a slow moving low
frequency stochastic trend.
Implications of a non-stationary zt
The estimation of the relationship given by eq. (3.8) or eq. (3.9) as a cointegrating
relationship using standard methods like static OLS or dynamic OLS is spurious if zt
is non-stationary (see Granger and Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986). Highly significant
OLS estimates could be obtained for the elasticities α and β with high R2’s even if
ct and the regressors at and yt are completely independent merely because these
variables are all stochastically trended. While it is unlikely that the variables in eqs.
(3.8) and (3.9) are completely independent, the estimates for the elasticities obtained
via standard cointegration analysis are nonetheless unreliable if zt contains a unit
root. Additionally, the non-stationarity of the variable zt may invalidate its use as a
predictor for other variables, in particular (excess) stock returns (see e.g. Rudd and
Whelan, 2006). These issues are tackled in the next section where we discuss an
alternative empirical approach based on an unobserved component model.
11For instance, different forms of heterogeneity at the micro level may imply structural instability in
the aggregate relationship estimated using time series data (see Cooper, 2016, and references therein).
12To see this, note that if the true relationship between ct, at and yt is given by ct = αtat + βtyt + vt
where the time-varying parameters αt and βt are given by αt = α+ α˜t and βt = β+ β˜t - i.e., consisting
of a constant and a time-varying component where the latter can be stationary or integrated - then
estimating ct = αat + βyt + zt causes zt to have an I(1) component since zt = vt + α˜tat + β˜tyt.
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3.5 Unobserved component model
We can reliably estimate the long-run relationship between ct, at and yt in eq. (3.8)
or between ct, ast , a
ns
t and yt in eq. (3.9) - even when these variables are not cointe-
grated - using an unobserved component or state space framework (see Harvey, 1989;
Durbin and Koopman, 2001). In such a set-up, the omitted I(1) component in zt can
be explicitly added to the regression equation as an unobserved component and esti-
mated together with the parameters - among which are the elasticities α, αs, αns and
β - of the model (see e.g. Harvey et al., 1986; Canarella et al., 1990; Planas et al., 2007;
Everaert, 2010). Section 3.5.1 presents the specification of the unobserved component
model. Section 3.5.2 discusses the methodology used to estimate the model. Section
3.5.3 presents the main estimation results.
3.5.1 Empirical specification
Set-up
We can write equations (3.8) and (3.9) in general form as,
ct = xtφ+ zt (3.10)
where xt =
[
at yt
]
and φ =
[
α β
]′
for eq. (3.8) or xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
and
φ =
[
αs αns β
]′
for eq. (3.9).
The unobserved variable zt is modelled as the sum of an I(1) non-stationary
component µt and an I(0) stationary component vt. As such, we have,
zt = µt + vt (3.11)
The non-stationary component µt is modelled as a random walk process, i.e.,
µt = µt−1 + ηt (3.12)
where ηt ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2η
)
.
Following the literature where dynamic OLS is typically applied to the estima-
tion of regression equations between consumption, earnings and assets, the station-
ary component vt is modelled as consisting of an error term εt and lags, leads and
contemporaneous values of the first difference of the regressors xt, i.e.,
vt =
p
∑
j=−p
∆xt+jρj + εt (3.13)
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where εt ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2ε
)
.13
Discussion
The presence of an integrated unobserved component µt in eq. (3.10) may have
multiple causes.14 As noted in Section 3.4.2 above, the reason for failing to find
cointegration between the variables ct, yt and at - or between the variables ct, yt,
ast and a
ns
t - may be due to a violation of the transversality condition, the neglect
of potentially integrated higher-order terms in the conducted log-linearizations or
structural instability in the steady state ratios of the model variables. And while
Bianchi et al. (2017) argue that monetary policy shifts render the returns on wealth
non-stationary, this paper focusses instead on financial liberalization and its impact
on aggregate consumption growth (see Section 3.5.4). Of course, objections can be
raised to giving an integrated variable or unit root interpretation to some of these
failures of finding cointegration. For instance, violations of the transversality con-
dition may be short-lived (i.e., bubbles tend to burst). However, for other failures
this concern seems unwarranted. For example, the neglected higher-order terms in
the log-linearizations are functions of the levels of the variables in the model and are
therefore unquestionably integrated variables. Additionally, even if one objects to the
principle of there being an integrated component in this context, this component may
actually provide the best way to approximate the non-stationarity of zt within a given
sample period. Indeed, as we detail in Appendix 3C, using an alternative and more
general modelling approach for the unobserved component suggests that the non-
stationarity of zt is best modelled through an integrated variable. More specifically,
we find that the data supports a regression model with an integrated unobserved
component included to capture non-stationarity rather than a regression model con-
taining a Markov switching intercept along the lines of Bianchi et al. (2017). Before
discussing the results of the estimation of the unobserved component model, the next
section first elaborates on the methodology used.
3.5.2 Methodology
We first discuss the advantages of Bayesian estimation. Then, we present the Bayesian
model selection approach to determine whether or not a non-stationary unobserved
component is present in the regression. Finally, we discuss our choice of parameter
priors. The general outline and technical details of the Gibbs sampling algorithm
together with a convergence analysis of the sampler are provided in Appendix 3D.
13The results reported in this section change very little if, additionally, lags of the first difference of
the dependent variable ct are added to the component vt.
14Instead of an "unobserved component", the variable µt could alternatively be denoted as a "time-
varying intercept" without changing the implications of the results found in the paper.
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Bayesian estimation
Using a standard classical approach to state space estimation, the Kalman filter could
be applied to estimate the unobserved component and calculate the likelihood, where
the latter would be maximized with respect to the model parameters using an iter-
ative numerical procedure.15 This paper instead follows a Bayesian approach. In
particular, we use a Gibbs sampling approach which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method used to simulate draws from the intractable joint posterior distri-
bution of the parameters and the unobserved state using only tractable conditional
distributions. Our Bayesian approach has a number of advantages. First, as dis-
cussed in the next section, model selection allows for the calculation of the posterior
probability that an integrated unobserved component is present in the regression,
i.e., we calculate the probability of a model with integrated unobserved component
versus a model without integrated unobserved component. Second, model averaging
is possible so that we may calculate parameter estimates - in particular, elasticities -
averaged across both models. In this way, valid parameter estimates can be obtained
for any value of the posterior probability that a non-stationary unobserved compo-
nent is present in the regression. This stands in contrast to the standard classical
cointegration approach where valid parameter estimates can only be obtained under
stationarity, i.e., when there is no integrated unobserved component in the regression
error term. Third, the Gibbs sampler provides small sample posterior distributions
of the parameters making it possible to avoid the use of asymptotic approximations
to parameter distributions.16
Model selection
We test whether to include or exclude the integrated unobserved component to
the regression equation using the stochastic model selection approach for Bayesian
state space models as developed by Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010). Test-
ing whether or not an integrated unobserved component µt is present in eq. (3.10)
amounts to testing σ2η > 0 against σ2η = 0. This is a non-regular testing problem from
a classical viewpoint as the null hypothesis lies on the boundary of parameter space.
Our Bayesian approach is convenient to deal with this problem. In a Bayesian setting
each of the two potential models - i.e. the model for ct that includes the integrated
15Under stationarity assumptions, the obtained maximum likelihood estimates are consistent and
asymptotically Gaussian provided that the model is identified (see e.g, Hamilton, 1994). Chang et al.
(2009) show that these asymptotic properties can be extended to state space models with integrated
observed and latent variables.
16Further advantages compared to the standard classical maximum likelihood (ML) estimation ap-
proach to state space models are (i) the fact that Gibbs sampling is computationally easier to implement
than ML estimation and, as such, does not suffer from the numerical optimization problems inherent to
ML estimation (see Kim and Kim, 2011) and (ii) the fact that both the parameters and the unobserved
state are treated as random variables in a Bayesian setting whereas the traditional ML approach treats
the ML estimates of the parameters as if they are the true values hence neglecting parameter uncertainty
when conducting inference on the unobserved state (see Kim and Nelson, 1999).
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unobserved component and the model for ct that excludes the integrated unobserved
component - is assigned a prior probability, and the posterior probability of each
model is then calculated conditional on the data. Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wag-
ner (2010) extend the Bayesian model selection approach of George and McCulloch
(1993) to state space models. Following their approach, we consider a non-centered
parameterization of the unobserved component µt. A binary stochastic indicator is
then assigned to the integrated unobserved component so that it is either included
in or excluded from eq. (3.10). This indicator is sampled together with the model
parameters in our Gibbs sampling algorithm.
Non-centered specification
We can rewrite eq. (3.12) as
µt = µ+ σηµ
∗
t (3.14)
µ∗t = µ∗t−1 + η
∗
t µ
∗
0 = 0 η
∗
t ∼ iidN (0, 1) (3.15)
where µ is the initial value of µt if µt is time-varying (σ2η > 0) and it is the constant
value of µt when µt is constant (σ2η = 0). Crucially, the non-centered specification
is not identified as the signs of ση - i.e., the square root of the variance σ2η - and
µ∗t in eq. (3.14) can be changed without changing their product. As a result of
this non-identification, the likelihood is symmetric around 0 along the ση dimension.
When σ2η > 0, the likelihood is bimodal with modes −ση and ση . When σ2η = 0, the
likelihood is unimodal around zero. Allowing for non-identification of ση therefore
provides useful information on whether σ2η > 0, and this non-identification can be
exploited when drawing ση and µ∗t in the Gibbs algorithm through the use of a ran-
dom sign switch, i.e., when sampling we multiply both by −1 with probability 0.5
and leave both unaltered with probability 0.5.
Selection of the integrated unobserved component
The non-centered parameterization is useful for model selection as the transformed
component µ∗t , in contrast to µt, does not degenerate to a static component if the
innovation variance equals zero. This means that if the variance σ2η = 0, then ση = 0
in eq. (3.14) and the time-varying part µ∗t of the unobserved component µt drops
from the model. Hence, in the non-centered parameterization the presence or absence
of a non-stationary unobserved component can be expressed as a standard variable
selection problem. In particular, we write
µt = µ+ ισηµ
∗
t (3.16)
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where ι is a binary inclusion indicator which is either 0 or 1. If ι = 1, there is an
integrated unobserved component, µ is the initial value of µt and ση is estimated from
the data. If, on the other hand, ι = 0, there is no integrated unobserved component,
µt becomes constant as µt = µ and ση is set to 0. The binary indicator ι is sampled
together with the other parameters so that from its posterior distribution we can
calculate the posterior inclusion probability of the integrated unobserved component
in the regression.
Parameter priors
Our Bayesian estimation approach requires choosing prior distributions for the model
parameters.
Prior for the binary indicator ι
For the binary inclusion indicator, we assume a Bernoulli prior distribution with
probability p0. When calculating the posterior probability of the unobserved in-
tegrated component in the regression, we set p0 = 0.5 but also report results for
p0 = 0.25 and p0 = 0.75.
Prior for the innovation variance σ2η of the unobserved component
Following Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010), the standard inverse gamma (IG)
prior for the variance of the innovation to the unobserved component is replaced by
a Gaussian prior centered at zero for the square root of the variance. The reason for
this is that when using the standard IG prior distribution for variance parameters,
the choice of the shape and scale hyperparameters that define this distribution has
a strong influence on the posterior distribution when the true value of the variance
is close to zero. More specifically, as the IG distribution does not have probability
mass at zero, using it as a prior distribution tends to push the posterior density away
from zero. This is of particular importance when estimating the variance σ2η of the
innovation to the unobserved component µt as we want to decide whether or not
to include this component in the regression. As can be noted from equations (3.10),
(3.11) and (3.14), since ση is a regression coefficient in the consumption equation, a
further important advantage of the non-centered parameterization is therefore that it
allows us to replace the standard IG prior on the variance parameter σ2η by a Gaussian
prior centered at zero on ση . Centering the prior distribution at zero makes sense as,
for both σ2η = 0 and σ2η > 0, ση is symmetric around zero. Frühwirth-Schnatter
and Wagner (2010) show that the posterior density of ση is much less sensitive to
the hyperparameters of the Gaussian distribution and is not pushed away from zero
when σ2η = 0. In Table 3.2 we report the prior distributions assumed for the model
parameters. As can be seen in the table, we use a Gaussian prior distribution for ση
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with mean zero and a variance equal to 0.10. The variance is chosen such that the
prior distribution has support over a sufficiently large range of relevant parameter
values.
Other priors
As can be seen in Table 3.2, we also use Gaussian prior distributions centered at
zero for the elasticities φ, for the constant µ of the integrated unobserved component
and for the coefficients ρ on the contemporaneous values and leads and lags of the
first differences of the regressors. Again, the variances of these prior distributions
are chosen such that the distributions have support over a sufficiently large range of
relevant parameter values, i.e., a unit variance is used for the prior distributions of φ,
µ and ρ. Finally, for the variance σ2ε of the error term ε we use an IG prior distribution
with a relatively high belief equal to 0.01 and a relatively low strength equal to 0.01
(see Bauwens et al., 2000, for details on prior beliefs and strengths).17 By giving a
relatively high prior value to the parameter σ2ε , we give a relatively high weight to
the stationary component in the regression vt compared to the integrated component
µt. In general, all priors are rather flat so that the results reported in the next section
are driven mostly by the data and are not very sensitive to the priors chosen.
Gaussian priors N (b0, V0) Percentiles
mean (b0) variance (V0) 5% 95%
Elasticities on regressors xt φ 0.00 1.00 −1.64 1.64
Constant I(1) component µ 0.00 1.00 −1.64 1.64
Square root variance I(1) component ση 0.00 0.10 −0.52 0.52
Coeff. on lags/leads of ∆xt (DOLS terms) ρ 0.00 1.00 −1.64 1.64
Inverse Gamma prior IG(ν0T, ν0Tσ20 ) Percentiles
belief (σ20 ) strength (ν0) 5% 95%
Variance error term εt σ2ε 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.12
Notes: The basic regression equation is ct = xtφ + µt + vt. The random walk I(1) component is µt = µ + ισηµ∗t with
µ∗t = µ∗t−1 + η
∗
t . The stationary I(0) component is vt = ∑
p
j=−p ∆xt+jρj + εt. With p = 6 and data available over the
period 1951Q4− 2016Q4, the effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2 and the effective sample size is T = 248 (i.e., 261
observations minus 1 for first-differencing and minus 12 for constructing leads and lags).
Table 3.2: Prior distributions regression parameters
17Note that the strength 0.01 times the sample size T can be interpreted as the number of fictional
observations used to construct the prior belief.
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3.5.3 Results
This section presents the results of the estimation of the unobserved component
model. Table 3.3 presents the posterior probabilities that there is an integrated un-
observed component present in the basic regression eq. (3.10). These are reported
for different prior probabilities p0 and for the two regression specifications that we
consider, i.e., for regressor vector xt =
[
at yt
]
(panel A) and regressor vector
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
(panel B). The results provide strong evidence that there is
an unobserved random walk component present in the regression, i.e., all posterior
probabilities are found to be equal to 1.
(A) (B)
xt =
[
at yt
]
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
p0 = 0.5 1 1
p0 = 0.75 1 1
p0 = 0.25 1 1
Notes: The regression equation is ct = xtφ + µt + vt. Reported is the posterior inclusion
probability of the integrated unobserved component µt. It is calculated as the average of
the 10.000 ι’s with each ι sampled in a Gibbs iteration. The prior distribution of the binary
indicator ι is Bernoulli with probability p0. The effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2.
Table 3.3: Posterior inclusion probabilities p(ι = 1) of an integrated
unobserved component (for different prior inclusion probabilities p0)
In Table 3.4 we present the posterior means and 90% highest posterior density
(HPD) intervals of the posterior distributions for the fixed parameters of the unob-
served component model given by eqs. (3.10), (3.11), (3.13), (3.16) and (3.15) with the
exception of the coefficients ρj in eq. (3.13) which are excluded due to space con-
straints. Again, we present results for regressor vector xt =
[
at yt
]
(panel A) and
for regressor vector xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
(panel B). Furthermore, we present results
both with the binary indicator set to 1 and with the binary indicator set to 0. Set-
ting ι = 1 is in line with the posterior inclusion probabilities equal to 1 as reported
in Table 3.3, i.e., the integrated component is included in the model and estimated.
Setting ι = 0 is in line with the models estimated in the existing literature, i.e., the
non-stationarity of zt in eq. (3.10) is typically not accounted for.18 From the table
we note that when we neglect the non-stationary component in zt (i.e. when ι = 0)
the impact of log assets at on log consumption ct is somewhat overestimated, i.e., in
18Frequentist estimates using dynamic least-squares (DLS) like in Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) or
(2015) yield coefficients on at, yt, ast and a
ns
t that are mostly similar to the ones reported in Table 3.4 for
which ι = 0. When the frequentist coefficients are different (for αns and µ), these coefficients are even
further away from the ones with the assumption that ι = 1 than the Bayesian estimates with ι = 0.
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panel A the elasticity α is found to be equal to 0.27 when ι = 0 and equal to 0.24
when ι = 1. From panel B in the table we find that this difference can be attributed
to the non-stock part of assets ans as αns equals 0.25 when ι = 0 and only 0.18 when
ι = 1 (while the estimates for αs are essentially the same when ι = 0 and when
ι = 1). Panel B of the table further shows that non-stock asset wealth, which consists
mainly of housing wealth, has a larger long run impact on consumption than stock
wealth. This finding is in line with results reported in the literature (see e.g. Davis
and Palumbo, 2001; Carroll et al., 2011). The standard deviation |ση | of the error term
of the integrated random walk component µt is estimated only when ι = 1 and is
found to be larger than zero both in panels A and B. This result for |ση | suggests that
there is important time-variation in µt and corroborates the finding of a posterior
inclusion probability p(ι = 1) equal to 1 as reported in Table 3.3.
(A) (B)
xt =
[
at yt
]
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
(1) (2) (1) (2)
ι = 1 ι = 0 ι = 1 ι = 0
α 0.2382 0.2728 - -
[0.1722,0.3041] [0.2405,0.3050]
αs - - 0.0817 0.0881
[0.0428,0.1243] [0.0763,0.1000]
αns - - 0.1783 0.2486
[0.1175,0.2391] [0.2078,0.2895]
β 0.7209 0.7575 0.7161 0.7115
[0.6412,0.8004] [0.7218,0.7934] [0.6249,0.8045] [0.6662,0.7576]
µ 0.0718 -0.6491 0.0424 -0.7449
[-0.1781,0.3196] [-0.7226,-0.5753] [-0.1800,0.2778] [-0.8554,-0.6345]
|ση | 0.0033 - 0.0035 -
[0.0025,0.0043] [0.0026,0.0045]
σ2ε .00028 .00055 .00027 .00045
[.00024,.00032] [.00048,.00064] [.00023,.00032] [.00039,.00052]
Notes: Reported are the posterior mean with 90% HPD interval (in square brackets). In panel A of the
table the coefficient vector is φ =
[
α β
]′
and in panel B it is φ =
[
αs αns β
]′
. The random
walk I(1) component is µt = µ + ισηµ∗t with µ∗t = µ∗t−1 + η
∗
t . The stationary I(0) component is vt =
∑
p
j=−p ∆xt+jρj + εt. The coefficients ρj are excluded from the table due to space constraints. With p = 6
and data available over the period 1951Q4− 2016Q4, the effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2
and the effective sample size is T = 248 (i.e., 261 observations minus 1 for first-differencing and minus
12 for constructing leads and lags).
Table 3.4: Posterior distributions parameters of equation
ct = xtφ+ µt + vt
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Figure 3.2 presents the estimated random walk µt and its components as obtained
from the estimation of eq. (3.10) with xt =
[
at yt
]
and ι = 1, i.e. as obtained
from the estimates reported in Table 3.4 panel A with ι = 1. Results obtained with
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
and ι = 1 are very similar and therefore not reported. The upper
left panel of the figure presents µt. From the non-centered specification given by eq.
(3.14), the initial value µ of the random walk is presented in the upper right panel of
the figure while the time-varying part σηµ∗t of the random walk is presented in the
lower left panel. Based on these figures we confirm that there is considerable time-
variation in µt. The rather wide 90% HPD intervals around the posterior mean of µt
stem mainly from uncertainty surrounding the initial value µ while the HPD intervals
around the time-varying part σηµ∗t are much narrower. The posterior distribution of
ση (i.e., the square root of the variance σ2η ) presented in the lower right panel of the
figure is clearly bimodal and therefore again constitutes evidence that points toward
time-variation in µt and thus to the presence of a random walk µt in eq. (3.10).
(a) Integrated component µt
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Note: Depicted in the first three figures are the posterior means with shaded areas denoting the 90% HPD interval.
All figures are based on the results of Table 3.4 panel A with ι = 1. The effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2.
Figure 3.2: The integrated component µt, its initial value µ and time-varying part
σηµ
∗
t , and the posterior distribution of the square root of its error variance ση
Figure 3.3 then presents the posterior means and 90% HPD intervals of the sta-
tionary component vt both for ι = 0, i.e. when no integrated unobserved component
is included in the model, and for ι = 1, i.e. when the non-stationary random walk
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µt is included in the model and estimated. In the former case, vt corresponds to
the traditional proxy for the consumption to total wealth ratio "cay" estimated in the
literature so we denote it by cayt. We find that it is nearly identical to the standard
"cay" as calculated and reported by Lettau and Ludvigson (2015). In the latter case,
vt constitutes a new "cay" obtained after controlling for an unobserved integrated
component. We denote this series by cayintt . The figure reveals that cay
int
t is consid-
erably less persistent (i.e. more stationary) than cayt as the non-stationarity in zt in
eq. (3.10) is entirely soaked up by µt in this case.19 The variable cayintt can be inter-
preted as the stationary or transitory component of the consumption-to-wealth ratio
while the integrated unobserved component µt constitutes the permanent component
of the consumption-to-wealth ratio. In Section 3.5.5, we take a closer look at cayintt
but first, in Section 3.5.4, we present an interpretation for the unobserved integrated
component µt.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
·10−2
cayintt cayt
Notes: Depicted are the posterior means. The shaded areas denote the 90% HPD interval. cayintt is calculated from
the results of Table 3.4 panel A with ι = 1. cayt is calculated from the results of Table 3.4 panel A with ι = 0. The
effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2.
Figure 3.3: The stationary component vt for ι = 1 (cayintt ) and ι = 0 (cayt)
3.5.4 Interpretation of the unobserved component µt
In this section we first link the estimated integrated unobserved component found
in the regression of consumption on assets and earnings to a proxy for financial
liberalization. Second, we discuss and estimate the theoretical channel by which
the unobserved component - interpreted as stemming from financial liberalization -
19Moreover, note from the figure that the HPD interval around cayintt is wider than that around cayt
which stems from the fact that the estimation of cayintt entails the estimation of both fixed parameters
and a time-varying state - i.e. the unobserved component µt - while the estimation of cayt entails only
the estimation of fixed parameters.
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affects the consumption-to-wealth ratio.
Linking the unobserved component to financial liberalization
By relaxing liquidity constraints, financial liberalization may have increased the prop-
ensity to consume out of (total) wealth over time, and thereby raised the consump-
tion to wealth ratio. Figure 3.4 shows the estimated unobserved component µt and
Abiad et al. (2010)’s proxy for financial liberalization in the US, which we denote by
f lt and which is available over the period 1973Q1− 2005Q4. Note that in the figure
both variables are re-scaled so as to make them comparable graphically. The finan-
cial liberalization index of Abiad et al. (2010) is a mixture of indicators of financial
development (credit controls and ceilings, interest rate liberalization, capital account
transactions, securities market development, banking sector supervision). More de-
tails on this index are provided in Appendix 3A. We choose this particular proxy
over other proxies because - since it is based on readings of laws and regulations - it
is more likely to be driven by credit supply and less by demand.20 From the figure,
we note the similar trend in both measures. This suggests that financial liberaliza-
tion may be - at least partially - responsible for the structural increase in the proxied
consumption-to-wealth ratio and hence for the failure to find a stationary long-run
relationship (i.e. cointegration) between consumption and wealth (where the latter
is proxied by assets and earnings). We note that the structural increase in the (un-
observed) US consumption to total wealth ratio due to financial liberalization is in
line with the structural decrease in the (observed) US household saving to disposable
income ratio as documented by Carroll et al. (2012). They note that this development
can be largely attributed to financial liberalization.
A more formal approach however is needed to investigate the financial liberaliza-
tion interpretation of µt. To this end, we conduct Engle-Granger cointegration tests
between consumption, assets, earnings and our proxy for financial liberalization. We
note that ct, at, yt and µt are cointegrated by construction since the unobserved com-
ponent µt is added to the regression equation for that specific purpose. Finding
cointegration between ct, at, yt and f lt however when - as noted in Section 3.4.2 -
there is no cointegration between ct, at and yt would provide strong support for the
liberalization story. The results of the conducted tests are presented in Table 3.5. We
test for cointegration between ct, at, yt and f lt/ f l+t where f l
+
t equals f lt over the
period 1973Q1− 2005Q4 after which it is set to the last available value of f lt for the
remainder of the sample which is a value that indicates full financial liberalization.
20This in contrast to alternative measures such as household liabilities to disposable income or the
credit easing accumulated (CEA) index - see Carroll et al. (2012) - which is strongly based on the
household liabilities ratio. Upon using the CEA index instrumented by the Abiad et al. (2010) index,
we find similar results as those reported in this section for the Abiad et al. (2010) index.
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Notes: Depicted is the posterior mean of µt re-scaled by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation.
µt is calculated from the results of Table 3.4 panel A with ι = 1. Depicted is Abiad et al. (2010)’s index of financial
liberalization f lt re-scaled by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation. The effective sample
period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2 but f lt is only available over the period 1973Q1− 2005Q4.
Figure 3.4: The unobserved component µt and Abiad et al. (2010)’s index of financial
liberalization f lt
We also test for cointegration between ct, ast , a
ns
t , yt and f lt/ f l
+
t . From the table,
we note that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 10% level for
all the conducted regressions between the variables ct, at, yt and f lt/ f l+t . For the
variables ct, ast , a
ns
t , yt and f lt/ f l
+
t , the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 10%
level only over the sample period 1973Q1− 2016Q4 (i.e., for the largest sample size
which provides more power to the test). All in all, the results presented provide
reasonable evidence that the lack of cointegration between consumption, assets and
earnings and, therefore, the presence of an integrated unobserved component in the
relationship between these variables - which implies a non-stationary consumption-
to-wealth ratio ct − wt - can be attributed to financial liberalization. The theoretical
channel by which this occurs is investigated in the next section.
Channel
The theoretical framework of Section 3.2 is based only on the budget constraint of a
representative consumer. To incorporate financial liberalization into our model, we
now also impose behavioral restrictions on the representative consumer. In particular,
we consider a first-order condition that incorporates a potentially binding liquidity
constraint (see e.g. Zeldes, 1989), i.e.,
Et
[
δRt+1
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
(1+ λt)
]
= 1 (3.17)
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c, a, y, f l c, as, ans, y, f l
73Q1− 05Q4 73Q1− 16Q4 73Q1− 07Q3 73Q1− 05Q4 73Q1− 16Q4 73Q1− 07Q3
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
-3.82 -4.09 -3.98 -3.81 -4.25 -3.99
5% and 10% critical values (4 variables) 5% and 10% critical values (5 variables)
5% −4.10 5% −4.41
10% −3.81 10% −4.13
Notes: The null hypothesis tested is the no cointegration hypothesis. A constant is included in the cointegrating equation. The
5% and 10% critical values are taken from MacKinnon (2010). The number of lags included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller
regression is based on the Bayesian information criterion. The sample 1973Q1 − 2005Q4 uses Abiad et al. (2010)’s index of
financial liberalization f lt which is only available over this period. The samples 1973Q1− 2016Q4 and 1973Q1− 2007Q3 use the
financial liberalization variable f l+t which equals Abiad et al. (2010)’s index f lt over the period 1973Q1− 2005Q4 after which it
is set to the last value f lt takes for the remainder of the sample which is a value indicating full financial liberalization.
Table 3.5: Engle-Granger cointegration test between c, a, y and f l and c, as, ans, y and f l
where δ is the consumer’s discount factor, Rt = 1+ rt+1 is the gross real rate of return
on assets, u′(Ct) is marginal utility of consumption with u(Ct) the utility function
and Ct the period t consumption level, and λt is the (normalized) Lagrange multiplier
associated with the period t liquidity constraint which is positive when the constraint
is binding and zero when the constraint is not binding. From eq. (3.17), we can write
δRt+1
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct) (1 + λt) = 1 + et+1 where et+1 is an expectation error uncorrelated with
period t information. We can then specify the utility function as being of the CRRA
type so that u(C) = C
1−θ
1−θ with coefficient of relative risk aversion θ > 0 and write
δRt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−θ
(1 + λt) = 1 + et+1. After taking logs of both sides of this expression
and solving for the growth rate in consumption ∆ct+1 = ct+1− ct = ln(Ct+1)− ln(Ct),
we obtain,
∆ct+1 =
1
θ
ln δ+
1
θ
ln Rt+1 +
1
θ
ln(1+ λt)− 1
θ
(1+ et+1) (3.18)
Financial liberalization can be expected to make liquidity constraints less binding,
thereby reducing λt and leading to a lower future consumption growth rate ∆ct+1. If
financial liberalization is (stochastically) trended, aggregate consumption growth is
non-stationary. And if the trend in financial liberalization is upward, then consump-
tion growth decreases permanently. If future consumption growth is permanently
reduced, the intertemporal budget constraint then suggests that - ceteris paribus -
the (log) current consumption-to-wealth ratio ct − wt can increase permanently. This
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should be clear from eq. (3.5), which is repeated here for convenience, i.e.,
ct − wt = Et
∞
∑
j=1
ρj(rt+j − ∆ct+j) (3.19)
The proposed channel can be tested by conducting regressions of the present
discounted value of future consumption growth ∑hj=1 ρ
j∆ct+j - with h the consid-
ered horizon - on the integrated unobserved component µt, which is the permanent
component of the consumption-to-wealth ratio ct − wt. The financial liberalization
interpretation of µt suggests that the impact of µt should be negative, i.e., higher
financial liberalization and therefore a higher µt and ct − wt implies lower future ag-
gregate consumption growth. In Table 3.6, we present the results of the estimation
of this relationship for discount factors ρ equal to 1 and 0.99. Because µt is non-
stationary and ∆ct is expected to be non-stationary - whereby considering longer
horizons exacerbates the problem as summing consumption growth rates increases
their persistence by construction - our estimation method must be such that spurious
results are avoided. As noted by Hamilton (1994, pages 561-562), this can be achieved
by a Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment for first-order serial correlation in the residuals
of the regression of ∑hj=1 ρ
j∆ct+j on µt (which is asymptotically equivalent to first-
differencing the regression equation). In the table we further report the results of a
Cochrane-Orcutt regression of ∑hj=1 ρ
jrt+j on µt. We do this because from eq. (3.19),
it can be seen that an integrated unobserved component µt leading to a structural
increase in the consumption to wealth ratio ct − wt could stem from a negative im-
pact of that component on the present discounted value of aggregate consumption
growth, but also from a positive impact of that component on the present discounted
value of the returns on wealth. Since no data are available for the returns on total
wealth, we use real stock market returns rs,t as a proxy for rt (see Appendix 3A for
details). The results reported in the table show that there is indeed a negative impact
of the unobserved component µt on the present discounted value of future consump-
tion growth, which is significant for all horizons considered with the exception of the
one quarter horizon case. This result provides further support for the interpretation
of the integrated unobserved component µt as stemming from financial liberalization
and acting through the channel described above. On the other hand, while the impact
of µt on the present discounted value of future returns on wealth (proxied by stock
market returns) is as expected positive, it is never significant.
3.5.5 Characteristics of the cayint variable
Following the discussion of the non-stationary component of the consumption-to-
wealth ratio ct−wt, we now take a closer look at the stationary component of ct−wt,
which we denoted in Section 3.5.3 by cayintt . The persistence and stationarity prop-
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ρ = 1 ρ = 0.99
Horizon h (in quarters) Horizon h (in quarters)
mt = 1 16 32 48 64 1 16 32 48 64
∆ct -0.02 -1.24 -2.56 -1.54 -2.63 -0.02 -1.25 -2.32 -1.50 -2.16
(-0.91) (-2.21) (-3.86) (-1.98) (-3.43) (-0.92) (-2.38) (-3.85) (-2.35) (-3.41)
rs,t 0.10 2.91 2.78 6.18 1.19 0.10 2.64 2.64 5.00 1.94
(0.61) (1.28) (0.68) (1.12) (0.16) (0.61) (1.25) (0.74) (1.11) (0.36)
Notes: The table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter b with t-statistics between brackets. The t-statistics
are calculated from standard errors based on outer gradient products. ∆ct is the growth rate in real per capita personal
consumption expenditures and rs,t is the real stock market return. For µt the posterior mean of the integrated unobserved
component is used which is obtained from estimating the unobserved component model discussed above. The effective
sample period is different in every case depending on the horizon h considered.
Table 3.6: Cochrane-Orcutt estimation of equation ∑hj=1 ρ
jmt+j = a + bµt + et+h
(with et+h = δet+h−1 + εt+h)
erties of the cay variables calculated from the unobserved component model - i.e.
cayintt which is calculated from the model with an unobserved integrated component
included and estimated, and cayt which is calculated from the standard model with
no unobserved integrated component included - are quite different. The AR(1) coeffi-
cient obtained from a regression of each cay on its own lag and a constant shows that
cayintt - with an AR(1) coefficient of less than 0.5 - is considerably less persistent than
the standard cayt - which has an AR(1) coefficient equal to 0.91. We also conduct an
(augmented) Dickey-Fuller unit root test on the standard cayt variable, which shows
that a unit root cannot be rejected using the standard critical values at both the 5%
and even 10% levels of significance. This confirms the results reported above in Table
3.1 for the standard cointegration approach. The cayintt variable, on the other hand, is
stationary by construction.
The findings concerning the persistence and stationarity of the variables cayintt
and cayt are important to evaluate their predictive ability for excess stock returns.
According to the theory discussed in Section 3.2, the consumption to total wealth ra-
tio is expected to have predictive power for the returns on wealth. The literature has
in particular focussed on the ability of the "cay" proxy to predict future excess stock
returns, as much of the variation in "cay" is attributed to the stock market component
of assets at around the less variable consumption ct and earnings yt variables (see
e.g, Lettau and Ludvigson, 2004). As noted by Ferson et al. (2003), if underlying ex-
pected excess returns are persistent then using highly persistent (i.e. non-stationary)
regressors in typical forecasting models of excess returns will yield spurious results.
Moreover, as noted by Rudd and Whelan (2006), this problem is likely more serious
when longer horizon excess returns are used, as these are more persistent by con-
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struction. Since the variable cayintt is stationary by construction while the evidence
reported above suggests that the standard cayt variable is not stationary, it is useful
to investigate the predictive power of cayintt for excess stock returns and compare it
to the potentially spurious predictive ability of the cayt variable. We consider both
the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive ability for excess stock returns of our
cayintt variable as calculated from a regression of ct on at and yt that contains an inte-
grated unobserved component. Excess stock returns, denoted by res,t, are defined as
the difference between the log real stock market return and the log real three-month
Treasury bill rate. More details on this series and its calculation are provided in Ap-
pendix 3A. We note that the results for stock returns not in excess of a risk-free rate
are very similar to those for excess stock returns. Hence, we follow the literature
which has focussed especially on excess returns and report these results. The results
for returns that are not in excess of a risk-free rate are unreported but available from
the authors upon request.
Table 3.7 presents the results of in-sample forecast regressions at different hori-
zons for excess stock returns using as predictors the cayintt and cayt variables. Fol-
lowing the literature, we consider horizons of one, four, eight, twelve and sixteen
quarters and we report the regression coefficient on each "cay" variable of the fore-
cast regression for res,t, its corresponding Newey-West corrected t-statistic, and the
adjusted R2 of the forecast regression. From the t-statistics and adjusted R2’s re-
ported in the table, we note that the standard cayt variable has strong predictive
power for excess stock returns and that this predictive ability increases considerably
when longer horizons are considered. However, since the discussion of the previous
section casts doubt on the stationarity of the variable cayt, these results may be spu-
rious. It is therefore interesting to note that our variable cayintt , which is stationary by
construction, still has considerable predictive power for excess stock returns. As can
be seen when comparing the t-statistics and R2’s in the table, the predictive power
of cayintt is lower compared to that of cayt, but it is nonetheless still important. We
find t-statistics of the regression coefficient on cayintt in the forecast regression above
2.5 for horizons from four to sixteen quarters and R2’s of the forecast regression as
high as 10% and 12% at eight and twelve quarter horizons respectively. Ferson et al.
(2003) argue that R2’s of this magnitude can be considered economically significant.
Moreover, the magnitudes of the R2’s reported in Table 3.7 are in accordance with
the univariate predictability results typically reported in the literature using other
predictors for excess stock returns (see Ferson et al., 2003, for an overview).
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Horizon h (in quarters)
kt = 1 4 8 12 16
cayintt 1.50 5.93 10.79 10.93 9.32
(1.80) (3.16) (4.49) (3.61) (2.68)
[0.01] [0.06] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09]
cayt 0.73 2.91 5.54 7.20 8.27
(2.71) (3.21) (4.37) (5.60) (6.91)
[0.02] [0.10] [0.21] [0.27] [0.31]
Notes: The effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2. The table reports OLS estimates of
the parameter b with Newey-West corrected t-statistics between brackets and the adjusted R2
of the regression between square brackets. res,t is the stock excess return. cay
int
t is the estimated
stationary part of the log consumption to wealth ratio as obtained from the model containing
an integrated unobserved component. cayt is the estimated log consumption to wealth ratio
as obtained from the standard model without an integrated unobserved component.
Table 3.7: In-sample forecast regressions for excess stock returns
∑hj=1 r
e
s,t+i = a + bkt + εt+h
We next consider the the out-of-sample forecast performance of the cayintt vari-
able for excess stock returns. In particular, our evaluation is based on root mean
squared error (RMSE) ratios calculated from 60-quarter rolling forecasting regres-
sions for excess stock returns, again over different horizons. Table 3.8 presents RMSE
ratios which are calculated as the ratio of the RSME based on a forecast regression for
cayint over the RSME based on a forecast regression for an alternative predictor. As al-
ternative predictors for the excess stock returns res,t, we consider the variable cayt, the
lagged excess stock return res,t−1 (i.e., assuming an AR(1) process for excess returns)
and a constant c (i.e., using the sample mean of res,t as a predictor). A ratio below one
means that the cayintt based forecast model performs better than the alternative fore-
cast model and a ratio above one means that the cayintt based model performs worse.
We also calculate the modified Diebold-Mariano (MDM) statistic that tests the null
hypothesis that the mean squared error (MSE) of the forecasts obtained with cayintt
is the same as the one obtained from the alternative forecast model considered. The
p-value of this test is reported between square brackets. From the table we note that,
based on the reported RMSE ratios, the cayintt variable performs worse than cayt at
longer horizons (i.e., at horizons of twelve and sixteen quarters) and better at shorter
horizons (i.e., at horizons of four and eight quarters). The reported MDM statistics
however suggest that - with the exception of the sixteen quarter horizon case - these
differences are not significant. Hence, we can conclude that the predictive ability of
cayintt for excess stock returns is largely comparable to that of cayt. The table further
shows that the RMSE ratios obtained from using cayintt as a predictor for excess stock
returns versus lagged returns or a simple constant are lower than one at all horizons.
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This suggests out-of-sample prediction using cayintt which is superior to that which
can be achieved by these naive models. However, upon looking at the p-values of
the MDM statistics reported in the table, we find that these differences are seldom
significant (i.e., only in the eight quarter horizon case).
Horizon h (in quarters)
kt = 1 4 8 12 16
cayt 1.00 0.97 0.95 1.06 1.22
[0.59] [0.58] [0.60] [0.17] [0.02]
res,t−1 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.95
[0.88] [0.11] [0.03] [0.21] [0.20]
c 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.96
[0.70] [0.35] [0.05] [0.29] [0.38]
Notes: The effective sample period is 1953Q3− 2015Q2. The table reports root mean squared
error (RMSE) ratios obtained from out-of-sample h-period ahead forecasts of the excess stock
returns res,t using 60-quarter rolling subsamples. Forecasts are based on the predictive variables
cayintt and kt where kt is either cayt, the lagged excess return r
e
s,t−1 or a constant c. RMSE
ratios are calculated as the ratio of the RSME based on cayint as a predictive variable over the
RSME based on kt as a predictive variable. A ratio below 1 means that the cayint based forecast
model performs better than the alternative forecast model and a ratio above 1 means that the
cayint based model performs worse. Between square brackets is the p-value of the modified
Diebold-Mariano statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the mean squared error (MSE) of
the forecasts obtained with cayintt and kt are the same. cay
int
t is the estimated stationary part
of the log consumption to wealth ratio as obtained from the model containing an integrated
unobserved component. cayt is the estimated log consumption to wealth ratio as obtained from
the standard model without an integrated unobserved component.
Table 3.8: Out-of-sample forecast evaluations for excess stock returns
(RMSEcayintt /RMSEkt measure)
3.6 Conclusions
This paper proposes an alternative empirical approach to study the long run ag-
gregate relationship between household consumption and household wealth, where
household wealth consists of tangible assets and unobserved human wealth. The
evidence in favor of a stable cointegrating relationship between consumption, assets
and earnings (as a proxy for human wealth) in the US is weak. Hence, the consump-
tion to total wealth ratio (i.e., the variable "cay") estimated from such a relationship
is non-stationary - rendering it inadequate to predict excess stock returns - while
the elasticities of consumption to wealth estimated from this type of regression are
unreliable.
The approach followed in this paper applies an unobserved component model
to US data over the period 1951Q4− 2016Q4 whereby the regression of consump-
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tion on assets and earnings is augmented with an integrated unobserved component.
Our results strongly support the presence of an integrated unobserved component
in the consumption equation. The residuals of this regression are stationary be-
cause consumption, assets, earnings and the integrated unobserved component are
cointegrated by construction. The elasticities of consumption to assets and earnings
are positive and those estimated for assets (and their components) tend to be lower
compared to the case where no integrated component is added to the regression.
We interpret the integrated unobserved component as stemming from financial lib-
eralization which, by relaxing liquidity constraints of consumers, has permanently
increased the consumption-to-wealth ratio over the sample period. We calculate an
alternative "cay" variable, i.e., the stationary part of the consumption-to-wealth ratio,
which is much less persistent than the traditional "cay" variable. In-sample, we find
that its predictive ability for future excess stock returns, while diminished compared
to that of the traditional "cay" variable, is statistically and economically significant
and in line with the univariate predictability results typically reported in the litera-
ture for excess stock returns using other predictors. Out-of-sample, we find that its
predictive ability for future excess stock returns is comparable to that of the standard
"cay" variable.
3.7 Appendix
Appendix 3A. Data
Quarterly seasonally adjusted data for consumption, earnings (disposable labor in-
come), population and the price deflator are collected from the National income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) at the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The assets (wealth) data are collected from the Flow of
Funds Accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Consumption is measured as total personal consumption expenditures (line 1 of
NIPA Table 2.3.5).
Earnings are defined as the sum of compensation for employees (line 2 of NIPA
Table 2.1) plus personal current transfer receipts (line 16) minus contributions for
domestic government social insurance (line 25) and minus personal labor taxes. Per-
sonal labor taxes are derived by first calculating the labor income fraction of total
income, and subsequently using this ratio to back out the share of labor taxes from
the total personal current taxes (line 26). The labor income to total income ratio is de-
fined as the ratio of wages and salaries (line 3) to the sum of wages and salaries (line
3), proprietors’ income (line 9), rental income (line 12) and personal income receipts
on assets (line 13).
Assets are defined as the net worth of households and nonprofit organizations,
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measured at the end of the period. Stock market wealth is defined as households’
and nonprofit organizations’ holdings of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, life
insurance reserves, and private and public pension entitlements. Non-stock wealth is
defined as non-stock assets minus liabilities. The non-stock assets consist of house-
holds’ and nonprofit organizations’ holdings of consumer durable goods, real estate,
and non-stock financial assets (total currency and deposits including money market
fund shares, debt securities, mortgages, proprietors’ equity in non-corporate business
and other assets). Liabilities include all loans, such as mortgages, consumer debt and
other loans.
Stock returns are the returns (excluding dividends) of the value-weighted CRSP
index from the Center for Research in Security Prices. The CRSP index is a broad
stock market index including the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ and ARCA, and the data
are collected from CRSP via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Excess stock returns are defined as the difference between the quarterly log real
stock market return (as stated above) and the quarterly log real 3-month Treasury
Bill return (i.e., the "risk free rate"). The 3-month Treasury Bill data is the secondary
market rate, not seasonally adjusted, collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St.Louis.
Financial liberalization is proxied by the Index of Financial Reform by Abiad et al.
(2010). The annual index covers the period 1973-2005 and includes seven different
dimensions of financial sector policy: credit controls and reserve requirements, in-
terest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets,
banking regulations and restrictions on the capital account. Liberalization scores for
each category are combined in a graded index which is normalized from zero to one.
All series except the financial liberalization proxy are deflated with the price index
for total personal consumption expenditures (line 1 of NIPA Table 2.3.4) with base
year 2009 = 100. All variables except the (excess) stock returns and the financial
liberalization proxy are further expressed in per capita terms, with population data
also collected from the NIPA (line 40 of Table 2.1).
Appendix 3B. Unit root and cointegration tests
In Table 3.9 we present the t-statistics from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit root
tests for the variables c, y , a, as and ans. In Table 3.10 we present a summary of
the results of a number of additional tests conducted to determine whether there
is cointegration between the variables c, a and y or between the variables c, as, ans
and y. These tests by and large suggest that there is no cointegration between the
variables c, a and y nor between the variables c, as, ans and y. We note that some
of these tests like the Engle and Granger (1987), Phillips and Ouliaris (1990), and
Johansen (1988, 1991) tests have the absence of cointegration as the null hypothesis
82 CHAPTER 3. WEALTH AND CONSUMPTION
while others like Park (1990)’s added variable test have the presence of cointegration
as the null hypothesis. According to Park (1990) and Ogaki and Park (1997), the
inability to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the variable zt in eqs. (3.8)
and (3.9) may be due to a potential lack of power of cointegration tests that have the
absence of cointegration as the null hypothesis. Park’s (1990) added variable test has
cointegration as the null hypothesis and - for the full sample period - cannot reject
the null of cointegration when a linear deterministic time trend is added to mimic
the potential stochastic trend in zt, but does reject cointegration when the potential
stochastic trend is mimicked in a more general and realistic way through the addition
of a linear, quadratic and cubic time trend to the regression. This suggests that the
failure of finding cointegration does not stem from statistical issues - i.e., the lack
of power to reject a false null hypothesis - of standard cointegration tests. Rather, it
suggests that there is in fact a unit root present in zt.
Level 1st difference
ct -1.28 [0.64] -7.90 [0.00]
yt -1.91 [0.33] -15.76 [0.00]
αt -0.02 [0.96] -12.74 [0.00]
αst -0.40 [0.91] -14.50 [0.00]
αnst -0.80 [0.82] -3.43 [0.01]
Notes: Reported are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics. The null hypothesis tested is the
existence of a unit root. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are presented in square brackets. A
constant is included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression, and the number of lags included
is based on the Bayesian information criterion.
Table 3.9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
"
c, a, y c, as, ans, y
Sample 1951Q4− 2016Q4 1951Q4− 2007Q3 1951Q4− 2016Q4 1951Q4− 2007Q3
Engle-Granger No No No No
Phillips-Ouliaris No No No No
Johansen Trace 1 lag No No No No
Johansen Max Eig. 1 lag No No No No
Park’s H(0,1) test Yes No Yes No
Park’s H(0,3) test No No No No
Notes: The residual-based Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration tests and the Johansen Trace and Maximum Eigen-
value methodology test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, whereas Park’s H(q, p) added variable test, with time trends of
powers q up to order p, evaluates the null hypothesis of cointegration. Conclusions are based on 5% significance levels.
Table 3.10: A battery of frequentist tests for cointegration between c, a and y and between c,
as, ans and y
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Appendix 3C. A more general unobserved component model
We also consider and estimate a more general unobserved component model. Specif-
ically, we model the unobserved component µt as a weighted average of two random
walks, µ˘t and µ˜t, with the weights given by a regime switching variable St, i.e.,
µt = (1− St)µ˘t + Stµ˜t (3.20)
The variable St is assumed to follow a first-order two-state Markov switching process
(i.e., it takes on either the value of 0 or the value of 1). As in Section 3.5.2, we specify
the random walks in non-centered form as,
µ˘t = µ
′ + σ′η µ˘∗t = µ′ (3.21)
and
µ˜t = µ+ σηµ
∗
t (3.22)
where µ˘∗t and µ∗t are standardized random walks given by µ˘∗t = µ˘∗t−1 + η
′
t with µ˘
∗
0 = 0
and η′t ∼ iidN (0, 1), respectively µ∗t = µ∗t−1 + η∗t with µ∗0 = 0 and η∗t ∼ iidN (0, 1).
In eq. (3.21), we assume that σ′η = 0 so that µ˘t is constant and the unobserved
component µt is a constant µ′ in one regime and follows a standard random walk
with initial value µ in the other regime. Using eqs. (3.21) and (3.22) into eq. (3.20)
then gives,
µt = (1− St)µ′ + Stµ+ Stσηµ∗t (3.23)
This specification nests a number of models. First, if ση = 0, the consumption
equation does not contain an unobserved integrated process but includes a Markov
switching intercept along the lines of Bianchi et al. (2017). Second, if µ = µ′, the
unobserved component is given by µt = µ+ Stσηµ∗t . This model is similar in spirit
to a mixture innovation model along the lines of McCulloch and Tsay (1993), i.e., if
the variable St = 0 then µt = µ and the unobserved component is constant while if
St = 1 then µt = µ+ σηµ∗t and the unobserved component follows a random walk.
Third, if St = 1 (∀t), the model collapses to the model discussed in Sections 3.5.1 and
3.5.2 of the main text, i.e., with an unobserved component given by µt = µ+ σηµ∗t .
Upon estimation of the state space model presented in the text with a more general
specification for the unobserved component µt as given by eq. (3.23), we do indeed
estimate St = 1 (∀t) while we find ση 6= 0 so that this model collapses to the model
presented in the main text of this paper. We do not present the estimation details nor
the estimation results for this model but these are available from the authors upon
request.
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Appendix 3D. Gibbs sampler
This appendix first briefly presents the steps of the Gibbs sampler. Then, technical
details are discussed in Section 3D-2. Finally, a convergence analysis is provided in
Section 3D-3.
3D-1. General outline
We collect the constant parameters in a vector Γ, i.e., Γ = (ι, φ, ρ, µ, δ, ση , σ2ε ). The
Gibbs approach allows us to simulate draws from the intractable joint posterior dis-
tribution of parameters Γ and state µ∗, i.e., f (Γ, µ∗|data), using only tractable condi-
tional distributions. In particular, given the prior distribution of the parameter vector
f (Γ) and an initial draw for µ∗ taken from its prior distribution, the following steps
are implemented:
1. Sample the constant parameters Γ conditional on the unobserved state µ∗ and
the data
(a) Sample the binary indicator ι marginalizing over the parameter ση for
which variable selection is carried out (see Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wag-
ner, 2010).
(b) If ι = 1, sample the parameters φ, ρ, µ, ση , σ2ε and - if applicable - δ. If
ι = 0, sample the parameters φ, ρ, µ and σ2ε and - if applicable - δ. In the
latter case, we set ση = 0.
2. Sample the unobserved state µ∗ conditional on the constant parameters Γ and
the data. To this end, if ι = 1, we use the multimove sampler for state space
models of Carter and Kohn (1994)(see also Kim and Nelson, 1999). If ι = 0,
we draw µ∗ from its prior distribution. To exploit the non-identification of the
non-centered specification discussed in Section 3.5.2, we conduct a random sign
switch on µ∗ and ση , i.e., with probability 0.5 we multiply both by −1 and with
probability 0.5 we leave both unaltered.
These steps are iterated J times and in each iteration Γ and µ∗ are sampled. After a
number of burn-in draws B, the sequence (B + 1, ..., J) of draws of Γ and µ∗ approx-
imates a sample from the posterior distributions of Γ and µ∗. The results reported
below are based on J = 20.000 iterations with the first B = 10.000 draws discarded as
a burn-in sequence, i.e., the reported results are all based on posterior distributions
constructed from J− B = 10.000 draws. Note further that from the distribution of the
binary indicator ι, we calculate the posterior probability that there is an unobserved
integrated component in regression eq. (3.10) as the fraction of ι’s that are equal to 1
over the J − B draws of the Gibbs sampler.
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3D-2. Details on the steps of the sampler
Sample the constant parameters Γ
The parameters contained in Γ can be sampled from a standard regression model,
y = wrγr + χ (3.24)
where y is a T× 1 vector containing T observations on the dependent variable, w is a
T×M matrix containing T observations of M predictor variables, γ is the M× 1 pa-
rameter vector and χ is the T × 1 vector of error terms for which χ ∼ iidN (0, σ2χ IT).
If the binary indicators κ are equal to 1 then the restricted parameter vector γr and
the corresponding restricted predictor matrix wr are equal to γ respectively w. Oth-
erwise, the restricted γr and wr exclude those elements in w and γ for which the
corresponding binary indicators κ are equal to 0. The prior distribution of γr is given
by γr ∼ N (br0, Br0σ2χ) with br0 a Mr × 1 vector and Br0 a Mr × Mr matrix. The prior
distribution of σ2χ is given by σ2χ ∼ IG (s0, S0) with scalars s0 (shape) and S0 (scale).
The posterior distributions (conditional on y, wr, and κ) of γr and σ2χ are then given
by γr ∼ N (br, Brσ2χ) and σ2χ ∼ IG (s, Sr) with
Br =
[
(wr)′wr + (Br0)
−1
]−1
br = Br
[
(wr)′y + (Br0)
−1br0
]
(3.25)
s = s0 + T/2
Sr = S0 +
1
2
[
y′y + (br0)
′(Br0)
−1br0 − (br)′(Br)−1br
]
Following Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010), we marginalize over the parame-
ters γ when sampling κ and then draw γr conditional on κ. The posterior distribution
of the binary indicators κ is obtained from Bayes’ theorem as
p(κ|y, w, σ2χ) ∝ p(y|κ, w, σ2χ)p(κ) (3.26)
where p(κ) is the prior distribution of κ and p(y|κ, w, σ2χ) is the marginal likelihood of
regression eq. (3.24) where the effect of the parameters γ has been integrated out. We
refer to Frühwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2010) (their eq. (25)) for the closed-form
expression of the marginal likelihood for the regression model of eq. (3.24).
Sample the binary indicator ι
Our regression has one binary indicator ι, so κ = ι. We sample ι by calculating the
marginal likelihoods p(y|ι = 1, w, σ2χ) and p(y|ι = 0, w, σ2χ) (see Frühwirth-Schnatter
and Wagner, 2010, for the correct expressions). Upon combining the marginal likeli-
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hoods with the Bernoulli prior distributions of the binary indicators p(ι = 1) = p0
and p(ι = 0) = 1 − p0, the posterior distributions p(ι = 1|y, w, σ2χ) and p(ι =
0|y, w, σ2χ) are obtained from which the probability
prob(ι = 1|y, w, σ2χ) =
p(ι = 1|y, w, σ2χ)
p(ι = 1|y, w, σ2χ) + p(ι = 0|y, w, σ2χ)
is calculated which is used to sample ι, i.e., draw a random number r from a uniform
distribution with support between 0 and 1 and set ι = 1 if r < prob(.) and ι = 0 if
r > prob(.).
Sample the other parameters in Γ
We then sample the regression coefficients φ, ρ, µ and ση and the regression error
variance σ2ε conditional on ι, the data and the unobserved component µ∗t . The de-
pendent variable is y = c where c is the T × 1 vector containing consumption ct
stacked over time while the error term is χ = ε with ε containing εt stacked over
time and where the variance is given by σ2χ = σ2ε . When ι = 1, we have wr =
w =
[
x ∆x−p ... ∆x+p e µ∗
]
and γr = γ =
[
φ′ ρ′−p ... ρ′+p µ ση
]′
where e is a T × 1 vector of ones and µ∗ is a T × 1 vector containing µ∗t stacked over
time. With x and every ∆xj (for j = −p... + p) being T × K matrices then φ and
every ρj are K × 1 vectors and we have M = K(2p + 2) + 2. When ι = 0, we have
wr =
[
x ∆x−p ... ∆x+p e
]
and γr =
[
φ′ ρ′−p ... ρ′+p µ
]′
. In this case, we
have Mr = K(2p + 2) + 1. Once the matrices of eq. (3.24) are determined, the pa-
rameters γr and σ2χ can be sampled from the Gaussian posterior distributions given
above with the prior distributions as specified in Table 3.2 in the text.21
Sample the unobserved state µ∗
If ι = 0, the unobserved component is drawn from its prior distribution. In particular,
µ∗t is drawn from eq. (3.15), i.e., as a cumulative sum of standard normally distributed
shocks η∗t so µ∗t = ∑
t
s=1 η
∗
s . If ι = 1, the unobserved component µ∗t is sampled
conditional on the constant parameters and on the data using a state space approach.
In particular, we use the forward-filtering backward-sampling approach discussed in
detail in Kim and Nelson (1999) to sample the unobserved state. The general form of
21From the specification of the prior distributions in Table 3.2, we note that s0 = ν0T = 0.01T,
S0 = ν0Tσ20 = 0.01 × T × 0.01 and that br0 is a Mr × 1 vector of zeros. Further, Br0 is an Mr × Mr
diagonal matrix containing as elements the variances 0.1 (for parameter ση) or 1 (for all other regression
parameters) - i.e., the variable V0 - divided by the prior belief for σ2ε - i.e., the variable σ20 in Table 3.2.
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the state space model is given by
Yt = ZSt +Vt, Vt ∼ iidN (0, H) , (3.27)
St = TSt−1 + KEt, Et ∼ iidN (0, Q) , (3.28)
S0 ∼ iidN (s0, P0) , (3.29)
(where t = 1, ..., T) with observation vector Yt (n× 1), state vector St (ns × 1), error
vectors Vt (n × 1) and Et (nss × 1 with nss ≤ ns) that are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated and independent of each other, and with the system matrices that are
assumed to be known (conditioned upon) namely Z (n× ns), T (ns × ns), K (ns × nss),
H (n× n), Q (nss× nss) and the mean s0 (ns× 1) and variance P0 (ns× ns) of the initial
state vector S0. As eqs. (3.27)-(3.29) constitute a linear Gaussian state space model,
the unknown state variables in St can be filtered using the standard Kalman filter.
Sampling S = [S1, . . . , ST] from its conditional distribution can then be done using the
multimove Gibbs sampler of Carter and Kohn (1994). Given our state space system
presented in eqs. (3.10), (3.11), (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15) we have n = ns = nss = 1.
The matrices are then given by Yt = ct − xtφ− µ− ∑pj=−p ∆xt+jρj, Z = ση , St = µ∗t ,
Vt = εt, H = σ2ε , T = 1, K = 1, Et = η∗t , Q = 1, s0 = µ∗0 = 0 and P0 = 10−6.
3D-3. Convergence analysis
We analyse the convergence of the MCMC sampler using the simulation inefficiency
factors as proposed by Kim et al. (1998) and the convergence diagnostic of Geweke
(1992) for equality of means across subsamples of draws from the Markov chain (see
Groen et al., 2013, for a similar convergence analysis).
For each fixed parameter and for every point-in-time estimate of the unobserved
component, we calculate the inefficiency factor as IF = 1 + 2∑ml=1 κ(l, m)θ̂(l) where
θ̂(l) is the estimated the l-th order autocorrelation of the chain of retained draws and
κ(l, m) is the kernel used to weigh the autocorrelations. We use a Bartlett kernel with
bandwidth m, i.e. κ(l, m) = 1− lm+1 where we set m equal to 4% of the retained
sampler draws J − B = 10.000 (see 3D-1). If we assume that n draws are sufficient
to cover the posterior distribution in the ideal case where draws from the Markov
chain are fully independent, then n × IF provides an indication of the minimum
number of draws that are necessary to cover the posterior distribution when the
draws are not independent. Usually, n is set to 100. Then, for example, an inefficiency
factor equal to 20 suggests that we need at least 2.000 draws from the sampler for
a reasonably accurate analysis of the parameter of interest. Additionally, we also
compute the p-values of the Geweke (1992) test which tests the null hypothesis of
equality of the means of the first 20% and last 40% of the retained draws obtained
from the sampler for each fixed parameter and for every point-in-time estimate of the
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unobserved component. The variances of the respective means are calculated using
the Newey and West (1987) robust variance estimator using a Bartlett kernel with
bandwidth equal to 4% of the respective sample sizes.
In Table 3.11 we present the convergence analysis corresponding to the results
in Table 3.4. The convergence results are reported for individual parameters or for
parameter groups. Groups are considered when the parameters can be meaningfully
grouped which is the case for the k elasticity parameters in φ (with k = 2 or k = 3
depending on whether xt =
[
at yt
]
or xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
), for the k × (p + 1)
parameters ρ of the DOLS specification of the stationary component vt (where, given
p = 6, we have 26 or 39 parameters depending on whether xt =
[
at yt
]
or
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
), and for the unobserved component µ∗ which is a state, i.e.
a time series of length T = 248. We report statistics of the distributions of the ineffi-
ciency factors for every parameter or parameter group, i.e., median, minimum, max-
imum, and - for the state µ∗ - the 5% and 10% quantiles. These statistics are identical
for the non-grouped parameters. We also report rejection rates of the Geweke tests
conducted both at the 5% and 10% significance levels. These rates are equal to the
number of rejections of the null hypothesis of the test per parameter group divided
by the number of parameters in a parameter group. These rates can only be 0 or 1
for individual parameters but can lie between 0 and 1 for the grouped parameters.
The calculated inefficiency factors suggest that the MCMC sampler performs well
and all parameters are well converged using our retained 10.000 draws. An accurate
analysis could even have been conducted with less than 10.000 draws. From the table
we note that more draws are required when the integrated unobserved component
(UC) is included and estimated, i.e. for cases where ι = 1, while the inefficiency
factors are all close to 1 when the estimated model is a standard regression, i.e. when
ι = 0. When ι = 1, the most draws are required to estimate the posterior distribution
of the initial values µ of the unobserved component. That this parameter is somewhat
harder to estimate is not surprising and is also clear from inspection of the wide 90%
HPD interval surrounding its posterior mean depicted in Figure 3.2 (corresponding
to the convergence results in Table 3.11 with xt =
[
at yt
]
and ι = 1). Our findings
for the inefficiency factors are corroborated by the results for the Geweke (1992) test
for equality of means across subsamples of the retained draws. The reported rejection
rates are with few exceptions equal to 0, which strongly suggest that the means of the
first 20% and last 40% of the retained draws are equal. Occasionally, high rejection
rates rates are observed, in particular again for µ and sometimes for the elasticities
φ. We argue that these high rejection rates are due to the particular sample of draws
and are not indicative of non-convergence as these rejection rates are not withheld
when we rerun the sampler using another seed. Hence, in general, we can conclude
that the convergence of the sampler for the retained number of draws is satisfactory.
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Inefficiency factors Convergence
(Stats distribution) (Rejection rates)
Regressors UC Parameters Number Median Min Max 5% 10% 5% 10%
xt =
[
at yt
]
ι = 1 φ 2 16.15 9.12 23.18 - - 0.00 0.00
µ 1 55.42 55.42 55.42 - - 0.00 0.00
|ση | 1 28.68 28.68 28.68 - - 0.00 0.00
σ2ε 1 1.13 1.13 1.13 - - 0.00 0.00
ρ 26 1.44 1.02 1.86 - - 0.00 0.08
µ∗ 248 1.07 0.83 1.16 0.92 1.12 0.00 0.02
ι = 0 φ 2 0.83 0.83 0.83 - - 0.00 0.00
µ 1 0.78 0.78 0.78 - - 0.00 0.00
|ση | 1 - - - - - - -
σ2ε 1 1.03 1.03 1.03 - - 0.00 0.00
ρ 26 0.95 0.81 1.18 - - 0.04 0.08
µ∗ 248 - - - - - - -
xt =
[
ast a
ns
t yt
]
ι = 1 φ 3 23.96 17.30 26.83 - - 0.67 0.67
µ 1 27.34 27.34 27.34 - - 1.00 1.00
|ση | 1 15.93 15.93 15.93 - - 0.00 0.00
σ2ε 1 1.12 1.12 1.12 - - 0.00 0.00
ρ 39 1.83 0.95 4.02 - - 0.08 0.15
µ∗ 248 0.93 0.84 1.14 0.88 1.07 0.00 0.00
ι = 0 φ 3 1.09 1.05 1.17 - - 0.00 0.00
µ 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 - - 0.00 0.00
|ση | 1 - - - - - - -
σ2ε 1 0.91 0.91 0.91 - - 0.00 0.00
ρ 39 0.94 0.80 1.25 - - 0.05 0.10
µ∗ 248 - - - - - - -
Notes: The convergence analysis corresponds to the results reported in Table 3.4. The statistics of the distribution
of the inefficiency factors are presented in columns 5 to 9 for every parameter or group of parameters. These
statistics are identical when parameters are considered individually as only one inefficiency factor is calculated in
these cases. The inefficiency factors are calculated for every fixed parameter and for every point-in-time estimate
of the unobserved component using a Bartlett kernel with bandwidth equal to 4% of the 10.000 retained sampler
draws. The rejection rates of the Geweke (1992) test conducted at the 5% and 10% levels of significance are
reported in columns 10 and 11. These rates are equal to the number of rejections of the null hypothesis of the test
per parameter group divided by the number of parameters in a parameter group. These rates are either 1 or 0 for
parameters that are considered individually. They are based on the p-value of the Geweke test of the hypothesis
of equal means across the first 20% and last 40% of the 10.000 retained draws which is calculated for every fixed
parameter and for every point-in-time estimate of the unobserved component. The variances of the respective
means in the Geweke (1992) test are calculated with the Newey and West (1987) robust variance estimator using
a Bartlett kernel with bandwidth equal to 4% of the respective sample sizes.
Table 3.11: Inefficiency factors and convergence diagnostics (results Table 3.4)

4 Determinants of International
Consumption Risk Sharing in
Developing Countries
4.1 Introduction
If markets are complete, economic agents, or countries, can pool their resources and
thereby eliminate any differences in consumption growth between themselves ac-
cording to conventional macroeconomic theory. International consumption risk shar-
ing thus enables consumption smoothing, which creates welfare gains through lower
volatility of aggregate consumption. Although theory predicts full risk sharing, in
reality, aggregate consumption is highly sensitive to domestic income shocks and
the empirical evidence shows fairly limited international consumption risk sharing
among countries, see e.g. Canova and Ravn (1996), Lewis (1996) and Bai and Zhang
(2012). Common explanations to this include financial market incompleteness, fric-
tions and high financial transaction costs, although there is quite some disagreement
regarding the empirical relationship between financial globalization, integration and
risk sharing.1
There is a broad literature on international consumption risk sharing starting from
Backus et al. (1992), Obstfeld (1993), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Sorensen and Yosha
(1998), however most studies focus only on advanced economies. Exceptions such as
Kose et al. (2009), Flood et al. (2012), Bai and Zhang (2012) and Fuleky et al. (2015),
found that international consumption risk sharing is generally lower in developing
countries, but the main constraints on international risk sharing in these countries
0I thank Lorenzo Pozzi, Casper de Vries, Massimo Giuliodori, Vadym Volosovych and seminar par-
ticipants at EEA and Ecomod for helpful comments, and Bröderna Lars och Ernst Krogius forsknings-
fond, Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland for financial support.
1Financial globalization and integration should increase the set of available financial contracts, re-
ducing the problem of market incompleteness. Studies like Artis and Hoffmann (2008) and Bai and
Zhang (2012), that compare international consumption risk sharing during periods of different degrees
of financial globalization, find that international risk sharing was not significantly higher during peri-
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have so far not been identified. Some studies, such as Corcoran (2007) and Ventura
(2008), point to the importance of financial integration for improving international
risk sharing in developing countries. However, while Kose et al. (2009) and Flood
et al. (2012) show that financial globalization and integration improve international
risk sharing in advanced economies, they found that emerging markets and devel-
oping countries seem unable to benefit from this. Kose et al. (2009) note that the
capital flows to emerging markets tend to be concentrated in typically procyclical
portfolio debt, as compared to the more stable FDI and portfolio equity flows, which
could prevent emerging market economies from benefiting from financial openness
in terms of risk sharing.
This paper aims to identify determinants of international consumption risk shar-
ing with a focus on developing countries. As consumption growth in developing
countries is generally volatile, and much more so than in advanced economies, there
are high potential welfare gains from increased consumption smoothing especially in
less developed countries. To this end, I study international consumption risk sharing
in a panel of 120 advanced and developing countries over the time period 1970-2014.
My first finding is that, in contrast to the findings of some previous studies, con-
ventional risk sharing determinants such as capital account openness and total exter-
nal liabilities to GDP do have a significant impact on also developing countries’ risk
sharing capacities. Secondly, I show that this conclusion holds also for a broad mea-
sure of financial liberalization, namely an index of financial reform. In addition to
looking at the capital account, the financial reform index includes six further dimen-
sions of financial sector policy, which are credit controls and reserve requirements,
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets
and banking regulations. As the financial market restrictions are generally more
stringent and extend to a broader number of sectors in developing than advanced
economies, this index is more suitable as a proxy for financial openness in poorer
developing countries than a measure looking solely at the capital account. Once this
broader financial liberalization measure is used, the estimated degree of international
consumption risk sharing in less developed countries rises from around 27 % to be-
tween 35-50 %. The effect of financial liberalization in emerging markets is however
much less distinct, and the results reveal that only capital account openness seems to
have a positive impact on international consumption risk sharing in these countries.
Further, I add to the risk sharing literature by showing that a larger share of low
income households and higher domestic income inequality can explain a part of the
difference in risk sharing between developing and advanced countries. High poverty
rates and inequality may exclude a large share of the population from participating
in international financial markets, thus reducing domestic financial access, which
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reduces international consumption risk sharing in the aggregate and causes a risk
sharing gap between the country groups. My study also confirms the findings of
Hadzi-Vaskov (2006) and Balli and Rana (2014), that the size of migrant remittances
(money transfers by migrant workers to their home country) improve risk sharing in
developing countries. Finally, I find that official development assistance and foreign
aid do not significantly impact consumption risk sharing in developing countries.
My main conclusion is thus that financial market restrictions, lower financial in-
tegration and a higher share of hand to mouth consumers in the less developed
countries can partly explain why developing countries share substantially less con-
sumption risk internationally than advanced economies.
The second aim of this paper is to exploit the cross-sectional dependence when
estimating the degree of international consumption risk sharing between individual
countries and country groups. Most economies are very likely influenced by unob-
served common factors such as global business cycles or financial globalization, and
Chudik and Pesaran (2013) even claim that some form of cross-sectional correlation
of errors in panel data applications in economics is likely to be the rule rather than
the exception. I therefore allow for a common unobserved factor in the data, which is
allowed to have a differential impact on the different countries in the sample. Cross-
sectional dependence has, despite its recurrence, so far been largely overlooked in the
risk sharing literature, with the exception of Fuleky et al. (2015). This paper thereby
contributes to the risk sharing literature by using a more appropriate approach when
examining the effect of financial integration and inequality on degree of consumption
risk sharing than previously. When I recover the unobserved component and assume
that there is only one, I find that global economic and financial uncertainty and US
monetary policy can explain around a quarter of the variation of this unobserved
component. It thus seems like the unobserved common factor picks up short-term or
business cycle factors that have a heterogeneous impact on risk sharing in the differ-
ent countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the basic theo-
retical framework underlying the idea of international risk sharing. Section 4.3 out-
lines the empirical implementation strategy and discusses some estimation issues.
Section 4.4 presents the data. The results are presented and discussed in section 4.5
and Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 International Risk Sharing
This section provides a theoretical discussion of international risk sharing and its de-
terminants. The first subsection lays out a model of complete financial markets and
full risk sharing, whereas the second subsection looks at the determinants of par-
tial risk sharing (especially in developing countries), elaborating on the discussion
already given in the introduction. Particular attention is given to the degree of fi-
nancial integration, the prevalence of poverty and income inequality in the respective
countries. The third subsection gives an overview of the current literature.
4.2.1 Full risk sharing
The empirical consumption risk sharing specification was originally developed by
among others Mace (1991) for the study of domestic consumption risk sharing, and
was later extended by Lewis (1996) to an international setting. The underlying the-
oretical framework of full consumption risk sharing can be derived from the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium as outlined in Mace (1991). Consider a social planner’s problem2
of maximizing utility over I countries with representative agents with state contin-
gent utility functions Ui(cit(st), st) where i = 1, . . . , I is the country index, cit(st) is
the country i consumption at time t given the state of nature st. The state of nature
affects both consumption and the utility function, for instance through a preference
change.
Utility is maximized subject to the representative agents’ resource constraints. By
combining the first order conditions for two distinct countries i, j we have that for all
dates t and all states st
Uci (cit+1(s
t+1))
Uci (cit(s
t))
=
Ucj (cjt+1(s
t+1))
Ucj (cjt(s
t))
=
λt+1(st+1)
λt(st)
= λ(s) ∀ i, j, t (4.1)
where Uci (.) denotes the derivative of Ui(.) w.r.t. consumption and is the marginal
utility of consumption, and λt(st) is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource con-
straint. Equation (4.1) implies that if markets are complete, then marginal utility
growth should be the same for all agents and countries at all times t. In an inter-
national setting, this implies that relative shocks to home or foreign output should
not affect the relative consumption growth rates in the different countries. All shocks
should be equally shared across countries, only global shocks should matter for con-
sumption growth. Hence the consumption allocation is said to satisfy full consump-
tion risk sharing if the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption between any two
2Although the existence of a global social planner can be questioned, if markets are complete and
competitive and there are no externalities, the competitive equilibrium allocation is the same as the one
chosen by the social planner.
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countries is constant across all times t and states of nature st.
If we assume that preferences are of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form
and allow the utility function of the representative consumer to also feature a country
and time specific preference shock bit(st), we can write the utility function as
Ui(cit(st), st) = exp (bit(st))
cit(st)1−σ − 1
1− σ (4.2)
After some algebra and rearrangement3, we can write the full risk sharing condi-
tion for the preferences specified above as
∆ln(cit) = ∆ln(Ct) +
1
σ
(
∆bit − ∆Bt
)
(4.3)
where the capital letters Ct and Bt represent the population averages of consump-
tion and the preference shocks and ∆ denote changes such as ∆ln(cit) = ln(cit(st))−
ln(cit−1(st−1)). The full consumption risk sharing equation thus states that if mar-
kets are complete, country-specific consumption growth should only be dependent
on the global consumption growth and on the idiosyncratic and global changes in
preferences.
4.2.2 Partial risk sharing
The previous section assumed complete financial markets and full capital mobility.
However in reality, state contingent securities for each and every possible state of na-
ture do not exist, although financial innovation has expanded the set of available and
tradable assets during the past 30 years (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Limited con-
tract enforceability furthermore provides an impediment to risk sharing, and capital
mobility is often also restricted by capital controls. Financial markets in especially
developing countries are not fully liberalized but also subject to further restrictions
on the banking sector, interest rates and credit and securities markets. As Moser
et al. (2005) pointed out, differences in investor protection, financial regulation and
accounting standards affect transaction and information costs, which in turn increase
the attractiveness of domestic investments relative to foreign ones. Also, even though
the financial sector is in theory fully open, it might be that there are other (poten-
tially unobserved) factors preventing the country from being fully integrated into the
international financial markets. If individuals over-weigh domestic assets in their in-
vestment portfolios, they will not share consumption risks optimally with foreigners,
which in turn prevents the convergence of marginal rates of substitution between
countries (Lewis, 1996). Instead, domestic output changes might have (potentially
3Appendix 4A provides a full derivation of the empirical international risk sharing equation.
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large) influences on the growth rate of consumption.
There is a substantial literature that has rejected the hypothesis of full interna-
tional risk sharing,4 and the estimates for the degree of risk being shared interna-
tionally range between 10-60 % in the literature. The empirical results regarding
the effect of financial globalization on risk sharing are however inconclusive. Bai
and Zhang (2012) and Fuleky et al. (2015) compared the degree of international con-
sumption risk sharing during periods of financial globalization (between the 1980’s
and today) to periods of lower financial integration, and found no difference in the
two time samples. Artis and Hoffmann (2012) however reached the opposite con-
clusion and found that international consumption risk sharing has increased due to
financial integration since the 1990’s, and Imbs (2006), Hevia and Serven (2013) and
Corcoran (2007) also concluded that financial linkages increase consumption corre-
lations in samples including both advanced and developing countries. Flood et al.
(2012) and Kose et al. (2009) found some evidence that financial integration improve
international risk sharing in developed countries, however in developing countries it
seems like financial globalization has not helped the countries smooth consumption.
The channel through which the increase in international consumption risk sharing
has occurred is according to Artis and Hoffmann (2012) through the increase in in-
ternational capital income flows. Relatedly Volosovych (2013) points to income risk
sharing via portfolio diversification as one of the main channels through which in-
ternational income (but also consumption) risk sharing occurs. Both Becker and
Hoffmann (2006) and Artis and Hoffmann (2012) distinguish between permanent (or
long term) and transitory shocks short term shocks, and posit that the permanent
shocks are generally smoothed on the international financial market, whereas short-
term shocks are smoothened through savings and dissavings.
The standard macroeconomic model assumes that all individuals can afford to
participate in the international financial markets, ignoring individuals living hand-
to-mouth. Poverty or income inequality might prevent some individuals from saving
or participating in international financial markets. Consequently, a large share of
poor individuals or inequality could increase the share of hand-to-mouth consumers
within that country. As the consumption growth of individuals with binding bud-
get constraints is largely dependent on the change in these individuals’ disposable
income, a large share of hand-to-mouth consumers in the population implies that
there are fewer individuals that are able to pool their consumption risks through
international financial markets. This is consistent with the findings of Antonakakis
and Scharler (2012), who find that international risk sharing is lower in countries
4see among others Mace (1991), Backus et al. (1992), Obstfeld (1993), Lewis (1996), Kose et al. (2009),
Artis and Hoffmann (2012) and Fuleky et al. (2015).
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where credit constraints are more binding. Even though the relative contribution of
poor and low income households’ to aggregate consumption tends to be smaller than
for wealthier households, if a very large share of the population falls into this low
income category, which is often the case in developing countries, these households’
contribution to aggregate consumption is non-negligible. Especially as the marginal
propensity to consume is generally higher for poor households than rich ones, a high
share of hand-to-mouth consumers could have a decreasing effect on risk sharing in
the aggregate.
High inequality is also associated with higher risks of social unrest and political
instability (Barro, 2000), which affects the types of capital flowing into the country.
As the risk of social unrest or political instability is typically higher during eco-
nomic downturns, high inequality and thereby higher political risks might amplify
the typical procyclicality of capital flows to emerging market and developing coun-
tries. Higher procyclicality reduces the “hedging” benefit of international financial
market participation, and might even increase the correlation between capital flows
and domestic output, thus affecting international risk sharing negatively. However,
foreign aid and remittance flows from migrant workers abroad, which typically are
countercyclical, can insulate the consumption in the receiver economy from domestic
output shocks, thus improving risk sharing. On the other hand, if the remittance
flows are procyclical, they might even aggravate the impact of an adverse domestic
shocks (Balli and Rana, 2014).
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Empirical specification
Baseline regression
Equation (4.3) can be used for testing the international consumption risk sharing
relationship using the following empirical specification
∆ln(cit)− ∆ln(Ct) = αi + βi
(
∆ln(yit)− ∆ln(Yt)
)
+ eit (4.4)
where cit and yit denotes per capita consumption and GDP of country i in year t
and Ct and Yt denotes global per capita consumption and GDP in year t. Individual
country effects that capture time-invariant heterogeneity are represented by αi, and
eit is an error term which is a time-varying component that captures both idiosyn-
cratic and global preference shocks as well as potential measurement errors in the
consumption and income data. To allow for partial risk sharing, changes in GDP are
also included in the model. Moreover, as it is not possible to insure against global
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shocks, the global fluctuations in consumption and GDP are subtracted from the
country specific growth rates.
For notational simplicity I let ∆c˜it = ∆ln (cit)− ∆ln (Ct) and ∆y˜it = ∆ln (yit)−
∆ln(Yt). Using this simplification the standard international consumption risk shar-
ing model can be rewritten as
∆c˜it = αi + βi∆y˜it + eit (4.5)
Full risk sharing, according to the standard complete markets model, implies
that the change in domestic consumption should be uncorrelated with changes in
domestic output growth. This implies testing the hypothesis βi = 0. As argued by
Asdrubali et al. (1996), even if the null hypothesis of full risk sharing is rejected, βi can
still be interpreted as a measure of market incompleteness and represent the share
of consumption risk not shared internationally. As the estimate for βi is typically
between 0 and 1, 1− βi can be seen as a measure of international consumption risk
sharing, where a measure of 0 indicates no risk sharing and 1 denotes perfect risk
sharing.
Determinants of international risk sharing
In order to characterize the effect of financial openness, hand-to-mouth consumers,
remittances and foreign aid on the degree of international consumption risk sharing,
equation (4.5) is extended. This is done by parametrizing β as a linear function of the
country- and time-varying parameters of interest so that βit = βi + µix′it where µi is
a 1× K coefficient matrix and xit is a 1×K matrix containing K of the time-varying
and country-specific characteristics of interest; a measure of financial liberalization or
integration, an inequality index or a measure of the share of low income households,
remittance flows and foreign aid. When plugging in the augmented specification of
βi into the panel regression in (4.5), it is possible to directly determine the impact of
financial liberalization and other parameters of interest on the degree of international
risk sharing. The extended risk sharing panel regression model can be written as
∆c˜it = αi + βi∆y˜it + µix′it∆y˜it + eit (4.6)
Within this framework, the degree of risk sharing is now equal to (1− βi − µix′it).
Estimates of µix′it capture the extent to which risk sharing is affected by the financial
integration, inequality or headcount poverty rates. If the sign on µi is positive, this
indicates that the higher the value of xit, the lower is the degree of risk sharing.
The coefficient on inequality and headcount poverty is expected to be positive, as
a higher share of hand-to-mouth consumers are expected to reduce risk sharing.
As financially open economies are expected to share more risk internationally, the
4.3. METHOD 99
coefficient on financial liberalization and integration should be negative. As foreign
aid and remittance flows are predicted to increase risk sharing, their coefficients are
also expected to be negative.
4.3.2 Estimators
Basic estimators
The most basic panel estimator used is the within group (WG) estimator, also called
the fixed effects (FE) estimator, that assumes slope homogeneity but allows for coun-
try fixed effects. As the countries included in the study differ significantly from
each other in terms of economic and political structures, there might be some cross-
country heterogeneity in the impact of output growth on consumption growth as
well. In order to avoid potentially biased and inconsistent estimators by forcing the
regression slope parameters to be identical across countries, the mean group (MG)
estimator is also computed. The consistent MG estimator is the cross-sectional av-
erage of the OLS estimators resulting from running the model separately for each
country included in the panel.
Cross-sectional dependence and Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimators
An issue generally overlooked in the risk sharing literature is the observation that
many countries are subject to common factors, such as globalization or financial in-
novation contributing towards making financial markets more complete. If there is
some unobserved common factor casting a potentially heterogeneous influence on
output and consumption growth in several countries, this will appear in the residual
and cause error cross-sectional dependence.
To correct for the cross-sectional dependence, the conventional consumption risk
sharing relationship is augmented by a common factor loading in the panel regression
error. The error term eit therefore consists of an unobserved common factor ft with
the factor loading γi, and ε it which is i.i.d. in both time and space. As I allow for
heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence, γi can differ between countries. Hence
eit = ε it + γi ft (4.7)
Using (4.7), the international risk sharing model can be written as
∆c˜it = αi + βi∆y˜it + γi ft + ε it (4.8)
If the unobserved common factor is ignored, but correlated with the regressor, the
orthogonality condition is violated as plim
( 1
n∆y˜iteit
)
= plim
( 1
n∆y˜it(γift + ε it)
) 6= 0.
100 CHAPTER 4. INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING
This prevents the explanatory variables from becoming asymptotically uncorrelated
with the disturbances, in addition to causing higher estimator variance. In that case
the estimated coefficients will be inconsistent and suffer from omitted variable bias.
(Pesaran, 2006)
To exploit the cross-sectional dependence in the data, the Common Correlated Ef-
fect (CCE) estimator, developed by Pesaran (2006), is used. The CCE estimator filters
the country-specific regressors by the common cross-sectional averages, such that
asymptotically, as N tends to infinity, the differential effects of the unobserved com-
mon factors are eliminated.5 Pesaran (2006) shows that the unobserved component
ft can be approximated by
ft =
1
γ¯
[
y¯t − βx¯t − η¯ − ε¯t
]
(4.9)
where y and x are the dependent and independent variables, the bar denotes cross-
sectional averages of the series, γ¯ is the cross-sectional average of the factor loading
on the unobserved component and η¯ is the average fixed effect. In practice this
means that the time-varying unobserved common factor can be approximated by
the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the individual specific
regressors. The CCE estimator for the baseline regression can thus be estimated from
the following regression:
∆c˜it = αi + βi∆y˜it + θ1i ∆ct + θ
2
i ∆yt + ε it (4.10)
where the bar denotes cross-sectional averages of the series. The CCE estimator is
thus the model (4.5) augmented with the cross-sectional averages of the regressors
and the dependent variable, which can be estimated with OLS. For the extended
model, the regression equation for the CCE estimator is:
∆c˜it = αi + βi∆y˜it + µix′it∆y˜it + θ
1
i ∆ct + θ
2
i ∆yt + θ
3
i x′t∆yt + ε it (4.11)
In case the individual slope coefficients are identical, the observations can be
pooled over the cross-sectional units. Pesaran (2006) denotes this pooled version
of the CCE estimator as CCEP. Even though the slope coefficients on the estimated
parameters are the same for all cross sections in the panel, the slope coefficient of
the common unobserved factor is allowed to differ across countries. The Common
Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator for the heterogeneous panel is
obtained by taking the simple average of the individual CCE estimators.
5Pesaran (2006) shows that the estimates are unbiased for as samples as small as N=30 and T=20, as
long as the number of unobserved factors do not exceed the number of individual specific regressors
and a constant.
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In the international consumption risk sharing specification in equation (4.5), the
cross-sectional averages of both consumption and output growth are already in-
cluded in the model. However, the cross-sectional dependence correction in (4.5)
is homogeneous, as it imposes that the common unobserved factor has the same
effect on all countries. As the countries included in the sample are arguably hetero-
geneous with respect to economic and political structure, it is very likely that if there
is some unobserved common factor affecting the risk sharing relationship, the com-
mon factor will have a differential effect on the different countries. Thus, even though
the equation for international risk sharing by construction corrects for homogeneous
cross-sectional dependence, there might still be heterogeneous error cross-sectional de-
pendence in the panel, which warrants the use of the CCE estimator.
4.4 Data
The full data sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 120 countries over the
time period 1970-2014. The sample, listed in Appendix 4B, contains 30 advanced
economies and 90 developing countries. The developing countries are in turn di-
vided into two groups, one for emerging markets (41 countries) and one for less
developed countries (49 countries).6 The countries included in the sample together
accounted for 97.5 % of world GDP in 2011. Summary statistics for all the subsam-
ples are presented in Table 4.10 in Appendix 4B.
Annual country level PPP-adjusted real consumption, real output (GDP) and pop-
ulation data were collected from Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). Global
per capita GDP and consumption growth rates are defined as the respective aggre-
gated growth rates. The varying quality of international consumption data is however
a major drawback. Deaton and Heston (2010) note that ’the international accounts
are no better than the national accounts of the participating countries’, indicating that
caution is warranted especially with the national accounts data provided by countries
whose statistical capacity is weak. To avoid potential problems relating to measure-
ment error, the sample only contains countries with an average statistical capacity
above 50.7
There are several indices of financial liberalization and integration available for
the extended analysis, and in this study we use three different measures. Financial
liberalization is proxied by Abiad et al.’s (2010) Index of Financial Reform. The
6Advanced countries are the countries classified as High income countries by the World Bank since
1990. The emerging market sample consists of countries that are commonly listed as emerging markets.
7The World Bank Statistical Capacity Index ranges between 0-100, where 100 denotes very high
statistical capacity. In 2004 the average score was 64.
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index, covering the 86 of the countries in the study over the period 1973-2005, looks
at seven different dimensions of financial sector policy, namely credit controls and
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies
on securities markets, banking regulations and restrictions on the capital account.
Liberalization scores for each category are then combined in a graded index that is
normalized from zero to one.
An alternative measure of financial liberalization is the Chinn and Ito (2006) index
that measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. The index is available
for 115 of the included countries and covers 1970-2014. It is based on the binary
variables that codify the index of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions (AREAER), and ranges between zero and one. It is used to test the robust-
ness of the results to the financial openness specification and the time dimension.
Finally, we also use a de facto measure of financial integration. In the previ-
ous literature, the ratio of foreign liabilities or assets to GDP, has been used heavily.
This financial integration measure can on the one hand be seen as a measure of the
internationalization and depth of the financial market, but on the other hand as a
reflection of the financial globalization. The data on external asset holdings by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are collected from the External Wealth of Nations database,
and covers the full sample. As the correlation between the series of total foreign lia-
bilities to GDP and total foreign assets to GDP is very high, 0.99, I only use the series
of total foreign liabilities to GDP in the study.
Data on income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, are collected from
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, SWIID 6.2 (Solt, 2016). The
SWIID uses data from several reliable sources to make an net income (post-tax, post-
transfer) inequality measure which is comparable across countries and over time.
These data are available from 1970 onward for the full sample. The Gini index ranges
between zero and 100, where a higher coefficient implies higher income inequality.
To facilitate the interpretation and the comparison of the estimated coefficients in the
models, the Gini coefficient is divided by 100 so as to range from zero to one.
The share of individuals with low income in the population is represented by
threshold adjusted headcount poverty rates, which denote the percentage of the pop-
ulation living on less than $100 per month in 2011 PPP. The data are collected from the
World Bank’s database Povcalnet (2017).8 The threshold-adjusted headcount poverty
data are available for 111 countries from 1981 onward. As the data are not collected
every year (but typically every 3-4 years) and the low income population shares can
8For Argentina and Uruguay the headcount poverty data is only available for the urban population.
As the rural population accounted for only 6 % of the population in Uruguay and 9 % in Argentina in
2010 (WDI, 2017), the aggregate number is not expected to differ substantially from the urban one.
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be assumed to be fairly stable in the short run, the data are linearly intrapolated into
a time series.
Migrant workers’ remittances to developing countries are defined as received per-
sonal remittances to GDP. These data are available for 89 of the developing countries
in the study from 1970 onwards, and are collected from the World Development
Indicator WDI (2017) database provided by the World Bank.
Foreign aid is defined as net official development assistance and official aid re-
ceived as a fraction of GDP. The data, available for all the 78 developing countries
that have received any official development aid since 1970, are also collected from
the WDI (2017) database.
For the analysis of the unobserved common component, global output growth
volatility, the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), the Effective Federal
Funds rate, US real M2 growth and Global Stock price volatility are also used. The
Global EPU index that measures policy-related economic uncertainty, constructed
by Baker et al. (2018), is based on newspaper coverage of policy-related economic
uncertainty, disagreement among economic forecasters and expiring tax agreements
in a large number of different countries. The Fed Funds rate, US real M2 growth (%)
and the stock price volatility index are all collected from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis (FRED, 2018). Global output growth volatility is defined as the standard
deviation of ∆y across countries.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 The baseline risk sharing regression
The baseline risk sharing regression equation (4.5) is first estimated on an unbalanced
panel containing the full set of countries over the time period 1970-2014. The results
for the different estimators, the within group (WG), mean group (MG) and pooled
and mean group CCE estimators CCEP and CCEMG are all presented in Table 4.1.
The coefficient on idiosyncratic output growth, ∆y˜it, is clearly significant in all
cases and positive, as expected. If one uses 1 − βˆ as a measure for international
risk sharing (IRS), where βˆ denotes the estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic output
growth, the countries included in the study are suggested to share on average 31-33
% of consumption risk internationally, depending on the estimator.
In order to decide which estimator is the preferred one, diagnostic tests are con-
ducted.9 As can be seen from Table 4.1, Pesaran’s 2004 test for cross-sectional depen-
9Panel unit root tests have been conducted to confirm that all the time series (∆c˜, ∆y˜ and the inter-
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WG MG CCEP CCEMG
∆y˜ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
IRS 0.323∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
R2 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.61
DW 1.99 1.85 2.00 1.86
CD 25.2∗∗∗ 24.5∗∗∗
N 120 120 120 120
Obs. 4,370 4,370 4,370 4,370
Years 1970 - 2014 1970 - 2014 1970 - 2014 1970 - 2014
Note: White standard errors for the WG and CCEP estimators and nonparametric ones for
the MG and CCEMG estimators are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. For MG and CCEMG the R2 and DW
test statistics are the average statistics over the cross sections. IRS=1-βˆ.
Table 4.1: Consumption risk sharing estimates for the full sample
dence10 (CD) rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence for both
the WG and MG estimator. Despite the correction for homogeneous cross-sectional
dependence induced by the risk sharing specification, the basic estimators thus still
seem to suffer from cross-sectional dependence. This implies that the CCE estimators
are preferred. Here the different estimators produce quite similar coefficients, but in
general the results from the non-CCE estimators should be interpreted with caution.
In the extended model the estimated coefficients for the CCE models and non-CCE
models are however in some cases significantly different.11 As the panel Durbin-
Watson (DW) tests for the WG and CCEP estimator and the cross-sectional averages
of the individual DW statistics for the MG and CCEMG estimator are reasonably
close to 2, one can conclude that none of the models seem to suffer from autocorrela-
tion. According to the CCE estimators, countries share on average between 32-33 %
of their consumption risk internationally. This number is in line with the findings of
Fuleky et al. (2015), who control for cross-sectional dependence in a similar manner.
action term series) are stationary.
10The test statistic is CDP =
√
2T
N(N−1)
N−1
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=i+1
ρˆij where ρij is the pair-wise country cross-correlation
coefficient. Under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence the statistic asymptotically
follows a standard normal distribution.
11To assess the hypothesis of slope heterogeneity and determine whether more weight should be
given to the pooled or the mean group estimators, a Hausman test is conducted. The Hausman test
statistic is however negative, which is a problem as the test statistic is assumed to follow a χ2 distribu-
tion. Therefore no conclusion can be drawn based on the test and the test statistic is not reported in this
case.
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Risk sharing coefficients for individual countries
To illustrate how the degree of international risk sharing differs for each individual
country, the results from the individual CCE risk sharing regressions used to calculate
the CCEMG estimator are presented in Table 4.2. Most of the estimated coefficients
are significant, of expected sign and between zero and one. However, there seems to
be substantial heterogeneity in the estimated slope coefficients. If 1-βˆi is used as a
measure of the degree of consumption risk sharing for each country i, most countries
seem to be sharing between 0 to 80 % of their consumption risk internationally.
Risk sharing in the different country groups
As the degree of risk sharing between advanced and developing countries seems to
differ substantially, the risk sharing coefficients are estimated separately for the de-
veloping and advanced economies. As can be seen from the regression results for the
separate country groups in the upper part of Table 4.3, all the estimated coefficients
are again significant and of the expected sign. The degree of risk sharing is now sub-
stantially and significantly higher in the advanced economies, where between 44-72
% of income risks are shared internationally, whereas the corresponding number in
the developing countries is only 26-30 %. The finding that developing countries share
significantly less risk internationally than advanced countries is in line with earlier
findings by e.g. Kose et al. (2009) and Fuleky et al. (2015), although a risk shar-
ing coefficient of 0.72 is at the higher end of the spectrum of previously estimated
coefficients for the advanced economies.12
The developing country sample is further split into groups containing 41 emerg-
ing markets (EM) countries and 49 less developed countries (LDC’s). Risk sharing
in the emerging markets lies at 26-32% and is thus significantly lower than in the
full sample and also somewhat higher (although not significantly so) than in the less
developed countries, where the countries share on average between 25-29 % of their
consumption risk. This finding of low levels of consumption risk sharing in the de-
veloping and emerging market countries is in line with the findings of Kose et al.
(2009). They hypothesize that one possible reason to this phenomenon is that capital
flows to the emerging markets are generally procyclical. This procyclicality prevents
these countries from using the capital flows to smooth their consumption, as capital
is leaving the country in times when it might be needed the most. This might instead
aggravate the dependence of consumption changes on domestic output fluctuations
and suppress international risk sharing.
Wald tests evaluating the null hypothesis of identical estimated coefficients for
the full sample and the different subsamples reveal that rich, and to some extent also
12Fuleky et al. (2015) and Kose et al. (2009) found that advanced countries share around 30-50 % of
their short run consumption risks internationally, whereas developing countries generally share only
around 10-30 %. Most related studies have arrived at estimates in the same range.
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Country βˆi sei Country βˆi sei Country βˆi sei
Albania 0.691 (0.12) Guatemala 0.400 (0.11) Norway 0.012 (0.05)
Argentina 1.031 (0.06) Guinea 1.105 (0.06) Pakistan 0.999 (0.11)
Armenia 0.286 (0.12) Honduras 0.461 (0.17) Panama 0.555 (0.17)
Australia 0.330 (0.10) Hong Kong 0.253 (0.07) Paraguay 0.219 (0.28)
Austria 0.821 (0.09) Hungary 0.901 (0.10) Peru 0.914 (0.06)
Azerbaijan 0.201 (0.10) Iceland 0.518 (0.07) Philippines 0.665 (0.05)
Bangladesh 0.899 (0.06) India 0.866 (0.05) Poland 0.721 (0.14)
Belarus -0.016 (0.20) Indonesia 0.637 (0.05) Portugal 0.685 (0.09)
Belgium 0.662 (0.09) Ireland 0.571 (0.09) Romania 0.798 (0.07)
Bhutan 0.496 (0.13) Israel 0.773 (0.15) Russia 0.429 (0.09)
Bolivia 0.367 (0.13) Italy 0.846 (0.07) Rwanda 0.962 (0.18)
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.836 (0.11) Jamaica 0.432 (0.13) Senegal 0.647 (0.08)
Botswana 0.367 (0.12) Japan 0.648 (0.04) Serbia 0.419 (0.13)
Brazil 1.105 (0.08) Jordan 0.810 (0.06) Singapore 0.115 (0.07)
Bulgaria 1.081 (0.15) Kazakhstan 0.583 (0.18) Slovakia 0.858 (0.12)
Burkina Faso 1.080 (0.21) Kenya 0.949 (0.13) Slovenia 0.516 (0.11)
Cambodia 0.119 (0.06) Kyrgyzstan 0.210 (0.13) South Africa 0.589 (0.07)
Cameroon 0.769 (0.10) Laos 0.686 (0.10) South Korea 0.707 (0.06)
Canada 0.424 (0.07) Latvia 1.318 (0.15) Spain 0.912 (0.06)
Chile 0.839 (0.09) Lesotho 0.705 (0.11) Sri Lanka 1.025 (0.10)
China 0.766 (0.08) Lithuania 0.881 (0.17) Suriname 1.712 (0.41)
Colombia 0.851 (0.07) Luxembourg 0.171 (0.07) Swaziland 0.301 (0.32)
Costa Rica 0.647 (0.14) Macedonia 0.772 (0.12) Sweden 0.665 (0.10)
Croatia 0.699 (0.08) Madagascar 0.998 (0.04) Switzerland 0.644 (0.09)
Cyprus 0.508 (0.07) Malawi 0.772 (0.16) Syria 0.776 (0.07)
Czech Republic 0.768 (0.13) Malaysia 0.729 (0.08) Taiwan 0.640 (0.07)
Denmark 0.882 (0.11) Malta 0.388 (0.09) Tajikistan 0.283 (0.11)
Dominican Republic 0.226 (0.17) Mauritius 0.665 (0.15) Tanzania 0.953 (0.04)
Ecuador 0.602 (0.14) Mexico 0.836 (0.05) Thailand 0.679 (0.17)
Egypt 0.745 (0.06) Moldova 1.224 (0.08) Tunisia 0.857 (0.13)
El Salvador 0.647 (0.18) Mongolia 0.325 (0.23) Turkey 0.617 (0.13)
Estonia 0.870 (0.14) Montenegro 0.714 (0.15) Uganda 0.779 (0.07)
Ethiopia 0.665 (0.09) Morocco 0.855 (0.09) Ukraine 0.957 (0.06)
Fiji 0.499 (0.19) Mozambique 0.530 (0.20) UK 0.856 (0.09)
Finland 0.518 (0.07) Namibia 0.372 (0.16) United States 0.664 (0.05)
France 0.886 (0.05) Nepal 0.650 (0.09) Uruguay 0.945 (0.06)
Georgia 1.205 (0.73) Netherlands 0.682 (0.10) Uzbekistan 0.484 (0.04)
Germany 0.702 (0.09) New Zealand 0.489 (0.06) Venezuela 0.124 (0.22)
Ghana 0.723 (0.12) Niger 1.011 (0.22) Vietnam 0.147 (0.11)
Greece 0.668 (0.09) Nigeria 1.354 (0.24) Zambia 0.719 (0.09)
Note: Coefficients significant at 5 % level in bold, standard errors in parentheses. The risk sharing
coefficient for each country i is 1− βˆi.
Table 4.2: Estimated β coefficients from the individual CCE regressions for each country
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emerging market countries, share significantly different degrees of consumption risk
internationally than the rest of the sample. Based on the results from the CD test, the
CCE estimators are preferred to the basic ones in all samples, and the CCE estimators
now produce significantly different results compared to the basic estimators for the
advanced country sample. Ignoring heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence im-
plies that international risk sharing is underestimated by as much as 11 percentage
points for those countries.13
The common factor
If we assume that there is only one unobserved common component (although there
can be several) approximated by fˆt in equation (4.9), this factor fˆt can be identified up
to a scaling factor (γ¯). These common factors for the different samples are presented
in Figure 4.1. From there can be seen that the common component for the different
country groups differ somewhat, where the biggest difference is found between the
common component for the advanced economies and the other samples.
Global business cycle synchronization, global economic uncertainty and mon-
etary policy are all common factors that could affect individuals’ decisions to share
their consumption risks internationally, but the aggregate impact could vary between
countries. Table 4.4 shows the results from regressing the common unobserved com-
ponent fˆt on potential determinants such as the global output growth volatility, US
monetary policy measures like the Fed Funds rate and US real M2 growth (which are
generally also perceived as global monetary policy measures), and financial market
uncertainty measures like the global stock price volatility and the Global Economic
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index. As can be seen from the table, these global uncer-
tainty and monetary policy variables can explain around 18-28 % of the variation
in the common factor in the different samples. It thus seems like the latent factor to
some extent captures the short run effects of the global financial business cycle on risk
sharing. Hence, for the advanced economies global uncertainty and monetary policy
reduces the positive impact of risk sharing, as the degree of risk sharing in Table 4.3
is estimated to be much higher once we take this common effect into account.
This finding is somewhat related to the findings of Artis and Hoffmann (2012)
and Becker and Hoffmann (2006), who make a distinction between consumption
risk sharing patterns over the long-term through international financial markets, and
short-term via savings and dissavings. My result however indicate that the short run
variation in advanced economies comes not only from savings and dissavings, but
also to some extent from global monetary policy and financial markets.
13The Hausman tests yield negative test statistics for most subsamples and are therefore not reported.
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Developing countries Advanced economies
WG MG CCEP CCEMG WG MG CCEP CCEMG
∆y˜ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.040) (0.028) (0.039)
IRS 0.264∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
R2 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.38 0.49 0.55 0.61
DW 2.02 1.92 2.05 1.96 1.65 1.66 1.65 1.68
CD 19.4∗∗∗ 15.8∗∗∗ 25.7∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗∗
Wald -1.71∗ -1.17 -1.38 -0.65 7.99∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 10.33∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗
N 90 90 90 90 30 30 30 30
Obs. 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
Years 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014
Less developed countries Emerging market countries
WG MG CCEP CCEMG WG MG CCEP CCEMG
∆y˜ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.040) (0.034) (0.049) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
IRS 0.251∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
R2 0.58 0.51 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.71
DW 2.08 1.98 2.09 1.98 1.84 1.84 1.83 1.86
CD 9.2∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗ 8.8∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗
Wald -1.81∗ -0.72 -1.41 -0.59 -0.71 -1.26 -0.33 -1.14∗∗∗
N 49 49 49 49 41 41 41 41
Obs. 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394
Years 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of equation (5) for WG and MG estimator and equation (9) for CCEP and
CCEMG. White standard errors for the WG and CCEP estimators and nonparametric ones for the
MG and CCEMG estimators are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10 % levels, respectively. For MG and CCEMG the R2 and DW test statistics are the
average statistics over the cross sections. IRS=1-βˆi and denotes the international risk sharing
coefficient. Wald test tests whether the estimated risk sharing coefficients for the subsamples are
significantly different from the ones for the full sample, with H0 : βAll = βcountry group.
Table 4.3: Consumption risk sharing estimates for the full sample
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Figure 4.1: The common factor in the different samples
Sample: All Developing Advanced EM Less Developed
St. Dev ∆y -0.111∗∗ -0.130∗∗ 0.069 -0.057 -0.174∗∗
(0.042) (0.049) (0.071) (0.047) (0.068)
Fed Funds rate -0.071∗∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Real M2 growth (%) -0.084∗∗ -0.095∗∗ 0.038 -0.046 -0.150∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038) (0.055) (0.037) (0.052)
Stock price volatility -0.030 -0.043 0.036 -0.056∗∗ -0.031
(0.024) (0.028) (0.041) (0.027) (0.039)
EPU Index 0.005 0.007∗ -0.010∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗∗ -0.005 0.011 0.019∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
R2 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.18 0.25
Obs 40 40 40 40 40
Note: Dependent variable: the common factor. Standard errors in parentheses, symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively.
Table 4.4: Determinants of the common factor in the different samples
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4.5.2 Determinants of international risk sharing
The analysis is now extended to regression models (4.6) and (4.11), to see how inter-
national consumption risk sharing is affected by financial liberalization, as measured
either by the Financial reform index (FinRe f ) or the Chinn-Ito capital account open-
ness index (KaOpen), financial integration as measured by total external liabilities to
GDP (Liab), and hand-to-mouth consumers as measured by income inequality (Gini)
and low income population ratios (LIR). For the developing countries the effects
of migrant remittances (Remit) and official development assistance and foreign aid
(ODA) on international risk sharing are also investigated. The time period under con-
sideration varies with the included variables, with the time period starting between
1970-1981 and ending between 2005 and 2014.
As the time series are relatively short, the CCEMG estimator, which consists of
the cross-sectional average of the individual CCE estimators, cannot be accurately
estimated for the models including several regressors due to insufficient degrees of
freedom.14 In the baseline risk sharing models the results for the CCEMG estimator
were however in most cases fairly similar to the ones obtained by the CCEP estima-
tors. This suggests that using only the pooled version of the CCE estimator might
be sufficient despite the fact that it ignores heterogeneity. As the Pesaran CD test
moreover indicates that all the models suffer from cross-sectional dependence, only
the results for the CCEP estimator are presented.
Full sample
The extended models including interaction terms for the different measures of finan-
cial openness and hand-to-mouth consumers are first estimated for the full unbal-
anced sample.15
As can be seen from the results in Table 4.5, the estimated coefficients on the id-
iosyncratic output variations are still significant for all models, and the interaction
terms including the different measures of financial liberalization and integration are
all significant and of the expected negative sign except in column (v). There is thus
some evidence that financial liberalization, measured either by the financial reform
index or capital account openness, or financial integration, represented by total exter-
nal liabilities to GDP, significantly enhances international consumption risk sharing.
The coefficients on FinRe f and KaOpen are relatively large, and to allow for the com-
parison of the estimated coefficients, normalized coefficients are presented in Table
14As the CCE estimators include also the cross sectional averages of the regressors and the dependent
variable, the extended models involves the estimation of 10 coefficients. Moreover, as there is not very
much variation in the series for financial openness, inequality and hand-to-mouth indicators on the
country level, this leads to severe multicollinearity problems in the mean group estimators.
15The extended models including all variables of interest are presented in this section. The results of
regressions including only one risk sharing determinant at a time are presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13
in Appendix 4C.
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4.14 in Appendix 4C. From there can be seen that the effects of financial reform and
capital account openness (when significant) on risk sharing are quite substantial. On
the other hand, de facto financial integration, measured as total external liabilities to
GDP, seems to have only a marginal impact on risk sharing as the coefficient on Liab
is fairly small.
The share of low income individuals in the population (LIR) and income inequal-
ity (Gini) both have a significantly negative impact on risk sharing in models (ii), (iii),
(v) and (vi), where the sample is longer and KaOpen and Liab are used as measures
of financial integration, but not in models (i) and (iv) including FinRe f . The coef-
ficients are large (see the normalized coefficients in Table 4.14, Appendix 4C) and
positive when significant, indicating that a higher share of low income individuals
and higher inequality have a large negative impact on international risk sharing. The
risk sharing coefficient, once financial integration, inequality or the share of low in-
come individuals and cross sectional dependence is controlled for, increases from
around 0.33 to between 0.34-0.40, depending on the model used.
Subsamples
In this section, the models are re-estimated for the sub-samples of 90 developing
countries and 30 advanced countries. The sample of developing countries is further-
more split into a group of 49 less developed countries and a group of 41 emerging
market countries.16
Developing countries
The results for the sample of developing countries are presented in Table 4.6, where
the analysis has been extended to include also the impact of migrant remittances
(Remit) and official development assistance and foreign aid per GDP (ODA).
Just like in the full sample, the estimated β’s are all significant and the different
measures of financial openness have a positive and significant impact on risk sharing
in all models except for the one in column (vii). Contrary to some of the previous
findings in the literature, this result implies that financial liberalization, but also fi-
nancial integration, enhance international risk sharing in developing countries. As
can be seen from Table 4.14 with the normalized coefficients in Appendix 4C, also fi-
nancial integration, Liab, seems to have a substantial economic impact on risk sharing
in developing countries.
There is some evidence that hand-to-mouth households, as proxied either by low
income ratios or income inequality, have a negative impact on international risk shar-
ing, as the interaction terms including LIR and Gini are positive and significant in
16The extended models including all variables of interest are presented in this section. The results of
regressions including only one risk sharing determinant at a time are presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13
in Appendix 4C.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
∆y˜ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.092) (0.076) (0.068) (0.049) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.028)
FinRe f ∗ ∆y˜ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.505∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.102) (0.071)
KaOpen ∗ ∆y˜ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.335∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.070) (0.059)
Liab ∗ ∆y˜ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini ∗ ∆y˜ 0.273 0.899∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.211) (0.198)
LIR ∗ ∆y˜ -0.010 0.305∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.072) (0.066)
FinRe f 0.056∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
KaOpen 0.009∗∗ 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Liab -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Gini -0.059 -0.017 -0.009
(0.048) (0.028) (0.025)
LIR -0.124∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.020) (0.015)
IRS 0.400∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
R2 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.65 0.64
DW 2.04 2.05 2.10 2.20 2.13 2.14 1.95 1.97 2.09
N 83 114 118 79 110 113 86 114 118
Obs. 2,226 3,739 3,825 1,696 3,072 3,140 2,309 4,039 4,161
Years 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014 1981-2005 1981-2014 1981-2014 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of model (10) using CCEP, White standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. IRS=1− βˆ− µˆ ¯¯x, where ¯¯x
denotes the cross-sectional and time average of xit. As not all series are available for all countries or
for the full sample period, the N and T between the different models vary.
Table 4.5: Consumption risk sharing CCEP estimates for the full sample
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the models in columns (iii), (v) and (vii)-(ix). The previous finding by Hadzi-Vaskov
(2006) that remittances have a significantly positive impact on risk sharing holds also
once financial liberalization, income inequality and cross-sectional dependence are
controlled for, as the coefficient is both negative and significant in two thirds of the
models. Finally, we look at whether official development assistance and foreign aid
to GDP (ODA) has an effect on risk sharing in the developing countries. It appears
that ODA has no significant impact on international consumption risk sharing. For
convenience, only the model including only the effect of foreign aid on risk sharing
is presented in Table 4.6, column (x), but the same conclusions are reached once the
other determinants of consumption risk sharing are included in the model.
When controlling for financial liberalization and integration, inequality and remit-
tances the risk sharing coefficient increases from the baseline case of around 0.26-0.30
to between 0.27-0.39, depending on the model used. The models adjusting for FinRe f
show a much higher upward adjustment in the estimated international consumption
risk sharing coefficient IRS than the ones using KaOpen or Liab. This result indicates
that it is not only the degree of capital account openness and capital flows that matter
for risk sharing in developing countries, but also other dimensions of financial sector
policy. Thus when adjusting for a broader dimension of financial liberalization, the
gap in risk sharing between developing and advanced countries is much smaller.17
Ignoring any general equilibrium effects, if the financial systems in the less devel-
oped countries were as integrated into the international financial markets as the ones
in the advanced economies, and low income ratios (or income inequality) were at
the same levels as in the advanced economies, the developing countries would ceteris
paribus share approximately as much risk internationally as the advanced economies.
It thus seems like the level of financial openness and hand-to-mouth consumers can
at least partly explain the gap in international risk sharing between developing and
advanced economies. These results thus suggest that there are potential welfare gains
through improved consumption risk sharing from increased financial liberalization,
integration and reduced inequality in developing countries.
17This result does not seem to be driven by the difference in the sample length, as when the models
are re-estimated to end in 2006 the IRS for the models using KaOpen and LIR are in the same range as
they are in the full sample.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆y˜ 1.160∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.158) (0.125) (0.137) (0.123) (0.098) (0.057) (0.048) (0.041) (0.038)
FinRe f ∗ ∆y˜ -0.384∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗
(0.124) (0.151)
KaOpen ∗ ∆y˜ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.089
(0.087) (0.081) (0.094)
Liab ∗ ∆y˜ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.078∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034)
Remit ∗ ∆y˜ -0.012∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.015∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Gini ∗ ∆y˜ -0.683 0.538 0.714∗∗∗ 0.254 0.629∗∗
(0.482) (0.356) (0.276) (0.306) (0.264)
LIR ∗ ∆y˜ -0.066 0.274∗∗∗ 0.153∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.099) (0.084) (0.072)
ODA ∗ ∆y˜ 0.005
(0.004)
FinRe f 0.054∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.019) (0.020)
KaOpen 0.008 0.011∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Liab -0.006∗ 0.000 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Remit 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini 0.015 0.045 -0.012 -0.036 -0.011
(0.095) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.034)
LIR -0.095∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016)
ODA 0.000
(0.000)
IRS 0.342∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026) (0.038) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031)
R2 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.73 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.65
DW 2.42 2.21 2.06 2.37 2.22 2.44 2.23 2.29 2.35 2.18
N 44 82 86 82 88 44 83 83 88 78
Obs. 1,057 2,131 2,616 2,102 2,611 949 2,045 2,041 2,319 2,613
Years 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1981-2005 1981-2014 1981-2014 1981-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of model (10) using CCEP, White standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. IRS=1− βˆ− µˆ ¯¯x, where ¯¯x denotes the
cross-sectional and time average of xit. As not all series are available for all countries or for the full
sample period, the N and T between the different models vary.
Table 4.6: CCEP Consumption risk sharing estimates for the Developing countries
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Less Developed Countries
Next, the same models are re-estimated for the less developed countries. As can
be seen from Table 4.7, financial reforms (FinRe f ) and integration (Liab) do have a
significantly positive impact on international risk sharing also in the less developed
countries. The normalized coefficients (in Table 4.15) on the interaction terms in-
cluding FinRe f are more than twice as large as the interaction terms including Liab,
suggesting that financial reforms have a much larger impact on risk sharing than fi-
nancial integration. Capital account openness (KaOpen) does however not have any
significant impact, thus suggesting that de facto financial openness is more important
for risk sharing than de jure. Only using capital account openness as a measure for
financial openness might thereby be misleading, as there seem to be several other
important financial market restrictions that affect risk sharing. This result thus im-
plies that in less developed countries, there are welfare gains from financial reforms
related to entry barriers, state ownership, interest rates controls, securities and credit
markets through better consumption smoothing opportunities.
Another important take-away is that a high share of low income individuals re-
duce risk sharing, as the interaction term including LIR is positive and significant.
Also, there is some evidence that income inequality (Gini) reduces it too, although
the negative coefficients in columns (i) and (ii) weaken this finding somewhat.
The impact of remittances on international risk sharing is somewhat ambiguous,
as the coefficient on the interaction term including remittances is insignificant in
most specifications except in column (iii). When remittances are included in the
models, although insignificant, they still heighten the total risk sharing coefficient
(IRS) substantially. Even though foreign aid and development assistance on average
accounted for 7.5 % of GDP in these countries, there seem to be no significant effects
of it on risk sharing (column (x)).18
The degree of international risk sharing once hand-to-mouth consumers and fi-
nancial integration are taken into account now range between 0.27 and 0.51. Note
that this range is slightly higher than for the sample including all developing coun-
tries. Noteworthy is also that the degree of risk sharing is substantially higher when
the measure for financial reform is used as the measure for financial openness, and
that the effect of FinRe f is much larger in the less developing countries than in the
sub-sample for all developing countries, again highlighting the relevance of using
the broader index of financial integration that looks at several dimensions of finan-
cial sector policy in the less developed countries. The potential welfare gains through
risk sharing from further financial liberalization and integration and the reduction of
inequality thus seem to be larger in the less developed countries than in the richer
developing countries.
18ODA is also insignificant in models where other risk sharing determinants are included.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
∆y˜ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 0.243 0.435∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.240) (0.233) (0.216) (0.158) (0.165) (0.082) (0.076) (0.073) (0.054)
FinRe f ∗ ∆y˜ -0.792∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ -0.589∗∗
(0.254) (0.202) (0.265)
KaOpen ∗ ∆y˜ -0.256 -0.106
(0.202) (0.168)
Liab ∗ ∆y˜ -0.172∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.108∗∗
(0.072) (0.050) (0.050) (0.045)
Remit ∗ ∆y˜ -0.012 -0.009∗∗ -0.007 0.029 -0.003 0.000
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
Gini ∗ ∆y˜ -1.167∗∗ -0.651 1.396∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.657∗
(0.524) (0.544) (0.549) (0.476) (0.363)
LIR ∗ ∆y˜ 0.546∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.124) (0.110) (0.096)
ODA ∗ ∆y˜ 0.004
(0.005)
FinRe f 0.043 0.068∗∗∗ 0.058
(0.027) (0.025) (0.036)
KaOpen 0.017 0.003
(0.013) (0.013)
Liab -0.007 -0.001 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Remit -0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini -0.086 -0.115 0.038 -0.018 -0.007
(0.108) (0.087) (0.076) (0.071) (0.049)
LIR -0.079∗ -0.030 -0.048∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.029) (0.028) (0.018)
ODA -0.001
(0.001)
IRS 0.507∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.050) (0.033) (0.059) (0.040) (0.032) (0.031) (0.041)
R2 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.74 0.65
DW 2.32 2.15 2.28 2.38 2.37 2.21 2.19 2.40 2.43 2.28
N 20 26 42 44 49 20 43 45 49 47
Obs. 437 566 1,012 1,047 1,326 416 1,030 1,086 1,281 1,448
Years 1973-2005 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014 1970-2014 1981-2005 1981-2014 1981-2014 1981-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of model (10) using CCEP, White standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels. IRS=1− βˆ− µˆ ¯¯x, where ¯¯x denotes the
cross-sectional and time average of xit. As not all series are available for all countries or for the full
sample period, the N and T between the different models vary.
Table 4.7: Consumption risk sharing CCEP estimates for the Less developed countries
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Emerging markets
The risk sharing estimates for the Emerging Markets, presented in Table 4.8, paint
a somewhat different picture. Contrary to previous findings by among others Kose
et al. (2009) and to the results for the less developed country sample, capital account
openness (KaOpen) and to some extent financial reforms (FinRe f ) do seem to have
a positive impact on risk sharing in emerging markets, although the impact of fi-
nancial reforms (FinRe f ) is not robust to all model specifications. De facto financial
integration (Liab) does however not have a significant impact on international risk
sharing. Unlike for the full developing country sample and the less developed coun-
tries, neither income inequality, low income ratios nor remittances seem to have any
significant impact on risk sharing, as all these interaction terms are insignificant. The
same applies to foreign aid (ODA), which does not have a significant effect either.
The international consumption risk sharing coefficient increases slightly to around
0.34 once capital account openness is accounted for. Even when accounting for other
(but insignificant) potential determinants of dollarization, is the total implied inter-
national risk sharing in the emerging market economies lower than in the less de-
veloped countries. The suggestion that the emerging markets do not seem to have
benefited substantially from financial globalization in terms of risk sharing is in line
with the results found by Kose et al. (2009). The previous conclusion that there are
potential welfare gains through improved risk sharing from further financial reform
and reductions in inequality thus does not seem to apply to the same extent to the
emerging markets, and low financial integration does not explain why the degree of
risk sharing is so much lower in the emerging market countries than in the advanced
economies.
Figure 4.2 plots the evolution of the average risk sharing coefficients for the less
developed countries and emerging markets over time for models including different
financial integration and hand-to-mouth measures. The average degree of risk shar-
ing has increased in both the less developed economies and the emerging markets,
and most of the increase has occurred after the 1990’s. Although the level of risk
sharing in the less developed countries was very low in the 70’s, the increase in risk
sharing in the less developed countries has been much larger than in the emerging
markets.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
∆y˜ 0.539∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.189) (0.165) (0.101) (0.060) (0.064) (0.054) (0.036) (0.040)
FinRe f ∗ ∆y˜ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.091
(0.116) (0.137) (0.098)
KaOpen ∗ ∆y˜ -0.182∗∗ -0.146∗ -0.310∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.087) (0.076)
Liab ∗ ∆y˜ 0.020 -0.011
(0.044) (0.049)
Remit ∗ ∆y˜ -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012 -0.009 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Gini ∗ ∆y˜ 0.788 -0.210 -0.309
(0.485) (0.392) (0.368)
LIR ∗ ∆y˜ -0.082 -0.088 -0.071
(0.123) (0.103) (0.111)
ODA ∗ ∆y˜ 0.005
(0.005)
FinRe f 0.026 0.005 0.025∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014)
KaOpen 0.004 -0.006 0.003
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006)
Liab 0.001 -0.013
(0.006) (0.008)
Remit 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini 0.080 -0.093 -0.087∗
(0.107) (0.058) (0.049)
LIR -0.159∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.029) (0.029)
ODA 0.000
(0.001)
IRS 0.267∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
R2 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.68
DW 2.33 2.14 2.21 2.43 2.17 2.21 1.92 1.92 1.89
N 24 40 38 24 40 38 34 40 31
Obs. 620 1,119 1,055 533 1,015 955 845 1,357 1,165
Years 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014 1981-2005 1981-2014 1981-2014 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of model (10) using CCEP, White standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. IRS=1− βˆ− µˆ ¯¯x, where ¯¯x
denotes the cross-sectional and time average of xit. As not all series are available for all countries
or for the full sample period, the N and T between the different models vary.
Table 4.8: Consumption risk sharing CCEP estimates for the Emerging Markets
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(a) Less Developed Countries
(b) Emerging Markets
Note: Plots of the average IRS coefficient for a number of models including financial reforms Finre f ,
capital account openness KaOpen, foreign liabilities Liab, Gini and the low income ratio LIR.
Figure 4.2: The evolution of the IRS coefficient for some of the models
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Advanced economies
Finally, we turn to the subgroup of advanced economies. As remittances to GDP
ratios are very low in the advanced economies, the models are estimated without re-
mittances. As can be seen from Table 4.9, de facto financial integration, as measured
by total external liabilities to GDP (Liab), seems to have a significant positive impact
on international risk sharing in all model specifications. This result is in line with
the ones obtained by Kose et al. (2009), who found that (only) de facto measures of
financial openness has a significant impact on risk sharing. The size of the coefficient
is however very small, pointing to a very limited although statistically significant
economic impact of financial openness on risk sharing. There is some evidence that
financial reforms and capital account openness support risk sharing as well, but es-
pecially the results for KaOpen are not very robust to different model specifications.
In the advanced economies, the results imply that a lower share of low income
households in the economy leads to higher international risk sharing as the interac-
tion term including LIR is positive in all specifications and significant in columns
(v) and (vi). Thus it seems like that also in the advanced economies does higher in-
comes and less hand-to-mouth consumers lead to more risk sharing internationally.
Once this and financial openness is taken into account, the degree of risk sharing
ranges between 65 % and 74 %. Nevertheless, the results in column (iii) implies that
income inequality increases international risk sharing, as the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term including Gini is negative. This raises questions on whether
income inequality is a good proxy for the hand-to-mouth households in the economy.
4.5.3 Robustness
Next, some robustness checks of the results presented in the previous section are
conducted. All the tables for the robustness tests can be found in Appendix 4C.
First, the sample is reduced and ended in 2006 to avoid having the results driven
by the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis. As can be seen from the results presented in Ap-
pendix 4C, Tables 4.16 and 4.17, the previous conclusions are largely unaffected by
the change in the sample. This can also be seen as an indication that the difference in
results between the models using FinRe f and KaOpen and Liab is not driven by the
difference in sample length. Also, to confirm that the difference in results between
the models that contain Gini and LIR are not mainly driven by the difference in the
sample length (as the LIR series starts only in 1981), the models are estimated with
LIR backwards interpolated to 1970. These results are not presented for the sake of
space, but the same conclusions still hold.
One potential explanation to the negative and/or insignificant coefficients on the
interaction terms for Gini and LIR for some of the subsamples is that inequality
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
∆y˜ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.434∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.127) (0.122) (0.257) (0.111) (0.053) (0.089) (0.059) (0.029)
FinRe f ∗ ∆y˜ -0.272∗∗ -0.207 -0.313∗∗
(0.131) (0.277) (0.126)
KaOpen ∗ ∆y˜ -0.103 -0.054 -0.188∗∗
(0.094) (0.113) (0.077)
Liab ∗ ∆y˜ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini ∗ ∆y˜ -0.770 -0.638 -1.008∗∗∗
(0.588) (0.419) (0.373)
LIR ∗ ∆y˜ 11.39 19.04∗∗∗ 17.43∗∗∗
(8.43) (4.75) (4.26)
FinRe f 0.001 0.005 -0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
KaOpen 0.015∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
Liab 0.000 -0.002∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gini -0.117 -0.120∗ 0.012
(0.090) (0.065) (0.056)
LIR -1.083 -0.492 -0.469
(0.897) (0.498) (0.449)
IRS 0.693∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.050) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028)
R2 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.62 0.59 0.61
DW 1.72 1.82 1.77 1.97 1.88 1.91 1.66 1.80 1.79
N 25 28 30 21 24 25 25 28 30
Obs. 825 1,123 1,214 525 779 821 825 1,188 1,281
Years 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014 1981-2005 1981-2014 1981-2014 1973-2005 1970-2014 1970-2014
Note: Estimation of model (10) using CCEP, White standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. IRS=1− βˆ− µˆ ¯¯x, where ¯¯x denotes the
cross-sectional and time average of xit. As not all series are available for all countries or for the full
sample period, the N and T between the different models vary.
Table 4.9: Consumption risk sharing CCEP estimates for the Advanced economies
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and poverty are endogenously affected by financial liberalization or international
consumption risk sharing. If international financial market participation takes place
at the expense of the poorer individuals or if the gains from financial liberalization
are concentrated mostly among the higher income individuals in the country, this
could worsen poverty or inequality. However when lagged values of Gini and LIR
are used for the interaction terms, presented in Tables 4.18 and 4.19, similar results are
obtained, thus implying that the endogeneity concern is unfounded. The conclusion
is also robust to using two or three year lags of the variables.
Third, the models are re-estimated with a sample split where Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, Slovenia and Taiwan are classified as emerging market countries instead of
advanced ones. Tables for the modified advanced country, developing country and
emerging market sample are presented in Table 4.20. Generally, the previous con-
clusions remain and now income inequality also has a significantly negative impact
on international consumption risk sharing in advanced economies in all three mod-
els where included. This thus reinforces the finding that hand to mouth consumers
reduce risk sharing in advanced economies. The results are also robust to additional
modifications and to the exclusion of China, but these are not reported for the sake
of space.
Another concern is that I have not correctly identified the set of countries that
pool their consumption risks together. I therefore estimate the degree of risk shared
only between the countries within the different subsamples, presented in Table 4.21
and 4.22. The degree of risk shared only among the rich countries, the developing
countries, the emerging market countries and finally the less developed countries
does however not differ significantly from the amounts of risk shared with the rest
of the world. OECD countries share between 37-48 % of their consumption risks be-
tween each other, and emerging market and advanced economies share roughly 31 %
of their consumption risks together. Furthermore, Table 4.22 reveals that although the
degree of risk shared between different geographical regions differs somewhat, the
results are still in line with the results for the different country groups. Africa, with
mostly less developed countries, share the least consumption risks among themselves
(around 20 %), where the European countries are the ones to share most risks among
themselves (around 50 %). The recent Euro crisis is a good example of how the neg-
ative output shocks were "shared" by the other EMU and European countries, and
from the results can also be seen that the smaller group of EMU countries share more
consumption risks among themselves than the more extended group of EU countries.
Finally, Ramsey’s RESET test for model misspecification indicates that in with the
exception of a few cases, the models used for all subsamples are correctly specified.
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4.5.4 Discussion
My analysis shows that financial openness matters for international consumption
risk sharing in the different subsamples. At the same time, the dimensions and the
economic impact of financial liberalization and integration on risk sharing seems to
vary significantly between the different country groups. Financial reforms and a
wider range of financial sector policies have an influence on risk sharing in less de-
veloped countries, where the financial markets are generally more regulated and less
developed. For emerging market economies, which are generally more financially
open, the only financial market restriction that seems to matter is the degree of cap-
ital account openness. As total liabilities to GDP has a significant and economically
meaningful impact on risk sharing in less developed countries but not in emerging
market economies, this raises questions about the usefulness of de facto financial in-
tegration for consumption smoothing in developing countries. These results suggest
that the benefits of financial reforms and liberalization for risk sharing in develop-
ing countries might be gradually receding with the level of financial development.
Nevertheless, it could be that there is no significant (positive) relationship between
financial integration and risk sharing in emerging markets due to the procyclicality
of international capital flows, which was the explanation put forward by Kose et al.
(2009). In advanced economies de facto financial integration seems to have the most
robust and significant impact. However, as the capital accounts in most advanced
economies are close to fully open and the additional financial restrictions are rather
modest (the median score for capital account openness and financial reforms is as
high as 0.94 and 0.77 respectively, where 1 is the maximum in both cases), it is not
very surprising that the effects financial liberalization on international risk sharing
are less relevant. Financial reforms seem to matter in countries with more closed
financial systems, but when the financial market is already fairly open, the impact of
further reforms or liberalization is not substantial.
Overall, a wider range of financial sector policies thus seem to impact risk shar-
ing in less developing countries than in emerging markets. These findings are in
contrast to the ones by Kose et al. (2011), who suggested that only once a country’s
financial sector and institutions are sufficiently developed, financial sector integra-
tion will have a significant impact on risk sharing. The earlier studies such as Flood
et al. (2012), Kose et al. (2009) and Corcoran (2007) that concluded that financial in-
tegration has not enhanced risk sharing in developing countries mostly looked at the
effect of financial openness as measured by total foreign assets, liabilities, portfolio
equity and FDI to GDP, or compared risk sharing during time periods of higher and
lower financial globalization. My results however indicate that financial liberaliza-
tion, measured by capital account openness and financial reforms, are important for
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risk sharing also in developing countries, which might explain the difference in the
conclusion compared to some earlier studies. Moreover, the global financial business
cycle (as proxied by the unobserved component) does seem to have different short
run effects on risk sharing in advanced and developing countries, which could also
lead to different risk sharing outcomes and conclusions.
The impact on risk sharing of financial access, or hand-to-mouth consumers, if
these can be approximated by low income population shares or income inequality,
also show a variable pattern with regards to the level of development of the country.
In less developed countries, where the level of income inequality and the fraction
of low income individuals are high, risk sharing is lower as a large fraction of the
population cannot afford to take part in it. The importance of these non-participants
for risk sharing seems to vary with the degree of national income and level of de-
velopment, as the effect is large and significant for the advanced and less developed
countries, but not the emerging ones. It is nevertheless somewhat surprising that the
effect of low income population ratios is negative but the impact of income inequality
is positive in the advanced economies, which raises questions regarding the appro-
priateness of using income inequality as a proxy for hand-to-mouth consumers. Also,
the appropriateness and cross-country comparability of the threshold adjusted head-
count poverty rates (where the threshold was set at $100 in 2011 PPP per month) is
not the optimal measure for low income population ratios. Low income population
ratios using national poverty definitions would in this case be a more appropriate
measure than the one currently used, but historical time series for this measure are
not available for the majority of countries included in the study.
The effect of financial openness and domestic financial access thus seems to partly
explain why risk sharing is lower in developing countries than in advanced ones.
Nonetheless, the observation that risk sharing in emerging markets is not supported
by financial reforms and lower than in less developed and less financially integrated
countries raises some doubts whether financial liberalization, financial integration
and lower inequality are sufficient for improving risk sharing. This furthermore has
an impact on the potential welfare gains from financial reforms and deeper financial
openness.
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4.6 Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical examination of international consumption risk shar-
ing and its determinants for a panel of 120 countries from 1970 to 2014. If one uses
1-βˆ as a measure for international risk sharing, where βˆ is the estimated coefficient on
the deviation of domestic output growth from the global output growth rate, about
33 % of the consumption risks are shared internationally according to the basic risk
sharing model. Advanced economies share on average between 44-72 % of their con-
sumption risks internationally, whereas the same number for developing countries is
much lower, only around 26-32 % for emerging markets and between 25-29 % for less
developed countries.
Contrary to what has been reported in some previous studies, I show that finan-
cial liberalization, as measured either by an index of financial reforms, or financial
integration as represented by total external liabilities to GDP, has a positive effect
on international consumption risk sharing in less developed countries. In emerg-
ing markets, the impact of financial liberalization is smaller and only capital account
openness is suggested to significantly enhance risk sharing. In advanced economies,
financial reforms, capital account openness but in particular financial integration has
a significant but small impact on risk sharing. Financial openness thus seems to
matter for international consumption risk sharing. However, the importance and the
dimensions of it seems to vary significantly between the different country groups.
Moreover, I find evidence that part of the difference in risk sharing between the less
developed countries and advanced economies can be attributed to a low domestic
financial access through a high share of hand-to-mouth consumers, as approximated
by either income inequality or the share of low income individuals. In emerging
markets, this does however not seem to be the case. In line with the previous lit-
erature, I find some weak evidence that remittances from migrant workers provide
consumption insurance in developing countries, but not so much so in emerging
market countries. Foreign aid and official development assistance does however not
facilitate consumption smoothing in any of the developing country groups.
Once financial openness, hand-to-mouth households and remittances are con-
trolled for, the estimated international consumption risk sharing coefficient in less
developed countries increases to 0.30-0.51. The corresponding estimate in emerging
markets increases to around 0.33 once capital account openness is taken into con-
sideration. Even though financial openness and inequality can explain a large part
of the difference in risk sharing between developing and advanced economies, this
explanation does not apply to emerging markets. The results are robust to a reduced
sample size that excludes the 2007-2008 financial crisis, modifications of the country
groups and further robustness checks.
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According to my results, there are potential welfare gains in less developed coun-
tries from continuing financial liberalization, deepening financial integration and re-
ductions in poverty and inequality through improved risk sharing. The result that
financial reforms have a smaller impact on risk sharing in emerging markets however
raises some questions whether the benefits of financial openness on risk sharing will
gradually level off as the countries continue to develop and/or become more inte-
grated into the global financial markets. Further research is thus needed to identify
the factors that affect risk sharing in emerging market countries. It is also of impor-
tance to establish how and why the impact of financial sector reforms and inequality
becomes smaller once the less developed countries progress.
Finally, despite the fact that the risk sharing relationship by construction cor-
rects for homogeneous cross-sectional dependence, the international risk sharing rela-
tionship is still subject to heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence. If heterogeneous
cross-sectional dependence is ignored, the basic risk sharing relationship in advanced
economies is according to my calculations underestimated by almost 11 percentage
points. According to my estimations, around a quarter of this common component
which is allowed to have a heterogeneous impact on the different countries can be ex-
plained by global economic uncertainty and US monetary policy. In order to obtain
unbiased estimators when studying international consumption risk sharing, cross-
sectional dependence should hence be taken into account.
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4.7 Appendix
Appendix 4A. Derivation of the IRS equation
The underlying theoretical framework of full consumption risk sharing can be de-
rived from the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as outlined in Mace (1991) and Krueger
(2004): Consider a social planner’s problem of maximizing utility over I countries
with representative agents with state contingent utility functions Ui(cit(st), st), where
i = 1, . . . , I is the country index, cit(st) is the consumption in country i at time t given
the state of nature st. The state of nature affects both consumption as well as the
utility function, for instance through a change of preferences. The social planner’s
objective is to maximize
∑
i
∑
t
∑
st
αiβ
tpit(st)Ui(cit(st), st) (4.12)
subject to the resource constraints
∑
i
cit(st) ≤∑
i
yit(st) ∀ st (4.13)
where αi is the social planner’s weight on country i utility, β is the discount rate,
pit(st) is the probability of state st occurring in time t and yit(st) is the output level of
country i at time t in state st.
The first order condition for any country i is
αiβ
tpit(st)Uci (cit(s
t), st) = λt(st) (4.14)
where Uci (.) denotes the derivative of Ui(.) w.r.t. consumption and λt(s
t) is the La-
grange multiplier on the resource constraint.
If we assume that preferences are of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
form and allow the utility function of the representative consumer to also feature a
country and time specific preference shock bit(st), we can write the utility function
as
Ui(cit(st), st) = exp (bit(st))
cit(st)1−σ − 1
1− σ (4.15)
The first order condition for any country i at any time t can now be written as
αiβ
tpit(st)exp (bit(st))cit(st)−σ = λt(st) (4.16)
Taking logs of equation (4.14) yields
ln(cit(st)) =
1
σ
ln(αi)− 1
σ
ln
(
λt(st)
βtpit(st)
)
+
1
σ
bit(st) (4.17)
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In order to simplify the expression above, first note that the cross country average of
(4.17) can be written as
1
N ∑i
ln(cit(st)) =
1
σN ∑i
bit(st) +
1
σN ∑i
ln(αi)− 1
σ
ln
(
λt(st)
βtpit(st)
)
(4.18)
This relationship in equation (4.18) can in turn be used to substitute out 1σ ln
( λt(st)
βtpit(st)
)
from equation (4.17). Moreover, by denoting the population averages as19 1N ∑
i
bit(st) =
Bt(st), 1N ∑
i
ln(cit(st)) = ln(Ct(st)) and 1N ∑
i
ln(αi) = ln(α) equation (4.17) can be
rewritten as
ln(cit(st)) =
1
σ
(
bit(st)− Bt(st)
)
+
1
σ
(
ln(αi)− ln(α)
)
+ ln(Ct(st)) (4.19)
When taking first differences of equation (4.19) the term 1σ
(
ln(αi) − ln(α)
)
disap-
pears. By suppressing the dependence on st and denoting ∆ln(cit) = ln(cit(st)) −
ln(cit−1(st−1)), the equation can be written as the full risk sharing condition for the
preferences specified above
∆ln(cit) = ∆ln(Ct) +
1
σ
(
∆bit − ∆Bt
)
(4.20)
19This derivation involves some abuse of notation, as the last two expressions are sums of logs instead
of logs of sums.
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Appendix 4B. Data
∆c˜ ∆y˜ Finref Kaopen Liab Gini Assets LIC Remit ODA
Full sample
Mean 0.003 0.004 0.511 0.474 1.643 0.368 1.348 0.291 - -
Median 0.006 0.006 0.524 0.415 0.698 0.356 0.306 0.153 - -
Std. Dev 0.066 0.072 0.301 0.363 7.322 0.098 7.436 0.316 - -
Obs. 4,625 4,625 2,394 4,242 4,316 4,333 4,303 3,601 - -
Countries 120 120 86 115 118 120 118 115 - -
Start 1970 1970 1973 1970 1970 1970 1970 1981 1970 1970
End 2014 2014 2005 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014
Advanced Economies
Mean 0.005 0.004 0.682 0.738 3.484 0.291 3.449 0.006 - -
Median 0.005 0.003 0.774 1.000 0.949 0.286 0.843 0.004 - -
Std. Dev 0.032 0.046 0.270 0.320 13.025 0.048 13.067 0.006 - -
Obs. 1,323 1,323 825 1,194 1,284 1,259 1,284 843 - -
Countries 30 30 25 28 30 30 30 25 - -
Developing Countries
Mean 0.003 0.003 0.422 0.371 0.863 0.400 0.455 0.378 0.045 0.050
Median 0.006 0.007 0.429 0.166 0.654 0.403 0.241 0.306 0.015 0.023
Std. Dev 0.076 0.080 0.278 0.325 1.570 0.095 1.889 0.313 0.092 0.065
Obs. 3,302 3,302 1,569 3,048 3,032 3,074 3,019 2,758 2,436 2,721
Countries 90 90 61 87 88 90 88 90 89 78
Less Developed Countries
Mean -0.003 -0.003 0.375 0.312 0.895 0.407 0.442 0.520 0.061 0.075
Median 0.001 0.000 0.333 0.166 0.635 0.405 0.203 0.549 0.022 0.055
Std. Dev 0.083 0.085 0.253 0.282 2.052 0.092 2.540 0.299 0.118 0.070
Obs. 1,703 1,703 665 1,551 1,606 1,468 1,599 1,427 1,234 1,521
Countries 49 49 27 47 49 49 49 49 48 47
Emerging Markets
Mean 0.009 0.010 0.456 0.431 0.827 0.395 0.470 0.226 0.030 0.019
Median 0.012 0.012 0.476 0.415 0.666 0.401 0.316 0.129 0.012 0.006
Std. Dev 0.067 0.074 0.290 0.353 0.706 0.097 0.568 0.251 0.048 0.039
Obs. 1,599 1,599 904 1,497 1,426 1,606 1,420 1,331 1,202 1,200
Countries 41 41 34 40 39 41 39 41 41 31
Note: ∆c˜ and ∆y˜ are the deviation of log consumption and output growth from their global averages.
Finref is a Financial Reform index, KaOpen is a capital account openness index, Liab and Assets represent
total external liabilities and assets to GDP, Gini is Gini income inequality (divided by 100), LIR is a low
income ratio (population share living on less than $100/month in 2011 PPP), Remit is received personal
remittances to GDP and ODA is net official development assistance and official aid received per GDP.
Table 4.10: Data
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∆c ∆y FinRef KaOpen Liab Assets Gini LIR Remit
∆c 1
∆y 0.581 1.000
FinRef 0.067 0.064 1.000
KaOpen 0.007 0.005 0.682 1.000
Liab -0.020 -0.009 0.432 0.303 1.000
Assets -0.024 -0.013 0.425 0.282 0.994 1.000
Gini 0.049 0.049 -0.276 -0.290 -0.118 -0.112 1.000
LIR 0.024 0.035 -0.569 -0.511 -0.132 -0.118 0.475 1.000
Remit 0.065 0.078 -0.059 -0.087 -0.025 -0.017 0.146 0.154 1.000
ODA -0.032 -0.047 -0.090 -0.174 -0.070 0.018 -0.037 0.479 0.149
Table 4.11: Correlation Matrix for the full sample
List of countries
Advanced economies (30):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States.
Developing countries (90):
Of which Emerging Market countries (41):
Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pak-
istan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, South
Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam.
Less developed countries (49):
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suri-
name, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Zam-
bia.
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5 Dollarization and Financial
Development
with Geoffrey Bannister and Jarkko Turunen1
5.1 Introduction
Developing economies have made significant strides in financial development over
the past decades, including through financial deepening, improvements in financial
inclusion and banking sector efficiency. Financial development has, in turn, sup-
ported higher economic growth in these countries (Levine, 2005). At the same time,
financial dollarization, defined as the share of foreign currency deposits/credit in
total deposits/credit, remains a common and persistent phenomenon. For example,
average deposit dollarization across our sample of partially dollarized developing
economies was around 30 percent in 2015.
The coexistence of financial development on the one hand and dollarization on the
other raises questions about the impact of foreign currency use in financial transac-
tions on financial deepening, inclusion and efficiency. The negative aspects of partial
dollarization are well documented, including risks related to currency mismatches
and balance sheets (Baliño et al., 1999; Eichengreen, 2001) and weaker monetary pol-
icy transmission (Levy Yeyati, 2006). Partial dollarization has also been associated
with significant financial stability risks (see e.g. Gulde et al., 2004). However, a num-
ber of authors (e.g. Hausmann (1999); De Nicolo et al. (2005) and Levy Yeyati (2006))
have also raised the possibility that, in providing financial solutions to economic
agents in less-than-optimal policy environments, dollarization can support greater
financial development.
We study the impact of partial (unofficial) dollarization on financial development
1This articles was written during my stay at the IMF under the Fund Internship Program. We would
like to thank seminar participants at the IMF, as well as Benedict Baduel, Evrim Bese Goksu, Qiaoe Chen,
Marco Espinosa, Massimo Giuliodori, Daniel Hardy, Fah Jirasavetakul, Lilia Kadyrberdieva, Padamja
Khandelwal, Hui Miao, Alexandros Mourmouras, Lorraine Ocampos, Lorenzo Pozzi, Andrea Pres-
bitero, Sergio Rodriguez, Kevin Ross and Kazuko Shirono for helpful comments. We would also like to
thank Albe Gjonbalaj and Ross Rattanasena for excellent assistance.
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in developing and emerging economies.23 We refer to financial deepening, as mea-
sured by the credit-to-GDP ratio, as the readily available aggregate measure of finan-
cial development that is also closely related to economic activity. However, in line
with the suggestion in recent literature (e.g. Sahay et al., 2015) that financial devel-
opment is a multidimensional concept, we also examine the impact of dollarization
on financial access and banking sector efficiency. We also differentiate across foreign
currency deposits and credit. While the two empirical measures of dollarization are
often closely correlated (see below), there are important differences in the levels of
these two variables that are likely driven by both market factors – differences in sup-
ply and demand for foreign currency deposits and loans – and regulatory factors –
such as restrictions on foreign currency lending.
We contribute to the existing dollarization literature by taking a broader look at
the impact of dollarization on a wider set of dimensions of financial development
than before. When most previous studies have focused mostly on deposit dollar-
ization, we consider both deposit and credit dollarization, and also the aggregate
mismatch between the two. We bring to bear a new dataset for a sample of 77
emerging and developing countries over the period 1996–2015 (see Appendix 5A for
a detailed description). Our dataset covers more countries and a longer time period
(including the global financial crisis and its aftermath) than data used in previous
studies. Following Barajas et al. (2013), we study the relationship between financial
development and dollarization in a framework that takes into account the joint policy
and structural determinants of financial development. Finally, we study the impact
of dollarization using dynamic panel GMM estimation, thus controlling for potential
endogeneity of the regressors.
Our results show that financial dollarization, and deposit dollarization in particu-
lar, has a negative impact on financial development. Specifically, we find that dollar-
ization slows down financial deepening. The aggregate difference between deposit
and credit dollarization is also negatively associated with financial depth, whereas
credit dollarization seems to have no significant impact on financial development.
These results are robust to alternative specifications and estimation methods. The
negative impact of deposit dollarization on financial depth may reflect the fact that
2We use the term “dollarization” to refer to the use of any foreign currency other than the legal
tender, not just the dollar. Full (official) dollarization where the foreign currency is the sole legal
tender, is typically adopted by countries to stabilize inflation and to promote fiscal discipline. It does
not involve a currency choice by firms and households, a common feature in countries with partial
dollarization.
3We follow most of the literature in defining dollarization as the ratio of non-local currency deposits
in total deposits, and non-local currency credit over total credit, in the banking system. We do not
consider non-bank financial institutions (insurance funds or pension funds, for example), and we do
not include off-shore transactions or assets and liabilities to non-residents. We also do not include loans
denominated in domestic currency but indexed to the exchange rate.
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a share of foreign currency deposits are transferred overseas, rather than returned to
the domestic economy as private credit, thus contributing to a shallower domestic fi-
nancial sector. It could also reflect the existence of additional frictions and costs that
inhibit further financial deepening in markets where financial assets and liabilities
are denominated in two or more currencies. Our results regarding the relationship
between deposit dollarization and financial depth, using a larger sample of coun-
tries and including data for more recent time periods, are broadly consistent with
results in De Nicolo et al. (2005) and Court et al. (2012). We also find that, similar
to De Nicolo et al. (2005), the negative impact of dollarization on financial deepen-
ing is dampened somewhat in countries with past experiences of very high inflation.
Therefore, there may be country cases where dollarization helps mitigate the nega-
tive impact of past macroeconomic instability on financial development. We also find
some evidence that dollarization has a negative impact on financial efficiency. Our
estimations indicate that net interest margins are positively related to levels of dol-
larization, suggesting a negative effect on financial efficiency. However, results across
model specifications vary, suggesting caution in interpreting this result. Finally, we
find no evidence of an association between financial dollarization and financial access
in our data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we review existing
literature on dollarization and financial development. We then discuss available mea-
sures of dollarization and financial development in Section 5.3 and empirical methods
in Section 5.4. We present our main results in Section 5.5, with focus on the impact
of dollarization on financial deepening, followed by the impact on other measures
of financial development. Results from multiple robustness checks are included in
Appendix 5B. We conclude with a summary of main results and policy implications
in Section 5.6.
5.2 Literature and Theory
Following Ize and Yeyati (2005), we look at dollarization as the outcome of a financial
equilibrium between creditors and borrowers that optimize the currency composition
of their contracts, in response to certain features of the economic environment.
The portfolio approach (Ize and Yeyati, 2003) explains dollarization as a reaction
to macroeconomic instability, as manifest in high inflation and exchange rate volatil-
ity. Under this approach, the domestic investor chooses the composition of invest-
ments to minimize the variance of expected returns, which depend on the volatility of
inflation and the real exchange rate. This is in line with ample evidence that episodes
of high inflation and real exchange rate depreciations are associated with increases
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in dollarization. An implication of this approach is that expectations have an impor-
tant role to play, and the credibility of monetary policy and the exchange rate regime
are key (Levy Yeyati, 2006). The lack of credible monetary policy and exchange rate
regimes explain the persistence of dollarization, even after inflation has been tamed,
usually by relying on a stable real exchange rate as a nominal anchor. Following
this approach, not surprisingly, a number of authors have found that dollarization is
associated with weak economic institutions (De Nicolo et al., 2005; Levy Yeyati, 2006).
The portfolio approach can be extended to the currency choice related to total in-
comes, rather than just financial investments. In this case, in an environment where
exchange rate depreciations are contractionary, economic agents prefer foreign cur-
rency (e.g. dollars) to maintain the real value of their consumption in the face of
macroeconomic uncertainty. The existence of balance sheet mismatches in highly
dollarized economies tends to reinforce the contractionary effect of exchange rate
deprecation, thus also explaining the persistence of dollarization (Ize and Yeyati,
2005).
A second feature that explains dollarization is the existence of market frictions
or failures in credit markets. For example, Jeanne (2000) highlights how a local cur-
rency premium induced by devaluation expectations (i.e. a peso problem) leads to
dollarization when liquidations are costly (the relevant market friction). Under this
situation, higher credit risk on local currency loans leads creditors to prefer to lend in
dollars. At the same time, this can lead to “fear of floating” or limited exchange rate
flexibility to limit the currency risk on creditors’ portfolios. Moral hazard, related to
government guarantees or other forms of regulation in the presence of asymmetric
payoffs, can also lead to dollarization, to the extent that they insure dollar creditors
and borrowers from large losses in the event of a large depreciation (e.g. Burnside
et al., 2001). Barajas and Morales (2003) also point to factors such as the relative mar-
ket power of borrowers and central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets.
The role of incomplete credit markets is also highlighted by the fact that the presence
of foreign banks tends to be associated with higher dollarization. For example, Basso
et al. (2011) suggest that in European transition economies there is a strong link be-
tween financial deepening, cross border banking activities and dollarization.
Empirical studies of de-dollarization also support the idea that financial dollar-
ization has its source in both macroeconomic stability concerns and frictions in credit
markets. Kokenyne et al. (2010), García-Escribano and Sosa (2011) and Catão and Ter-
rones (2016) confirm the importance of credible macroeconomic stabilization policies
to lower inflation and stabilize the exchange rate as a key component of successful
de-dollarization strategies in Europe and Latin America. These authors also refer to
differential prudential regulations to lower bank’s incentives to transact in foreign
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currencies and to provide incentives for economic agents to internalize the risks of
foreign currency lending and deposits. These policies have been pursued in a number
of Latin American and Asian economies and include raising provisions for foreign
currency loans, tighter capital requirements against open foreign exchange positions,
differentiated reserve requirements and remuneration on foreign currency deposits,
among others (see e.g. Catão and Terrones, 2016; Kokenyne et al., 2010). A third
component of successful de-dollarization is the development of local currency capital
markets, which provide alternate vehicles for longer term investment and savings.
In all these cases, financial dollarization is a response to a suboptimal policy en-
vironment, be it macroeconomic instability or underdeveloped local credit markets.
A natural question is whether dollarization, in providing a solution for economic
agents, opens the way for greater financial development (depth and access) or effi-
ciency. For example, Hausmann (1999) speculates that dollarization could expand the
menu of financial options available to agents and thereby improve financial stability.
There has been little or no treatment of this question in theory, but a number of
authors have attempted to investigate this issue empirically, albeit with conflicting
results. De Nicolo et al. (2005) posit that since dollarization offers an inflation hedge
for transactions it should therefore facilitate more financial transactions on-shore than
would otherwise take place.4 They regress financial depth (M2/GDP) on a number
of instruments that include the main underlying determinants of dollarization (regu-
latory, macroeconomic and institutional), and find that dollarization is not associated
with deeper financial markets, except in high inflation countries. Following De Ni-
colo et al. (2005), Levy Yeyati (2006) regresses financial depth on a dollarization legal
restrictions index (as an instrument for dollarization) and finds a significant positive
relationship, which could be interpreted as evidence that more dollarization is associ-
ated with shallower financial markets. Court et al. (2012) study 44 dollarized banking
systems using two-stage least-squares to deal with endogeneity, and find that dollar-
ization has a consistent and significant negative coefficient on financial deepening.
On the other hand, Reinhart et al. (2014), studying different aspects of dollarization
in a sample of emerging and developing countries, find that the joint existence of
domestic dollarization and external liability dollarization appears to have a positive
effect on financial deepening.
There have been even fewer systematic investigations of the effects of dollarization
on financial access or efficiency. To our knowledge, the only study in this area is
Honohan and Shi (2001), who look at the relationship between dollarization, the
4This is also supported by overwhelming evidence that countries that force conversion of dollar
deposits into local currency experience a large contraction in intermediation (Savastano, 1996; Baliño
et al., 1999).
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supply of credit, interest rates and spreads. They find that banks tend to place as
much as half of dollar deposits they receive off-shore, due to limits on safe and
profitable foreign exchange lending in the local market, thus potentially limiting the
supply of credit in the local market. They also find that net interest margins rise
(i.e. efficiency is lower) with higher dollarization, potentially due to market power of
dollarized banks in the system.
5.3 Measuring Dollarization and Financial Development
In this study we look at two different measures of partial dollarization – deposit
and credit dollarization.5 We define deposit dollarization as the ratio of dollar-
denominated deposits to total broad money deposits, and credit dollarization as the
ratio of dollar-denominated loans to total loans.6
Both deposit and credit dollarization have diminished over the sample period
1996 to 2015. (Figure 5.1). The Eastern European transition economies are generally
more dollarized than the average country in the sample, and the jump in dollarization
between 1996 and 1997 comes from the inclusion of the transition economies in the
sample. The average level of deposit dollarization in our 77 country sample is also
higher than the average credit dollarization level.
Figure 5.1: Deposit and Credit Dollarization
5A more complete measure of dollarization would also account for foreign currency cash holdings.
However, owing to limited data availability for foreign cash holdings across countries, we focus on
deposit and credit dollarization.
6A full description of the data is provided in Appendix 5A.
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There is also significant geographical dispersion. Dollarization, and in particular
deposit dollarization, is a prominent phenomenon in the Latin American countries in
addition to the European transition economies, and much less common in the MENA
or African countries (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Finally, although the correlation between
deposit and credit dollarization in our sample is fairly high at 82 %, there is still a lot
of variation in the difference across countries (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.2: Average regional deposit dollarization
Figure 5.3: Average regional credit dollarization
150 CHAPTER 5. DOLLARIZATION AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Figure 5.4: Deposit vs. Credit Dollarization
Financial development is a broad concept. In line with the emerging consensus
in the recent literature that financial development is a multidimensional concept (see
e.g. Sahay et al., 2015) we focus on three dimensions: financial depth, access and
efficiency. The log of private credit to GDP is used to measure financial depth. While
higher credit to GDP is usually consistent with a larger and more developed financial
sector, financial depth in itself does not guarantee financial access or efficiency. We
consequently also look at the impact of dollarization on access to financial services
and financial efficiency. Financial access is represented by the log of bank accounts
per 1000 adults, where a higher number of accounts in the adult population reflects
better access to financial services. The bank net interest margin, defined as the ac-
counting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its average interest-bearing
assets, reflects how efficient the financial sector is in providing financial intermedi-
ation to the economy. Net interest margins tend to be substantially higher in de-
veloping countries than in developed countries. High interest margins often reflect
market frictions, institutional and regulatory inefficiencies, information asymmetries,
high fixed costs, imperfect banking sector competition and entry barriers, or a large
vulnerability to macroeconomic variables such exchange rate, interest rate and real
economic fluctuations (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Beck and Hesse, 2009). Although a
higher net interest margin is desirable from an individual bank’s point of view, a
lower net interest margin signals that the financial sector is more efficient in offering
financial services to the society. Binned scatterplots of dollarization and the different
dimensions of financial development suggest that a higher level of dollarization, par-
ticularly deposit dollarization, and a positive difference between aggregate deposit
and credit dollarization, is associated with lower levels of financial depth, access and
efficiency (Figures 5.5 to 5.7).
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Figure 5.5: Financial Depth and Dollarization
Figure 5.6: Financial Access and Dollarization
Figure 5.7: Financial Efficiency and Dollarization
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5.4 Method
We use panel data analysis on our sample of 77 countries over the time period
1996–2015 to investigate the relationship between dollarization and financial devel-
opment. The baseline panel models that we use aim to identify the impact of both
credit and deposit dollarization on financial depth (PrivCred), access (Accounts) and
efficiency (NetIntMarg).
The literature has identified several factors that have an impact on financial devel-
opment. To ensure that we properly identify the impact of dollarization on financial
development, we include both structural and macroeconomic policy variables as con-
trols. Moreover, to make sure that we capture the underlying causes of dollarization
that might be related to our financial development indicators, we also include vari-
ables from the literature associated with dollarization. The baseline equation which
identifies the relationship between dollarization and the financial development indi-
cator FDi,t in country i in year t is therefore specified as:
FDi,t = αFDi,t−1 + βDoli,t + P′i,tγ+ S
′
i,tθ +D
′
i,tρ+ µi + δt + ε i,t (5.1)
where Doli,t is a measure of either deposit dollarization (DepDol) or credit dollariza-
tion (CredDol), P is a vector of policy variables that reflect the policy environment
influencing financial development, S is a vector of structural variables that have an
impact on financial development, D is a vector of variables that have an impact on
dollarization, β, γ and θ contain the estimated coefficients, µi represents the country
fixed effect, δt the time varying global component and ε the stochastic error term.
As financial development is persistent, the lag of the dependent variable is also in-
cluded. The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the impact of dollarization
on financial development.
Policy variables in P
A wide range of policy variables have been found to impact financial development.7
The policy variables in P can be divided into variables measuring macroeconomic de-
velopments, institutional quality and financial market regulation and structure. The
macroeconomic variables used are the log change of real GDP per capita (GDP growth),
CPI inflation (In f lation), and a banking crisis dummy (Banking Crisis). The market
share of the three largest financial institutions in the country (3 Bank Conc.), is used as
a proxy for financial market structure, an index of capital account openness (KaOpen)
is used to control for capital market regulations, and external debt to gross national
7See e.g. Almarzoqi et al. (2015), Barajas et al. (2013), Court et al. (2012), de la Torre et al. (2013) and
Trabelsi and Cherif (2017).
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income (GNI) (External Debt), is used as a measure of debt sustainability and exter-
nal vulnerability. The institutional quality measure used is the composite Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), which is a simple average of the subcomponents Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effec-
tiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
Structural variables in S
Financial development is also affected by several structural variables such as income
level, market size and demographics. Following Beck et al. (2008) and Barajas et al.
(2013) we include the log of real GDP per capita (GDP pc), the log of population (Pop),
and the log of the age dependency ratio (Age Dep. ratio) to control for the respective
income level, market size and demographics, respectively.
Dollarization variables in D
The level of Inflation is already included in P and captures the currency substitu-
tion motivation for dollar investment. Following the portfolio approach, the dollar
share of the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) is included to take into account
that resident investors may select the currency composition of their asset portfolio to
minimize the effect of volatility of the exchange rate and inflation.8 The correlation
between real GDP growth and the real exchange rate changes (REER Cycl) is used
to capture the real income effects of exchange rate volatility. The share of foreign
banks among total banks (Foreign Banks) is included as credit dollarization is found
to be higher and deposit dollarization is found to be lower in markets where foreign
banks are present (Basso et al., 2011). The log of the nominal effective exchange rate
(NEER) takes into account that de-dollarization is generally associated with an ex-
change rate appreciation (as shown in García-Escribano and Sosa (2011) and Catão
and Terrones (2016)). Finally, a dummy variable for Eastern European transition
economies (Transition) is included to control for the fact that dollarization generally
is higher in transition economies than in the rest of the sample. In the robustness
tests we also include imports to GDP (Imports) to control for trade openness, a mea-
sure for remittances to GDP (Remittances), and the short term (three month) nominal
interest rate differential between the domestic economy and the US (i Diff ).
5.4.1 Estimation strategy
The presence of fixed effects in equation (1) gives rise to an endogeneity issue if
estimated with OLS, as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error
8The dollar share of the minimum-variance portfolio (MVP) is defined as:
MVP=[Var(pi)+Cov(pi,s)]/[Var(pi)+Var(s)+2Cov(pi,s)], where pi denotes inflation and s is the change in
the real exchange rate. The inflation and real effective exchange rate variances and the covariance are
the respective values from the past five years.
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term through the fixed effects. In panels where the time series dimension is relatively
small like ours, this endogeneity creates biased coefficients, usually referred to as the
Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). To avoid the bias, we use the system and difference
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimators.
The difference GMM estimator removes the fixed effect through differencing, and
uses higher order lags of the endogenous regressors as instruments. However, if
the dependent variable is highly persistent, the difference GMM estimator performs
poorly as past changes in the variable contain little information about future changes.
If that is the case, the system GMM estimator is considered a superior alternative. The
system GMM exploits the fact that if a variable is highly persistent, past changes are
more useful in predicting current levels than past levels are in predicting current
changes (see Roodman, 2009a). The system GMM estimator thereby uses the same
moment conditions as the difference GMM, but in addition employs an additional
set of level moment conditions. That is, the system GMM estimator includes also a
level equation, where the levels are instrumented by their first differences.
As financial development, and especially financial depth, is a persistent phe-
nomenon, the system GMM model is our preferred model. We also estimate dif-
ference GMM and fixed effects models to test the robustness of our results to the
model specification (see Appendix 5B).
An additional benefit of the GMM estimators is that they allow us to relax the
assumption of exogeneity of the regressors in the model. As dollarization, finan-
cial development and some of the macroeconomic, policy and institutional variables
might be endogenously determined, we consider the impact of dollarization both
when it and its determinants are assumed to be endogenous and predetermined. The
log changes in GDP are considered endogenous to all dimensions of financial devel-
opment, as there is reason to believe that output growth is endogenously affected
by financial development. Inflation is also allowed to be endogenously determined
by financial depth, as an increase in private credit to GDP could have simultaneous
effects on the price level and on dollarization. The institutional, regulation and mar-
ket structure policy variables are considered predetermined along with the banking
crisis dummy, whereas the structural variables are assumed exogenous. To avoid si-
multaneity issues, the beginning of period values (i.e. one year lags) of the variables
are used for all the predetermined and exogenous structural variables.
The system GMM estimator aims to deal with endogeneity between dollarization
and financial development, and we also try to control for all the underlying reasons
for dollarizing that might affect financial development as well. Bellemare et al. (2017)
however argue that using lags to deal with reversed causality could lead to incon-
sistent and biased results if there are still some unobserved time varying sources of
heterogeneity (although the GMM estimator does a better job than a model that re-
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lies only on lags for identification). The existence of some dynamic latent sources of
heterogeneity could thus lead to biased results and increase the risk of making Type
1 errors, which is a pitfall of this empirical approach that we recognize.
Both the system and difference GMM estimators are designed for panels with a
relatively short time dimension. As the number of instruments grows quadratically
with the time dimension, instrument proliferation risks overfitting the endogenous
variables (Roodman, 2009b). In order to reduce the instrument count, we “collapse”
our instruments by combining the instruments through addition into smaller sets.
Despite collapsing the instruments we still have a fairly large instrument count when
we allow dollarization along with its determinants to be endogenous. For that rea-
son, we confirm that our results hold also when we use fewer instruments in the
robustness section (see Appendix 5B).
5.5 Results
In this section we present the results for estimating the impact of dollarization on fi-
nancial development. We first focus on the impact of dollarization on financial depth
(PrivCred), and in the latter part of this section we present the results on the impact
of dollarization on financial access (Accounts) and financial efficiency (NetIntMarg).9
The results using our preferred system GMM methodology are presented below.10
For the baseline model for financial depth we report results both from estimations
where dollarization and its determinants are considered predetermined and endoge-
nous in the main text. For the rest of the analysis we only report the results from
estimations where dollarization and its determinants are endogenous, and refer the
reader to Appendix 5B for the predetermined cases.
5.5.1 Financial Depth
The baseline results measuring the impact of dollarization on financial sector depth,
as measured by log of credit to GDP, are presented in Table 5.1. The results show
that deposit dollarization has a statistically significant negative impact on financial
9We have also explored an alternative approach based on financial possibility frontiers. Beck et al.
(2008) posit that there is a constrained optimum of financial development in an economy, which builds
on the notion that there is a maximal sustainable level of financial depth in an economy at any given
time. This maximal sustainable level, referred to as the financial possibility frontier, depends on struc-
tural and long term policy variables that impact the access to financial services in an economy. We look
at how dollarization affects the gap between the structural financial depth (as implied by the financial
possibility frontier) and actual financial depth, and find only insignificant or non-robust results. These
results are not presented for the sake of space but are available upon request.
10Results using difference GMM and the fixed effects (FE) models can be found in Table 5.8 in Ap-
pendix 5B. The difference GMM estimator generally performs poorly when the dependent variable is
highly persistent (Roodman, 2009b), so more weight should be given to the results from the system
GMM estimations. Moreover, due to the Nickell bias in the FE model, the FE results should only be
regarded as a check on the sign of the coefficients.
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development (see columns 1 and 2). This result holds regardless of whether dol-
larization is considered endogenous or predetermined. The results suggest that a 1
percentage point increase in deposit dollarization reduces credit to GDP by around
0.4 percent in the short run, and 2–2.5 percent in the long run. Our results would
therefore imply that, for the sample as a whole, the observed 5 percentage point
reduction in dollarization since its peak has contributed to an increase in credit to
GDP by about 10 percent in the past 15 years.11 For highly dollarized economies the
gains from de-dollarization can be large – cutting the level of dollarization by half
(e.g. from about 90 percent to 45 percent) would potentially increase financial depth
by close to 20 percent in the short run. Furthermore, the results suggest that in the
long run halving dollarization could theoretically double financial depth in countries
with near complete dollarization. The impact of credit dollarization is however much
smaller and not statistically significant.12
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant in all models, thus val-
idating our choice of a dynamic specification. The difference in magnitude of the
estimated coefficients on dollarization between the models where dollarization and
its determinants are considered predetermined versus endogenous is small. The re-
sults on financial depth are also robust to alternative specifications and estimation
methods. For example, the same conclusion can also be drawn from a more par-
simonious model with less instruments (Table 5.7 in Appendix 5B), from a model
with only the significant control variables (Table 5.5 in Appendix 5B ) and results
produced using the difference GMM estimator (Table 5.8 in Appendix 5B).13
To confirm the suitability of the model and instruments, a number of diagnostic
tests are performed. As can be seen from Table 5.1, the Arellano-Bond tests for order
2 serial correlation in the residuals, AB-AR(2), confirm that the models do not suffer
from autocorrelation.14 The Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions furthermore
confirms the joint validity of the instruments.
11Based on the long-run coefficient. Credit to GDP in our sample has increased by around 50 percent
since 1996 while deposit dollarization has declined by around 5–8 percentage points since its peak in
2000.
12Note that the sample for columns 3–4 is much smaller than for columns 1–2. When the regressions
in columns 1–2 are estimated with the same sample as in columns 3–4, we still find that deposit dol-
larization has a significantly negative impact on financial depth. Thus, the difference in results is not
coming from the difference in sample but rather from the different measure of dollarization.
13In addition to deposit dollarization, we see that external debt, inflation, foreign banks, banking
crises, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), low institutional quality and a high concentration
of bank market power (3 Bank Conc) have a negative, although not always very significant, impact on
financial sector depth.
14The null hypothesis for the Arrelano-Bond AR(p) test is no p order autocorrelation. Order one
serial correlation is expected through the construction of the model. As we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation, it justifies the use of second order lags as instruments
for the lagged dependent variable.
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Private Credit /GDP
Predet. Endog. Predet. Endog. Endog.
DepDol -0.392∗∗ -0.393∗∗
(0.164) (0.182)
CredDol -0.096 0.049
(0.088) (0.127)
DepDol − CredDol -0.239∗∗
(0.109)
PrivCred−1 0.845∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.052) (0.066) (0.042) (0.036)
GDPgrowth -0.104 -0.016 0.344 0.078 -0.018
(0.271) (0.299) (0.341) (0.213) (0.232)
In f lation -0.047 -0.168 -0.101 -0.338∗∗ -0.211
(0.159) (0.203) (0.110) (0.164) (0.164)
MVP -0.003 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.008
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
REER Cycl. 0.026 0.022∗ 0.021 0.015 0.016
(0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
NEER 0.095∗ 0.070 0.116∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.197∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.053) (0.083)
Institutions -0.022 0.090 0.043 0.085∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.102) (0.059) (0.060) (0.039) (0.044)
Foreign Banks -0.001 -0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3 Bank Conc. -0.410∗ -0.216 -0.257 -0.145 -0.132
(0.223) (0.155) (0.197) (0.150) (0.166)
KaOpen 0.051 0.057 -0.038 -0.086∗ -0.050
(0.098) (0.070) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048)
External Debt -0.163∗∗ -0.060 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.144∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.062) (0.053) (0.056) (0.048)
Banking Crisis -0.044 -0.064 -0.075 -0.134∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.046) (0.051) (0.047)
GDP pc -0.145∗ -0.050 -0.014 -0.008 -0.005
(0.081) (0.057) (0.066) (0.024) (0.023)
Population -0.145∗ -0.066 -0.084 -0.039 -0.039
(0.077) (0.050) (0.053) (0.043) (0.049)
Age Dep. Ratio -0.895 -0.102 0.003 0.006 0.129
(0.621) (0.483) (0.655) (0.197) (0.212)
Transition -0.010 0.358 0.177 0.191∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.256) (0.248) (0.286) (0.114) (0.119)
Obs 1 216 1 243 963 967 963
Countries 77 77 74 74 74
Max T 19 19 14 14 14
Avg T 16 16 13 13 13
Instruments 83 206 83 185 189
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.713 0.575 0.356 0.391 0.395
Hansen p-val 0.169 1.000 0.135 1.000 1.000
Note: Dependent variable: ln(Private Credit / GDP). System GMM estimations where dollarization and
its determinants are either considered predetermined (Predet.) or endogenous (Endog.). Robust SE in
parentheses, symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Models
include time dummies and a constant.
Table 5.1: The impact of dollarization on financial depth
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Figure 5.8: Deposit dollarization and foreign asset ratios of deposit taking banks
Deposit dollarization thus seems to have a significant and negative impact on
financial deepening of the financial system, whereas credit dollarization does not.
One possible explanation for these results is the hypothesis put forward by De Nicolo
et al. (2005) that part of foreign currency deposits are exported rather than returned
to the domestic economy in the form of private credit, which in turn leads to a
shallower domestic financial sector. A simple correlation plot suggests a positive
correlation between deposit dollarization and the share of assets that banks hold
abroad (see Figure 5.8), suggesting that deposit dollarization may hamper financial
depth as banks export part of the foreign currency deposits instead of extending new
loans.15 Additionally, the existence of financial assets and liabilities in two or more
currencies might create additional frictions and costs in the credit markets that inhibit
further financial deepening.
The baseline results shown in Table 5.1 suggest that there is a difference in how
deposit and credit dollarization affects financial development. We explore these re-
sults further by examining first, the impact of the mismatch between deposit and
credit dollarization on financial development and, second, the importance of high
inflation episodes in explaining the impact of dollarization. 16
If the negative impact of dollarization on financial development arises because the
banking sector invests the foreign currency assets abroad rather than extending for-
15For some economies, this could also reflect a form of carry-trade, i.e. foreign investment in relatively
high-yielding and stable foreign currency deposits in developing economies during periods of low
global interest rates.
16We have also explored whether there are other sources of impact heterogeneity, such as income level,
level of dollarization, financial market access, institutional quality, capital account openness, exchange
rate regime or foreign bank presence. We do not find any robust results suggesting that the impact of
dollarization is different across these characteristics.
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eign currency loans to resident investors, the negative impact should be larger when
the difference (or mismatch) between deposit and credit dollarization is larger. We
therefore look at whether the aggregate difference in deposit and credit dollarization
ratios (DepDol-CredDol) has an impact on financial depth. Re-estimating the system
GMM estimations including this mismatch suggests that it does indeed have a nega-
tive effect on financial depth (see column 5, Table 5.1).17 These results are in line with
the Honohan and Shi (2001) hypothesis that if banks receive more foreign currency
deposits than they can return to the domestic financial market as foreign currency
loans, they will invest the foreign currency deposits abroad. This result continues to
hold if we use the difference between foreign currency deposits and credit scaled by
GDP (not shown).
Second, the previous literature has found that the relationship between dollar-
ization and financial development is somewhat different in high inflation economies
compared to countries with stable price developments. De Nicolo et al. (2005) es-
tablish that deposit dollarization is associated with a deeper private financial sector
in economies with high inflation. Court et al. (2012) find that dollarization reduces
financial depth except in high-inflation economies. We extend our analysis to test
whether financial development is supported by dollarization in countries with a
history of high inflation. We add an interaction term between dollarization and a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has experienced an annual in-
flation rate higher than 250 percent between 1980 and 1997,18 and zero otherwise.
Alternatively, we add an interaction term of dollarization and the natural logarithm
of the country’s maximum historical inflation during 1980-1996.19 The results show
some evidence that deposit dollarization has a less negative or even positive impact
on financial depth in economies with a history of very high inflation (see Table 5.2).
This suggests that deposit dollarization can be used by investors as a tool to circum-
vent some of the risks related to a history of macroeconomic instability. In some
country cases, and in particular those hampered with high inflation and macroeco-
nomic instability, dollarization could therefore facilitate financial deepening. This
result also highlights the need to consider country specific circumstances in inter-
preting the average results obtained for the full sample. The results in Table 5.2 also
confirm the previous finding that credit dollarization does not have a statistically
significant impact on financial deepening.
17Here we present the results where the gap between deposit and credit dollarization is endogenous,
but the same conclusions hold if we consider the gap predetermined.
18For the Eastern European transition economies this period is 1995-1998.
19We only consider historical inflation to reduce endogeneity concerns, but we reach the same con-
clusions when we consider the maximum inflation over the full sample period.
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Private Credit / GDP
DepDol -1.006∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.158)
DepDol ∗ DHighIn f l 1.049∗∗∗
(0.400)
DepDol ∗MaxIn f l 0.104∗
(0.056)
CredDol 0.142 0.084
(0.159) (0.161)
CredDol ∗ DHighIn f l -0.097
(0.177)
CredDol ∗MaxIn f l -0.021
(0.047)
DHighIn f l -0.202 -0.084
(0.161) (0.122)
MaxIn f l -0.024 -0.022
(0.024) (0.029)
PrivCredit−1 0.798∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.044)
GDP growth -0.096 -0.111 -0.019 0.034
(0.261) (0.265) (0.206) (0.207)
External Debt -0.106∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.022 -0.030
(0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.056)
In f lation -0.282 -0.227 -0.363∗∗ -0.326∗
(0.198) (0.187) (0.183) (0.175)
MVP 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
REER Cycl. 0.032∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.018 0.021
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
NEER 0.093 0.095∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.120∗
(0.063) (0.049) (0.059) (0.068)
Foreign Banks -0.003∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutions 0.064 0.045 0.082∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.062) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040)
3 Bank Conc. -0.288∗ -0.324∗∗ -0.158 -0.210
(0.154) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138)
KaOpen 0.155∗∗ 0.077 -0.112∗∗ -0.087
(0.078) (0.064) (0.055) (0.063)
Banking Crisis -0.044 -0.051 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.049) (0.055)
GDP pc -0.106∗∗ -0.083∗ 0.017 0.021
(0.054) (0.049) (0.034) (0.039)
Population -0.109∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.052
(0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Age Dep. Ratio -0.423 -0.352 0.114 0.140
(0.447) (0.399) (0.242) (0.258)
Obs 1 243 1 243 967 967
Countries 77 77 74 74
Max T 19 19 14 14
Instruments 241 241 199 199
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.484 0.540 0.420 0.383
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: Dependent variable ln(Private Credit/GDP). System GMM estimations with dollarization and its
determinants endogenous. Robust SE in parentheses, symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10 % levels, respectively. Models include time dummies, a transition country dummy and a constant.
Table 5.2: Dollarization and financial depth in countries with a history of high inflation
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5.5.2 Financial Access and Efficiency
While financial depth is a useful summary indicator, it does not capture the multidi-
mensional nature of financial development. We therefore look at the impact of dollar-
ization on financial access, which is represented by the number of bank accounts per
adult, and on financial efficiency, approximated by the aggregate net interest margin.
Our results show no evidence of a link between dollarization and financial access
(columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.3). The results from the preferred system GMM estima-
tion show that both deposit and credit dollarization have no significant impact on
financial access.20
In contrast, there is some evidence that deposit dollarization increases the net
interest margin charged by firms (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.3). As a higher
net interest margin is a signal of lower financial sector efficiency, these results sug-
gest that deposit dollarization may also have a negative influence on banking sector
efficiency. As Honohan and Shi (2001) point out, this result may be related to the
contraction in the supply of credit when banks shift their assets abroad (as there
are strong economies of scale in banking). The higher spreads could also be related
to higher concentration and monopoly power in the banking system in dollarized
economies, as supported by the significance of the positive coefficient on the bank
concentration variable (3 Bank Conc.). However, these results should be interpreted
with care, as they rely on the model where dollarization is considered endogenous
(thus including multiple instruments) and vary somewhat across alternative spec-
ifications. The negative impact on efficiency is statistically significant in the more
parsimonious models (see Table 5.5 in Appendix 5B), but the magnitude of the coef-
ficients varies depending on the model specification. When we reduce the number of
instruments, the deposit dollarization coefficient is no longer significant (see Table 5.7
in Appendix 5B). In addition, few control variables are statistically significant, sug-
gesting that the model may not be good at explaining drivers of financial efficiency.21
5.5.3 Robustness
Finally, we conduct a number of robustness checks to ensure that our conclusions still
hold even if we reduce the number of instruments, use more parsimonious models,
use alternative estimators, and if we exclude countries with low levels of dollariza-
tion.22 These results are presented in Appendix 5B. First, we confirm that our results
20When the same models are re-estimated using difference GMM (shown in Table 5.8 in Appendix
5B), we find that both deposit and credit dollarization have a statistically significant negative impact
on financial access. However, as the difference GMM estimator tends to perform poorly when the
dependent variable is highly persistent, we give more weight to the system GMM results.
21When we look at the impact of the spread between the deposit and lending rate instead of the Net
Interest Margin we find similarly inconclusive results.
22To confirm that we have properly controlled for the reasons why economies become dollarized in
the first place, we have also created a proxy for dollarization which is by construction exogenous to the
known or observed determinants of dollarization. We do this by estimating dollarization using a very
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Accounts Net Interest Margin
DepDol 0.367 4.539∗∗
(0.261) (2.299)
CredDol -0.037 -0.869
(0.192) (1.654)
Accounts−1 0.758∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.071)
NetIntMarg−1 0.387∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.081)
GDP growth 0.588 0.727 0.714 3.392∗
(0.461) (0.453) (2.179) (1.842)
In f lation 0.790∗∗ 0.812∗∗ 1.799 1.651
(0.389) (0.402) (1.537) (1.504)
NEER -0.122 -0.143 -0.558 -1.418
(0.153) (0.160) (0.832) (1.016)
Institutions 0.158∗∗ 0.074 -0.517 -0.255
(0.075) (0.074) (0.602) (0.762)
3 Bank Conc. -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗ 0.029∗ 0.031∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign Banks -0.327 -0.440∗ -0.150 3.241
(0.258) (0.260) (1.630) (2.028)
KaOpen -0.041 0.024 -1.101 1.501∗∗
(0.075) (0.073) (0.924) (0.756)
MVP -0.239∗ -0.242∗ 0.062 0.012
(0.122) (0.125) (0.078) (0.110)
REER Cycl. 0.003 -0.001 -0.310∗∗ -0.074
(0.029) (0.031) (0.140) (0.176)
Banking Crisis 0.164∗∗ 0.176∗ -0.388 -0.416
(0.080) (0.098) (0.403) (0.459)
GDP pc 0.091∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.034
(0.043) (0.042) (0.655) (0.332)
Population -0.048 -0.110∗ -0.055 0.898
(0.066) (0.065) (0.480) (0.557)
Age Dep. ratio -0.161 0.003 0.089 2.261
(0.354) (0.298) (5.138) (2.675)
Transition Econ 0.101 0.203 -2.681 1.516
(0.214) (0.174) (2.625) (1.847)
Obs 487 481 1 131 876
Countries 58 57 75 72
Max T 10 10 18 13
Avg T 8 8 15 12
Instruments 225 204 237 216
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.017 0.014 0.000 0.003
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.743 0.803 0.518 0.434
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest Margin. System
GMM estimations where dollarization and its determinants are endogenous. Robust SE in
parentheses, and symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively. Models include time dummies and a constant.
Table 5.3: Dollarization and Financial Access and Efficiency
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are not driven by instrument proliferation. One drawback with the system (and
difference) GMM is that the number of instruments grows rapidly in the time di-
mension, especially in the models where we allow dollarization and its determinants
to be endogenous. The number of instruments is reduced if 1) we restrict dollar-
ization and its determinants to be predetermined instead of endogenous (Appendix
5B, Table 5.6) allow only the lagged dependent variable, GDP growth, inflation and
dollarization to be endogenous and restrict the dollarization determinants to be ex-
ogenous or predetermined.
As can be seen from Appendix 5B, Table 5.7, reducing the instrument count does
not change our main conclusions, and instead we find that when we restrict the dol-
larization determinants and inflation to be predetermined rather than endogenous,
the impact of deposit dollarization on financial depth is larger and more negative.
Second, we confirm that our results hold even if we exclude the insignificant
control variables from the models (Appendix 5B, Table 5.5). Third, we also find that
the difference GMM estimations (Appendix 5B, Table 5.8) yield results similar to the
preferred system GMM. The results from fixed effects (FE) estimations also support
our general conclusions.23
Finally, we confirm that we reach the same conclusions when we exclude coun-
tries that have very low levels of dollarization, possibly owing to foreign exchange
regulations (Appendix 5B, Table 5.9). In practice, we exclude all countries with either
deposit or credit dollarization below 1 % on average over the sample period, which
leaves us with a sample of 63 countries.
5.6 Conclusion
Despite significant strides in financial development, financial dollarization remains
common in developing economies. Consistent with past studies, our results using a
large sample of emerging and developing economies show that financial dollarization
can dampen financial development, and as a result, slow down economic develop-
ment. In particular, our panel regression estimates show that deposit dollarization
has a negative impact on financial deepening. We argue that this negative impact
may reflect the fact that a share of foreign currency deposits are transferred overseas
rather than returned to the domestic economy as private credit. We also find that
the negative impact of dollarization on financial development is dampened some-
rich set of dollarization determinants, and the resulting residuals can be seen as a proxy for the part of
dollarization which is not related to the underlying reasons for dollarizing. The same conclusions as
in the main analysis are reached when we use this by construction exogenous dollarization measure.
These results are not reported but available upon request.
23We have also estimated the model with dollarization and financial depth in first differences, and
these results also indicate that a reduction in deposit dollarization has a positive effect on financial
depth in the following year. These results are however not reported for the sake of space.
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what in countries with past experiences of high inflation. Therefore, while the results
from the full sample suggest potentially large gains from de-dollarization on average,
policy recommendations drawn from the results need to carefully consider country-
specific circumstances. The results suggest that there may be country cases where
dollarization helps mitigate the negative impact of high inflation and macroeconomic
instability on financial development. Our estimates also provide some evidence of a
negative relationship between dollarization and financial efficiency. It is possible that
deposit dollarization contributes to shallower domestic credit markets and therefore
limits opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale. We do not find evidence
that dollarization has a statistically significant effect on financial inclusion in our data.
Our results are driven by deposit dollarization and we do not find consistent
evidence that credit dollarization as such has an impact on financial development.
Consistent with our results for deposit dollarization, however, we find that an ag-
gregate level measure of mismatch (i.e. the difference between deposit and credit
dollarization) is associated with lower levels of financial development. This is in line
with evidence on currency mismatch as a source of financial sector instability. Fur-
ther research, perhaps using data at a more granular (sectoral, firm or individual)
level is needed to better understand how currency mismatch impacts financial devel-
opment. We also note that while we have gone through significant effort to obtain
robust empirical results, our system GMM estimation is only a partial solution to con-
cerns about identification. Further research is therefore needed to explore strategies
that could help better establish causality from dollarization to financial development.
An alternative empirical approach would be to examine significant de-dollarization
events for evidence of their impact on financial development.
Overall, our results suggest that, in addition to concerns related to lower mone-
tary policy effectiveness, limits to flexibility of fiscal policy and heightened financial
stability risks, there are additional costs from dollarization related to lower financial
depth and banking sector efficiency. The results therefore justify policy efforts to in-
crease the use of the domestic currency in financial transactions. This is particularly
the case for countries with a high degree of financial dollarization, where the gains
from de-dollarization in terms of the development of local financial markets could be
substantial. Studies of de-dollarization strategies suggest that dollarization is often
a persistent phenomena and that de-dollarization therefore requires sustained policy
efforts on multiple fronts. Kokenyne et al. (2010), García-Escribano and Sosa (2011)
and Catão and Terrones (2016) argue that credible macroeconomic stabilization poli-
cies to lower inflation and stabilize the exchange rate have been a key component
of successful de-dollarization strategies in Europe and Latin America. Strengthening
economic institutions, and particularly monetary policy frameworks that enhance the
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credibility of monetary policy in the face of external shocks, is a first step. Additional
efforts are also needed to lower the incentives for financial institutions and economic
agents to transact in foreign currencies. Prudential policies that have been success-
fully pursued include raising provisions for foreign currency loans, tighter capital
requirements against open foreign exchange positions, differentiated reserve require-
ments and remuneration on foreign currency deposits, among others. Finally, the
development of local currency financial markets can provide alternate vehicles for
longer term investment and savings.
5.7 Appendix
Appendix 5A: Data
The dataset contains annual data for a sample of 77 emerging market and developing
countries over the period 1996–2015. The sample is limited by data availability, and
the countries included in the sample have dollarization levels ranging between 0 and
98 percent (for both credit and deposit dollarization). As we are interested in the
impact of partial dollarization on financial development, fully dollarized countries
are excluded from the study along with countries with currencies whose currencies
are pegged to the USD (i.e. show close to zero exchange rate volatility) over the
sample period. The data panel is unbalanced, as not all of the series are available at
the starting date for all the countries. The Eastern European transition economies are
included in the sample from 1997 onwards.
Dollarization
Deposit dollarization (DepDol) is defined as total foreign currency deposits in broad
money over total broad money deposits. Credit dollarization (CredDol) is defined
as foreign currency loans over total loans. The dollarization data is collected from
a number of sources. Deposit and credit dollarization data from 2001 onward is
obtained from the IMF’s Standardized Report Form (SRF) for 70 of the countries in
our sample. Deposit dollarization data for the time prior to 2001 is supplemented by
data from Levy Yeyati’s (2009) dollarization database.24 As not all countries report
their foreign currency deposits and loans via the SRF, the missing dollarization data
for these countries were supplemented by data from IMF staff reports and Levy Yeyati
(2006). The deposit dollarization data is thus available from 1996 onward for some of
the countries, whereas the credit dollarization data starts only in 2001.
24For the countries where the Levy-Yeyati and IMF deposit dollarization data for the overlapping
period of 2001-2009 is different, we used the backward growth rates of the dollarization ratios to ex-
trapolate the SRF deposit dollarization data series.
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Financial development
The financial development data are retrieved from the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD) compiled by Cˇihák et al. (2012). Financial depth (PrivCred) is
defined as Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
to GDP (percent). This data is collected from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS). Financial access (Accounts) is proxied by the number of bank accounts with
commercial banks per 1,000 adults, originally published in the IMF’s Financial Access
Survey (FAS). Financial efficiency (NetIntMarg), represented by bank net interest
margin (percent), is defined as the accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue
as a share of its average interest-bearing (total earning) assets (originally sourced
from Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk (BvD)). Another measure of efficiency is the bank
lending-deposit spread, defined as the difference between lending rate and deposit
rate, originally published in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2017).
Data for GDP per capita in 2010 USD (GDP pc), Population (Population), Pop-
ulation density (PopDens) proxied by millions of people per square kilometer, Age
dependency ratio (percent) (AgeDepRatio) and dummies for Eastern European tran-
sition country (Transition), fuel exporter, offshore financial center status are collected
from the FinStats database by Feyen and Sourrouille (2017). Control and additional
variables The control variables are collected from a number of sources. The change in
the Consumer Price index (CPI) from IFS is used as a measure of inflation (In f lation).
Nominal and real effective exchange rates based on CPI (NEER and REER) are col-
lected from the World Economic Outlook (WEO, 2017) database.
The dollar share of the minimum-variance portfolio (MVP) is defined as:
MVP=[Var(pi)+Cov(pi, s)]/[Var(pi)+Var(s)+2Cov(pi, s)], where pi denotes inflation and
s is the change in the real exchange rate. The inflation and real effective exchange rate
variances and the covariance are the respective values from the past five years. (This
expression could also be simplified to MVP =Var(pi )/Cov(pi, e), where e denotes the
nominal rate of devaluation.)
The Three Bank Concentration ratio (3 Bank Conc) from GFDD is defined as the
assets of the three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking
assets in the country. The share of foreign banks among total banks (Foreign Banks)
is defined by Claessens and van Horen (2015) as the share of the number of foreign
owned banks to the number of the total banks in a country. A bank is defined as
foreign if 50 percent or more of its shares are owned by foreigners. The banking cri-
sis variable (Banking Crisis), constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2013), is a dummy
variable taking on value one if the country is in a systemic banking crisis, and zero
otherwise. Chinn and Ito’s 2006 measure of capital account openness (KaOpen) is
used as a de jure measure of financial openness. Remittance inflows to GDP, re-
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ported in the GFDD, measures current transfers by migrant workers as well as wages
and salaries earned by nonresident workers, as a fraction of GDP. Trade openness
(Imports) is proxied by the ratio of imports to GDP (and we also use exports to GDP
for robustness), with the data taken from WDI. The interest rate difference, (i Di f f ),
is the three month nominal deposit interest rate difference between the domestic
economy and the US, collected from IFS. External debt per GNI (External Debt) is
collected from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics and Quarterly External
Debt Statistics.25
There are several different measures of institutional quality available that measure
somewhat different institutional dimensions. In this study we use the composite
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from Kaufmann et al. (2010) as our measure
of institutional quality. The composite WGI indicator is the simple average of the six
different measures of institutional quality; Voice and Accountability, Political Stability
and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption.
Bank Foreign Assets consists of foreign portfolio investment and other foreign
assets by deposit-taking corporations, except the central bank, as reported in the
IMF’s Balance of Payment statistics, International Investment Position. Bank Total
Assets is from the GFDD and is defined as total assets held by deposit money banks.
Country coverage
The countries included in the sample are Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyr-
gyz Republic, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and
Zambia.
25The external debt data for Kuwait, Namibia and Trinidad & Tobago are collected from IMF staff
reports, and the external debt to GNI data for Trinidad & Tobago includes only external government
debt.
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Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs
Deposit Dollarization 0.291 0.245 0 0.984 1427
Credit Dollarization 0.252 0.24 0 0.982 1070
Private Credit to GDP 34.82 28.09 1.61 165.7 1427
Net Interest Margin 5.755 2.931 0.17 25.49 1406
Accounts per 1000 adults 942.4 915.7 2.39 5342 605
GDP p.c. (USD) 4739.1 6266.4 160.3 49015.9 1427
Inflation 0.134 1.146 -0.09 41.45 1425
Foreign Banks (%) 38.84 25.66 0 100 1357
3 Bank concentration ratio 0.626 0.189 0.146 1 1398
NEER 405.7 8200 33.2 304944 1427
KaOpen 0.476 0.33 0 1 1426
WGI -0.324 0.567 -1.67 1.25 1427
REER Cyclicality 0.104 0.544 -0.99 1 1383
External Debt/GNI 0.502 0.335 0.03 2.26 1394
MVP 0.045 0.934 -2.69 9.59 1338
Population (mil.) 51.0 157.7 0.47 1371.2 1427
Age Dependency Ratio 4.101 0.288 3.47 4.73 1427
Transition Economy dummy 0.222 0.416 0 1 1427
Banking Crisis Dummy 0.056 0.229 0 1 1423
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics
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Appendix 5B. Additional results
Private Credit / GDP Accounts Net Interest Margin
DepDol -0.451∗∗ -0.444 5.496∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.433) (1.330)
CredDol 0.194 -0.804∗∗ 0.632
(0.122) (0.400) (1.420)
PrivCredit−1 0.896∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042)
Accounts−1 0.545∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.080)
NetIntMarg−1 0.401∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.096)
GDP growth 0.076 0.191 0.558 0.419
(0.209) (0.211) (0.518) (0.511)
External Debt -0.047 -0.134∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.037)
In f lation -0.249∗∗∗ -0.194 0.284 -0.022 0.187 2.477
(0.044) (0.230) (0.329) (0.401) (0.331) (1.843)
MVP -0.057 -0.050
(0.054) (0.067)
NEER -0.166 -0.752
(0.812) (1.375)
Foreign Banks -0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.016)
Institutions 0.013 0.065∗ 0.146 0.210
(0.056) (0.039) (0.112) (0.138)
KaOpen -0.831 0.375
(0.510) (0.481)
Banking Crisis -0.101∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ 0.200 0.481 -0.677∗∗ -0.336
(0.032) (0.042) (0.259) (0.296) (0.288) (0.423)
GDP pc 0.257∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.099) (0.155) (0.154)
Transition 0.401∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.248 -0.100
(0.129) (0.079) (0.348) (0.453)
Obs 1 298 974 556 550 1 298 896
Countries 77 74 61 60 75 72
Max T 19 14 11 11 21 13
Avg T 17 13 9 9 17 12
Instruments 146 125 150 129 146 125
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.001 0.046 0.077 0.000 0.001
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.708 0.647 0.489 0.789 0.489 0.789
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Private Credit/GDP), ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest
Margin. System GMM estimations where dollarization and its determinants are endogenous. Robust SE
in parentheses, symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively.
Models include time dummies and a constant.
Table 5.5: Dollarization and Financial Development using more parsimonious models
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Private Credit / GDP Accounts Net Interest Margin
DepDol -0.502∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ 0.030 0.065
(0.172) (0.160) (0.328) (1.939)
CredDol -0.065 -0.156∗ 0.017 -0.017
(0.155) (0.093) (0.149) (1.247)
DepDol − CredDol -0.249∗∗∗
(0.096)
DepDol ∗ DHighIn f l 0.342
(0.346)
DepDol ∗MaxIn f l 0.076
(0.059)
CredDol ∗ DHighIn f l -0.465
(0.505)
CredDol ∗MaxIn f l -0.055
(0.067)
PrivCredit−1 0.830∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.055) (0.058) (0.051) (0.047)
Accounts−1 0.577∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.084)
NetIntMarg−1 0.358∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.108) (0.104)
DHighIn f l -0.060 0.334
(0.213) (0.304)
MaxIn f l -0.013 0.050
(0.035) (0.043)
GDP growth -0.105 -0.103 0.094 0.078 -0.006 0.338 0.293 2.578 2.112
(0.270) (0.267) (0.251) (0.240) (0.246) (0.579) (0.580) (2.527) (2.791)
External Debt -0.179∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.133∗ -0.115 -0.150∗∗∗ -0.195 -0.168 -0.472 -0.629
(0.062) (0.064) (0.077) (0.071) (0.053) (0.179) (0.214) (0.758) (0.923)
In f lation -0.119 -0.117 -0.437∗∗ -0.402∗∗ -0.342 0.265 0.147 -1.315 1.937
(0.204) (0.207) (0.189) (0.193) (0.262) (0.312) (0.318) (1.676) (2.288)
MVP -0.003 -0.005 0.021 0.017 0.011 -0.186∗∗ -0.151∗∗ 0.079 -0.045
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.081) (0.073) (0.103) (0.134)
REER Cycl. 0.026∗ 0.027∗ 0.020 0.016 0.024∗∗ -0.003 -0.010 0.078 -0.071
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.030) (0.163) (0.179)
NEER 0.074 0.081 0.139∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.117∗ 0.049 0.053 1.137 -1.939∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.069) (0.067) (0.063) (0.123) (0.137) (0.894) (0.751)
Foreign Banks -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.021)
Institutions 0.074 0.063 0.078 0.083 0.092 0.178 0.279∗∗ -0.341 0.616
(0.067) (0.066) (0.058) (0.053) (0.056) (0.123) (0.142) (0.666) (1.033)
3 Bank Conc. -0.354∗∗ -0.352∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.260∗ -0.426 -0.065 -0.726 1.837
(0.160) (0.156) (0.194) (0.155) (0.138) (0.406) (0.329) (2.772) (2.872)
KaOpen 0.044 0.038 -0.086 -0.097 -0.069 0.097 0.180 0.412 1.382
(0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.049) (0.118) (0.157) (1.016) (0.893)
Banking Crisis -0.027 -0.030 -0.056 -0.076 -0.087∗ 0.218 0.189 -0.321 -0.748
(0.037) (0.038) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.146) (0.152) (0.404) (0.571)
GDP pc -0.074 -0.079 -0.025 -0.026 -0.020 0.133∗∗ 0.162∗∗ -0.190 0.233
(0.077) (0.073) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.066) (0.078) (0.887) (0.656)
Obs 1 214 1 214 961 961 960 536 530 1 190 936
Countries 77 77 74 74 74 58 57 75 72
Max T 19 19 14 14 14 11 11 19 14
Avg T 16 16 13 13 13 9 9 16 13
Instruments 119 119 119 119 118 94 94 107 107
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.047 0.050 0.000 0.004
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.722 0.717 0.306 0.325 0.350 0.686 0.587 0.545 0.354
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.997 0.999 0.986 0.994 0.934 0.940
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Private Credit/GDP), ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest Margin. System
GMM with dollarization and its determinants predetermined. Robust SE in (), ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10 % levels. Models include time dummies, a transition economy dummy, population, age dependency
ratios and a constant.
Table 5.6: Financial development with dollarization and its determinants predeter-
mined
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Private Credit / GDP Accounts Net Interest Margin
DepDol -0.604∗∗ -0.818 6.336
(0.258) (0.818) (9.368)
CredDol -0.150 -0.686 1.520
(0.204) (0.500) (2.895)
PrivCredit−1 0.729∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.082)
Accounts−1 0.627∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.113)
NetIntMarg−1 0.288∗ 0.173
(0.147) (0.131)
GDP growth -0.217 -0.134 -0.068 0.041 -0.498 1.530
(0.401) (0.314) (0.585) (0.572) (1.954) (1.667)
External Debt -0.237∗∗ -0.121 -0.047 -0.040 -0.498 1.530
(0.098) (0.081) (0.244) (0.247) (1.954) (1.667)
In f lation 0.020 -0.226 0.823∗ 0.611 -2.040 -0.289
(0.129) (0.145) (0.450) (0.381) (3.557) (3.682)
MVP 0.011 0.007 -0.322∗∗∗ -0.235∗ 0.219∗ 0.139
(0.014) (0.014) (0.122) (0.126) (0.124) (0.276)
REER Cycl. 0.020 0.037 -0.034 -0.032 0.675∗ -0.123
(0.037) (0.028) (0.034) (0.041) (0.371) (0.327)
NEER -0.028 0.119 -0.593∗ -0.568∗ -0.198 -1.441
(0.110) (0.098) (0.320) (0.293) (2.877) (2.151)
Foreign Banks 0.004 0.009∗∗ -0.002 0.001 -0.035 -0.063∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.046) (0.031)
Institutions 0.371 0.015 0.319 0.282 -2.726 -1.214
(0.283) (0.162) (0.380) (0.335) (2.254) (2.155)
3 Bank Conc. -0.841∗∗∗ -0.493∗ -0.528 -0.578 4.123 2.367
(0.256) (0.266) (0.427) (0.503) (4.493) (2.948)
KaOpen 0.091 -0.005 0.081 0.441 -4.544 -0.287
(0.231) (0.157) (0.247) (0.291) (3.808) (2.768)
Banking Crisis -0.072 -0.210∗∗ 0.349 0.400 -0.568 -0.454
(0.092) (0.103) (0.225) (0.262) (1.588) (0.922)
GDP pc -0.347 -0.117 -0.014 -0.023 7.373∗∗ 1.381
(0.230) (0.138) (0.228) (0.265) (3.756) (2.209)
Population -0.148 0.090 -0.358∗ -0.228 -4.164 -1.761
(0.137) (0.148) (0.198) (0.139) (3.378) (2.511)
Age Dep. Ratio -0.406 -0.669∗ -0.396 -0.192 8.377 5.599
(1.103) (0.377) (0.824) (0.863) (28.730) (8.447)
Transition 0.106 -0.109 -0.338 0.101 -11.681 -0.546
(0.367) (0.257) (0.654) (0.569) (18.285) (7.203)
Obs 1 239 966 536 530 1 194 940
Countries 77 74 58 57 75 72
Max T 19 14 11 11 19 14
Avg T 16 13 9 9 16 13
Instruments 107 107 111 111 97 97
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.001 0.035 0.049 0.000 0.003
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.359 0.209 0.477 0.769 0.477 0.769
Hansen p-val 0.991 0.972 1.000 1.000 0.988 0.652
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Private Credit/GDP), ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest
Margin. System GMM estimations where the lagged dependent variable, GDP growth, inflation and
dollarization are assumed endogenous. Robust SE in parentheses, and symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. Models include time dummies and a constant.
Table 5.7: Dollarization & Financial Development relationship estimated with fewer
instruments
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Private credit / GDP Accounts Net Interest Margin
FE Diff GMM FE Diff GMM FE Diff GMM
DepDol -0.155∗∗ -0.441∗∗ -0.430∗ -0.614∗ 0.630 3.479∗
(0.070) (0.203) (0.234) (0.356) (0.818) (2.027)
PrivCred−1 0.817∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.056)
Accounts−1 0.694∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.094)
NetIntMarg−1 0.397∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.075)
GDP growth 0.190 -0.132 0.391 0.690 1.099 3.214
(0.192) (0.313) (0.333) (0.578) (1.331) (3.789)
In f lation -0.222∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.224∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.466
(0.069) (0.130) (0.036) (0.104) (0.254) (0.379)
MVP 0.004 0.002 -0.135∗ -0.133∗ 0.016 0.119
(0.006) (0.007) (0.081) (0.071) (0.063) (0.094)
REER Cycl. 0.013 0.018∗ 0.006 -0.029 -0.037 -0.201
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.028) (0.101) (0.151)
NEER 0.058∗ 0.196∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.015 -0.335 -0.547
(0.031) (0.057) (0.073) (0.134) (0.355) (0.746)
Foreign Banks 0.000 0.003∗ -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.021)
Institutions 0.088∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.132 0.166 -0.594 -1.171
(0.040) (0.065) (0.113) (0.199) (0.387) (0.827)
3 Bank Conc. -0.102 -0.101 -0.066 0.060 0.792 3.007∗
(0.063) (0.088) (0.125) (0.153) (0.626) (1.539)
KaOpen 0.034 0.074 -0.013 0.047 -0.298 0.316
(0.042) (0.062) (0.093) (0.096) (0.440) (0.683)
External Debt -0.049∗∗ 0.005 -0.081 -0.122 0.089 -0.552
(0.025) (0.082) (0.064) (0.096) (0.309) (0.766)
Banking Crisis -0.077∗∗∗ -0.072∗ 0.061∗ 0.224∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.466
(0.026) (0.037) (0.036) (0.104) (0.254) (0.379)
GDP pc 0.042 -0.083 0.083 0.456 0.657 2.879
(0.056) (0.194) (0.177) (0.281) (0.638) (2.118)
Population 0.052 0.336 0.632 1.382∗ 0.782 -1.483
(0.115) (0.342) (0.395) (0.787) (1.028) (3.389)
Age Dep. Ratio -0.125 -0.378 0.041 0.799 0.490 -0.747
(0.128) (0.573) (0.303) (0.751) (1.165) (5.778)
Obs 1,216 1,163 538 429 1,192 1,058
Countries 77 77 58 58 75 75
Max T 19 18 11 9 19 17
Avg T 16 15 9 7 16 14
R¯2 0.89 0.87 0.27
Instruments 198 215 217
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.033 0.000
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.475 0.538 0.575
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Private Credit/GDP), ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest
Margin. Fixed effects (FE) and Difference GMM (Diff GMM) estimations where dollarization and its
determinants are endogenous.
Table 5.8: Deposit dollarization and Financial Depth, Access and Efficiency with FE
and Difference GMM estimators
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Private Credit / GDP Accounts Net Interest Margin
DepDol -0.368∗∗ 0.223 5.285∗∗
(0.185) (0.305) (2.634)
CredDol 0.113 -0.106 -1.132
(0.128) (0.220) (1.896)
PrivCredit−1 0.828∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.040)
Accounts−1 0.761∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.075)
NetIntMarg−1 0.327∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.095)
GDP growth 0.059 0.021 0.772∗ 0.801∗ -0.033 2.043
(0.330) (0.220) (0.466) (0.465) (2.363) (2.463)
External Debt -0.033 -0.023 -0.227∗ -0.187 -0.671 -1.280
(0.063) (0.071) (0.116) (0.129) (0.813) (0.829)
In f lation -0.192 -0.327∗∗ 0.947∗ 1.011∗ 1.548 1.594
(0.196) (0.156) (0.484) (0.546) (1.595) (1.436)
MVP 0.002 0.006 -0.264∗∗ -0.262∗∗ 0.041 -0.003
(0.006) (0.010) (0.132) (0.130) (0.086) (0.113)
REER Cycl. 0.022 0.010 -0.010 -0.027 -0.244 -0.078
(0.013) (0.012) (0.031) (0.031) (0.163) (0.170)
NEER 0.076 0.177∗∗∗ -0.135 -0.116 -0.260 -1.770∗
(0.055) (0.058) (0.160) (0.151) (0.848) (0.986)
Foreign Banks -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.033∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017) (0.022)
Institutions 0.065 0.106∗∗ 0.136 0.079 -0.175 -0.561
(0.058) (0.053) (0.103) (0.096) (0.630) (0.857)
3 Bank Conc. -0.241∗ -0.090 -0.578∗ -0.637∗∗ 0.751 3.370
(0.140) (0.170) (0.312) (0.314) (1.475) (2.055)
KaOpen 0.014 -0.063 -0.079 -0.056 -1.080 1.438∗
(0.085) (0.066) (0.081) (0.080) (0.945) (0.766)
Banking Crisis -0.047 -0.096∗∗ 0.191∗ 0.210 -0.313 -0.127
(0.037) (0.038) (0.116) (0.137) (0.459) (0.465)
GDP pc -0.042 -0.018 0.057 0.070 -0.205 -0.344
(0.052) (0.027) (0.045) (0.044) (0.531) (0.334)
Population -0.089 -0.027 -0.129 -0.181∗∗ 0.062 0.875
(0.057) (0.053) (0.079) (0.082) (0.584) (0.700)
Age Dep. Ratio -0.062 0.033 -0.352 -0.302 -0.535 0.203
(0.430) (0.250) (0.335) (0.281) (4.534) (2.356)
Transition 0.286 0.213 -0.092 -0.099 -2.488 0.594
(0.205) (0.145) (0.204) (0.195) (2.446) (1.698)
Obs 1 022 777 405 399 945 713
Countries 63 60 49 48 62 59
Max T 19 14 10 10 18 13
Avg T 16 13 8 8 15 12
Instruments 200 179 218 197 255 234
AB-AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.012 0.027 0.027 0.000 0.006
AB-AR(2) p-val 0.813 0.575 0.785 0.813 0.632 0.592
Hansen p-val 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: Dependent variables: ln(Private Credit/GDP), ln(Accounts per 1000 adults) and Net Interest
Margin. System GMM estimations where dollarization and its determinants are endogenous. Robust
SE in parentheses, and symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively. Models include time dummies and a constant.
Table 5.9: The relationship between dollarization and financial development in coun-
tries with deposit and credit dollarization above 1 %

6 Conclusion
This thesis consists of four empirical articles that look at the relationship between
the financial market and the real economy. I study how different imbalances, either
global or domestic, and financial integration, affect macrofinancial outcomes such
as exchange rate sensitivity, consumption, international consumption risk sharing or
financial sector development.
In Chapter 2 I show that the composition of net foreign assets matter for the ex-
change rate sensitivity to changes in financial market risk tolerance using a panel
of 28 currencies over the period 1/1997-6/2016. I find that debt financing increases
the exchange rate sensitivity to financial turbulence, whereas equity financing re-
duces it - currencies of countries with large negative net external portfolio debt are
much more vulnerable to changes in financial market uncertainty than currencies
with the equivalent net external equity. Ownership matters too, private net foreign
debt heightens the exchange rate sensitivity much more than public. I also show that
the relationship between banking sector risk intolerance, net external asset positions
and exchange rates has moreover become stronger since the credit crisis.
Chapter 3 looks at the long run relationship between consumption and wealth.
We show that financial integration, by relaxing liquidity constraints of consumers,
has permanently increased the consumption-to-wealth ratio in the US over the sam-
ple period Q4/1951-Q4/2016. We do this using an unobserved component model,
where the regression of consumption on assets and earnings is augmented with a
non-stationary unobserved component. By explicitly estimating - and hence control-
ling for – such a component in the regression, valid long-run elasticity estimates of
consumption to wealth can be obtained irrespective of whether consumption, assets
and earnings are cointegrated. The results suggest that there is a non-stationary latent
component present in the consumption equation, and we interpret this component
as stemming from financial liberalization.
Chapter 4 looks empirically at international consumption risk sharing and its
determinants in a panel of 120 countries from 1970 to 2014. Complete financial mar-
kets allow countries to share their consumption risks internationally, thereby creat-
ing welfare gains through lower volatility of aggregate consumption. International
consumption risk sharing in especially emerging markets and developing countries
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is however far from complete, where the estimates of the degree of international
risk sharing range around 30 %. Contrary to some previous studies, I show that fi-
nancial liberalization and financial integration has a significantly positive impact on
international consumption risk sharing in poorer developing countries, whereas in
emerging market countries only capital account openness has an impact. Moreover,
there is some evidence that high income inequality or a high share of low income
individuals reduces consumption smoothing in less developed countries. Lack of
financial reforms, a lower degree of financial integration and higher inequality can
thus partly explain why the degree of risk sharing is lower in developing countries
than in advanced economies.
Finally, Chapter 5 looks at the impact of dollarization on financial development.
While developing economies have made significant strides in financial development
over the past decades, financial dollarization, as reflected in elevated shares of for-
eign currency deposits and credit in the banking system, remains common. Chapter
5 therefore studies the impact of financial dollarization, differentiating across foreign
currency deposits and credit on financial depth, access and efficiency for a sample
of 77 emerging market and developing countries over the past two decades. Panel
regressions estimated using system GMM show that dollarization, and deposit dol-
larization in particular, has a negative impact on financial deepening. There is also
some evidence that dollarization hampers improvements in financial inclusion. The
results suggest that beyond standard concerns related to heightened financial stability
risks, policy efforts to reduce dollarization can spur faster, safer and more inclusive
financial development.
The main conclusion is that international and domestic imbalances, such as the
reliance on foreign debt financing and foreign currency savings, can have adverse
effects on both exchange rate vulnerability and the financial market depth and effi-
ciency. Financial integration has both domestic and global effects. I find that it affects
both the domestic consumption-to-wealth ratio and international consumption risk
sharing in both advanced economies and poorer developing countries, but much less
so in emerging markets. This finding could be explained by the observation that
emerging market countries have experienced a lot of procyclical portfolio debt in-
flows, which are the ones that in Chapter 2 are found to also increase the exchange
rate vulnerability. Another take away of this thesis, which is more empirical in nature,
is the importance of controlling for potential unobserved factors. As is highlighted
in Chapters 3 and 4, ignoring this can lead to significantly different inferences.
Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de relatie tussen verschillende soorten mondiale en
binnenlandse onevenwichtigheden en financiële integratie, en bestaat uit vier em-
pirische hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt onderzocht hoe de samenstelling van de
netto buitenlandse vermogenspositie van invloed is op wisselkoersgevoeligheid voor
wereldwijde onzekerheid op de financiële markten. De empirische resultaten laten
zien dat schuldfinanciering de kwetsbaarheid van wisselkoersen voor financiële tur-
bulentie verhoogt, terwijl aandelenfinanciering dit vermindert. Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt
een niet-geobserveerde componentbenadering om de langetermijnrelatie tussen con-
sumptie en (woning)vermogen in de VS te bestuderen. De resultaten suggereren dat
er een niet-stationaire latente component aanwezig is in de consumptievergelijking
en dat het negeren ervan zorgt voor een overschatting van het effect van zowel fi-
nanciële als woningvermogen op consumptie. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert welke factoren
die de internationale risicodeling van consumptie beïnvloeden. Financiële liberaliser-
ing en financiële integratie hebben een aanzienlijk positief effect op de internationale
risicodeling in consumptie in armere ontwikkelingslanden. De resultaten suggereren
ook dat een hoog aandeel van personen met een laag inkomen de spreiding van
consumptie in zowel geavanceerde als minder ontwikkelde economieën vermindert.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op de relatie tussen dollarisatie en financiële ontwikkeling en laat
zien dollarisatie van depoisto’s, en ook de mismatch tussen dollarisatie van depos-
ito’s en kredieten, een negatief effect heeft op financiële ontwikkeling en financiële
efficiëntie in minder ontwikkelde landen.
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